文化与认知科学 and cognitive science (Daniel Kelly and Andreas De Block)

首次发布于 2020 年 12 月 2 日

民主社会通常以宗教、文化、种族和世界观的广泛多元化为特征，基于这些多元化，公民向其国家提出要求。民主国家另外的特征是致力于平等对待所有公民，因此它们需要公正和公平的方式来处理和回应这些要求。本条目特别考虑文化要求。

文化要求在政治和法律领域中无处不在。个人和团体不仅向国家提出文化要求，通常是为了获得法律或政治上的安排，而且国家经常以保护其文化的特定方面来解释其选择。本条目首先将审视政治和道德哲学家如何定义“文化”：文化作为包容性群体、文化作为社会形成、文化作为叙事/对话、文化作为身份。在讨论过程中，将引入“本质主义”挑战：文化的本质主义解释是将文化的某些关键特征视为其定义，并相应地所有成员必须共享某些关键特征才能被视为成员（有关更多信息，请参阅 Phillips 2010）。特别是，本条目继续指出，早期对文化作为包容性群体的概念批评为本质主义，而后来的概念是试图以避免本质主义挑战的方式重新制定文化。

在阐述了理解文化的主要方式之后，本条目转向评估少数群体向国家提出的不同（尽管偶尔重叠）类型的文化主张：豁免主张、援助主张、自决主张、认可主张、保护主张（以及反对强迫文化丧失的主张）、法律环境中的防御性主张，以及专属使用主张（反对文化挪用的主张）。对于这些主张既有理由，也有反对意见，它们往往取决于对“文化”是如何理解的。在许多情况下，关于这些主张是否合理的争论取决于对文化是什么的竞争性理解，特别是对于那些是成员的人来说它有多有价值，如下所示。最后，本条目将对多数社区提出文化主张以证明行动合理性的案例进行评估，主要是在控制移民和有时拒绝潜在移民入境的背景下，以及对被允许入境的人提出的文化要求，以及在这些案例中提出的各种理由和反对意见。本节考虑了多数文化的内容，新来者被要求遵守这些内容，以及他们被“要求”这样做的程度。

1. 定义文化

定义“文化”这个术语非常具有挑战性：它被描述为一个“臭名昭著的过于宽泛的概念”（宋 2009 年：177）和一个“臭名昭著的模糊概念”（艾森伯格 2009 年：7）。它以多种方式被运用：正如本条目将在更长篇章中考虑的那样，“文化”这个术语可以指代表征少数群体和多数群体的规范、实践和价值观，例如指出纽约的 Hasidic 犹太社区实践独特的“文化”，或描述意大利或塞内加尔的文化。但它也以其他方式被使用，例如，用来指代“兄弟”文化或“嬉皮士”文化，或者英国足球迷的文化。此外，任何一个人都可以是多种文化的成员——某人（比如本文作者！）可以同时是加拿大文化、渥太华文化、犹太文化和学术文化的成员。情境考量将解释为什么定义这些文化的规范、实践和价值在特定时刻变得相关。此外，只有一些文化具有政治和法律相关性；只有这些文化是本条目的重点。

在政治和法律领域，关于文化是什么存在广泛的分歧，接下来的部分将重点阐述这些不同的文化观点。然而，有相当大的共识，无论文化是什么，它对人们很重要，它为个人生活提供的意义和价值是捍卫和保护它在法律和政治空间中的最重要原因，如果不是最重要的原因。这个价值是为什么重要尝试发现文化是什么，以及相应地为什么，以及其中的哪些方面应该或不应该在公共领域受到保护。请注意，文化对人们有价值，确实为个人生活带来价值的观察，并不等同于说个别文化实践都是好的。任何可辩护的文化描述都必须认真对待文化的重要性，而不是捍卫其所有实例。文化已被解释为四种主要方式：作为一个包容性群体，作为社会形成，以对话术语，以及以身份术语。

1.1 作为包容性群体的文化

文化的一种思考方式是将其视为一种包罗万象的整体，塑造了我们生活的所有或大多数方面。或许 Will Kymlicka 对“社会文化”的阐述最能引发对以这种方式理解文化本质的深刻思考。社会文化为其成员提供了有意义的生活方式，涵盖了社会、教育、宗教、娱乐和经济生活的各个方面，包括公共和私人领域。(Kymlicka 1996: 76)

Kymlicka 解释说，一个充满活力的社会文化提供了“选择的背景”，即提供了个体依赖的资源，以理解他们的世界及其提供的选择。根据这一观点，民族国家被描述为具有社会文化，原住民群体和次国家民族少数群体（例如加泰罗尼亚人或藏人）也是如此；而维持一系列文化实践和规范的移民群体，即使他们融入更大的“社会文化”，也不是。

Kymlicka explains that a vibrant societal culture provides a “context for choice”, i.e., it provides the resources that individuals rely on to make sense of their world and the choices it offers. On this account, nation-states are well-described as having a societal culture, as are Indigenous groups and sub-state national minority groups (for example, the Catalans or the Tibetans); immigrant groups which sustain a range of cultural practices and norms even as they integrate into a larger “societal culture” are not.

Kymlicka 并不是唯一一个提供文化全面说明的人。Michael Walzer 也提供了这样一个说明，提议我们将政治社区理解为“性格社区”，其中成员被“共同意义世界”所约束（Walzer 1983: 28）。Avishai Margalit 和 Joseph Raz 也描述了所谓的“全面”团体，其中他们的成员

在其中找到一种在很大程度上塑造他们品味和机会的文化，并为他们的自我认同和轻松安全归属提供了锚点。（Margalit & Raz 1990: 448）

Avishai Margalit 和 Moshe Halbertal 论及一个全面团体，称其文化“涵盖了生活的各个重要方面”，并在这样说时，他们以 Ultra-Orthodox 犹太文化为例：

它定义了人们的活动（比如犹太正统文化中的托拉学习），决定了职业（比如割礼者），并定义了重要的关系（比如婚姻）。它影响着人们的一切行为：烹饪、建筑风格、共同语言、文学和艺术传统、音乐、习俗、服饰、节日、仪式……文化影响着其成员的品味，影响着他们的选择范围和这些选择的意义，以及他们在评价自己和他人时认为重要的特征。（Margalit & Halbertal 1994: 498）

而 Kymlicka 强调了强大社会文化所提供的自由，Margalit 和 Halbertal 谈到了文化在确保成员“个性身份”中的作用（Margalit & Halbertal 1994: 502），Walzer 则强调了文化在塑造“集体意识”中的重要性。尽管这些学者出于许多原因都为强大文化的保护提供了理由，但他们一致认为，文化的根本作用是提供一个背景价值体系，帮助成员在选择之间进行选择并解释其价值，例如在某些形式的就业、教育、家庭结构和子女抚养方面。Walzer 捕捉了文化如何影响人们理解甚至最基本事物的方式：

一个单一的必需品，总是必需的——比如食物，在不同的地方具有不同的含义。面包是生命之杖，基督的身体，安息日的象征，款待的手段，等等。（Walzer 1983: 8）

这些文化描述使我们对文化有了更多的了解，特别是为什么贫乏的社会文化可能无法提供 Kymlicka 强调的选择背景，或者为什么一个人的“个性认同”可能会受到威胁：如果一个文化群体的教育、政治或经济体系变弱，他们支持成员理解世界、在各种选择中做出决策的能力也会变弱。此外，这一描述还说明了削弱他人文化的错误之处：如果一种文化受到削弱，其成员可选择的选项也会减少。我们可以看到这一点在许多国家的土著文化中：在一些国家积极试图抹去土著文化的情况下，结果导致土著人民遭受严重的社会错位和疏离，他们做出选择的背景也大大减弱。

然而，对这种理解文化方式提出了多重异议，其中大部分是对所谓“本质主义”异议的变体；请注意，上述观点的持有者并不认为自己是本质主义者。本质主义异议针对的是它所认为的一个假设，即文化成员将认为同一组实践、规范和价值重要，并且程度相同。但是，批评者说，这一假设并不成立：在任何实际文化中，成员对其定义性实践和规范的承诺程度会有所不同，实际上，关于哪些实践和规范是首要的问题，必然会存在分歧。本质主义异议大致表示，将文化视为包罗万象会错误地做以下几件事情：1）它宣称文化的某些特征是其核心，因此不可改变，否则文化将解体（Eisenberg 2009: 120），并相应地，文化必然是有界和确定的，而不是有争议和流动的（Moore 2019；Patten 2014: 38）；2）在确定了这些特征为文化核心后，排斥那些认为自己是成员但不符合、展示或尊重这些特征的人（Parvin 2008: 318–19）；3）它忽视了自由社会中大多数人“从多重角色、社区和成员身上获得身份”的现实，这些身份在不同情境下可能具有社会重要性，独立于文化身份，有时也与文化身份一起具有社会重要性（Moore 2019）。总之，对文化成员的文化是什么的过于包罗万象的描述会冒着将文化边界视为确定、不变动，并且似乎其成员对整体文化及其定义性实践没有差异（也许不能有差异）的风险。

下面考虑的文化替代方案至少在一定程度上旨在应对本质主义挑战；换句话说，它们的目标是生成一个关于文化是什么，以及成为特定文化群体成员意味着什么的合理解释，可以用来理解法律和政治争议，并在理想情况下对其进行裁决，而不会屈服于本质主义挑战。一个警告：下面讨论的文化观应被理解为“理想类型”，以便理解其关键特征，它与其他观点的区别，以及为什么它在自身评估中不会受到本质主义挑战的影响。

1.2 文化作为社会形成

有一种重新构想文化的尝试，以回应本质主义挑战，但仍然保留了文化作为广泛包容的观点，提出文化是由其成员对社会形成的共同经历所定义的（Patten 2014: 39）。根据这种“社会血统”文化观，一个文化之所以存在，是因为其成员受到“一组与强加给其他人的形成条件不同的形成条件”的影响（Patten 2014: 51）。被共同机构支配的经历，广义上包括共享的教育空间、语言、媒体，以及共享的历史传统和故事，重叠的家庭结构等，塑造了文化群体成员之间的一种共同看待世界的感觉，以及他们拥有的某些假设是被其他人共享或至少被理解的。这种观点强调了文化的历史轨迹，但并不要求其定义的规范、价值观和实践随时间不变。（Patten 2014: 52）

内部变化是可能的，因为受到共同形成影响并不意味着人们最终会拥有一致的信仰或价值观。（Patten 2014: 52）

因此，文化是成员可以争论和深思其意义的场所，他们对世界运作方式有足够的共享假设，以便彼此认可为从事同一项目的人。

Patten 提到文化群体成员所受制约的机构至少在某种程度上“与那些致力于社会化外部人士的机构和实践隔离”（Patten 2014: 52），因此有助于区分一种文化与另一种文化。根据这一观点，重点放在谁控制着塑造成员形成的机构的杠杆上：也就是说，重要的是成员控制着自己所受制约的机构，以便他们可以合理地塑造自己的社会经验，以及年轻成员的经验，在根本上发生变化。当这种社会形成的控制被否定时，文化的成员因此受到伤害；当它被强制否定时，很可能存在一种需要补救的不公正。

通过关注共同文化机构的共同经历，这种观点避免了文化定义为其基本规范和价值观随时间稳定性的指责：在这种观点下，文化不是一个静态实体。相反，重要的是文化群体成员相信自己是文化群体的成员，而这种信念的基础在于共同文化机构的经验，而不在于对该群体至关重要的具体实践。这些核心实践可以发生根本性变化，而文化群体本身并不会解体。然而，这种观点受到担心控制形成杠杆的人并不代表所有成员观点的学者的批评（Phillips 2018），相反，他们利用自己相对权力地位来创造和强制执行不具备（或者没有）广泛共识的文化规范和实践。

1.3 文化作为对话

后一种反对意见认为，所谓的文化是部分而非全部成员的产物，这导致一些学者重新阐释文化，即通过成员之间的对话以及他们相互之间的互动来构建文化。强调文化成员是其主要实践、价值观和规范的来源的目的在于强调文化并非从上方“赋予”其成员，作为一个固定且不可改变的实体。相反，文化的成员在根本上是其创作者。詹姆斯·塔利在这里解释说：文化是

不断受到争议，被想象和重新想象，被转变和协商，既由其成员进行，也通过他们与他人的互动。（塔利 1995 年：11）

塞拉·本哈比布同样强调文化的叙事方面，指出内部人员通过共享的、尽管有争议和可争辩的叙事账目来体验他们的传统、故事、仪式和符号、工具以及物质生活条件。 （本哈比布 2002 年：5）

成员之间存在争议，并且其主要元素在不断协商之下，这并不会使文化对其成员变得不那么有意义。可能令人困惑的是，一个可争辩且不断变化的文化需要受到保护；也许保护意味着通过在某个时刻保护其中的元素来人为地阻止文化将要经历的自然变化。但这种观点的支持者要求以确保文化被协商、共享和传播的论坛以强大和包容的方式持续存在，且不受外部力量的干扰为形式的保护。与文化作为形成的描述一样，重点在于群体成员塑造中心规范和实践的能力，而不在于规范和实践本身。

成员之间存在争议，其主要元素在不断协商之中，并不会因此使文化对其成员变得无关紧要。令人困惑的是，一个存在争议且不断变化的文化需要得到保护的概念；也许保护意味着人为地阻止文化在某一时刻所经历的自然变化，通过在某个时间点保护其元素。但是，这一观点的支持者要求以确保文化得到保护的形式，保证文化被协商、共享和传播的论坛以健壮且包容的方式持续存在，并且不受文化外部力量的干扰。与将文化视为形成过程的论述一样，重点在于团体成员塑造核心规范和实践的能力，而不在于规范和实践本身。

这种观点如何回应对文化群体内部不对称权力分配的担忧？专注于文化的核心特征是如何通过成员之间的协商确定的，这是对塑造在这些协商过程中听取哪些声音的权力结构的关注，无论是在少数文化还是多数文化中（Dhamoon 2006）。在许多文化中，历史上占主导地位的声音通常是男性的，其中一个影响通常是对如何最好地组织文化生活的性别化观点，这通常以多种方式减少了妇女（和其他少数群体）的权利，往往是对她们的不利以及违背她们的意愿。对于一些人来说，弱势成员受到掌握权力杠杆的人的压迫至少引发了对在自由、民主国家保护或容纳文化价值的价值产生部分怀疑，特别是在可能看起来“多元文化对妇女有害”（Okin 1999）的情况下。根据这种观点，在自由民主国家不应该容忍削弱妇女（和其他少数群体）权利的文化实践。

许多文化实践对妇女（和其他少数群体）不利的认识并没有促使所有政治理论家在所有情况下都采取怀疑的态度。对于一些人来说，这是一个机会，他们可以看到文化即使被被认为是受压迫的人也可以被重视，即使他们从内部努力影响自己文化的方向，朝着更少压迫的规范和实践发展。例如，尽管经常被排除在权力中心之外，许多妇女以一种鼓励她们不是退出，而是参与改革不平等实践和规范的过程的方式重视自己的文化（Deveaux 2007）。这种关于文化及其内容的思考方式庆祝并鼓励“民主化”文化群体主要规范、价值观和实践的机制，并捍卫真正对多种声音开放的公共文化（Lenard 2012）。

因此，这种关于文化的叙事或对话式的描述对本质挑战做出了很好的回应，否认了文化的定义特征必须是静态且对文化群体的所有成员同样有价值。但是，它必须回应另一个挑战，即个体化挑战（Moore 2019）。如果一个关于文化的描述要足够强大，以定义应该有资格在各种方式上获得额外政治和法律考虑的实体，包括关于额外权利保护或免除某些法律和政治要求的规定，它还必须能够以某种具体性确定特定文化的边界，以及谁可以合法地被视为为了尊重由此产生的政治和法律主张而计入成员。但这可能是一个难以实现的挑战。

要了解原因，考虑本哈比卜对文化从外部观察和从内部体验的方式的描述。她说，观察者在很大程度上负责对文化施加“统一性和连贯性”，而从内部来看，参与者通过共享的、尽管有争议和可争辩的叙述来体验他们的传统、故事、仪式和符号、工具以及物质生活条件。（本哈比卜 2002 年：5）

以这种方式理解文化的一个效果是，虽然许多成员会深深坚守中心价值观，并对参与中心文化传统感到满足，但许多其他人会时不时地参与其中心实践，并在中心价值观和规范中进行选择。因此，谁算是成员是模糊不清的，当成员资格被认为赋予了非成员无法获得的权利和特权时，这种模糊性可能会被视为一个问题。在政治上需要区分文化的需求与文化边界之间存在不可避免的紧张关系，这些边界不可避免地界定不清。只有上下文才能让我们解决由此产生的政治问题。

以这种方式理解文化的一个影响是，虽然许多成员会深深地坚持核心价值观，并对参与核心文化传统感到满足，但许多其他人会时不时地参与其中的核心实践，并在其中的核心价值观和规范中挑选和选择。因此，究竟谁算是成员变得模糊不清，而当成员身份被认为赋予了非成员所无法获得的权利和特权时，这种模糊可能会被视为一个问题。在政治上对文化进行个体化的需求与文化边界之间存在着不可避免的张力，而这些边界又不可避免地划分得很不清晰。只有通过上下文，我们才能解决由此产生的政治问题。

1.4 文化作为身份（或身份而非文化）

为了回答如何确定文化及其成员的挑战，一个提议集中在与属于文化群体相关的主观组成部分。以玛格丽特·摩尔描述的这个例子为例：尽管北爱尔兰天主教徒和新教徒之间存在深刻分歧，但这些差异既不是宗教的（冲突并非关于对宗教文本的独特解释，宗教人物也不是暴力的目标），也不是文化的，因为对两个社区的文化价值观进行调查显示，竞争社区所持有的价值观之间存在相当大的重叠（摩尔 1999 年：35）。她说，相反，关注对立群体之间的共同身份更能解释冲突。一个主要或部分关注身份的观点强调文化的一个关键维度是它如何塑造文化群体成员的身份。此外，这种观点强调文化是许多人将会有重要联系的事物，但对他们来说将以多种和不同的方式定义。关注身份的观点具有明显的优点：例如，它可以解释为什么个人在历史上文化的中心定义特征发生变化时仍然名义上与文化相关联，即使他们不参与其中的一些更传统的方面。

此外，一个关注身份的观点可以容纳那些显然不是基于文化的身份，例如，包括 LGBTQ+ 身份（艾森伯格 2009 年：20；关于 LGBTQ+ 背景中文化/身份主张的讨论，请参见戈什 2018 年：第 4 章）。事实上，一个关注身份的观点旨在避免确定哪些具体材料是合法的文化材料的困难。正如上文所述，少数文化的学者经常指出，许多群体提出了各种各样的主张，这些群体由一系列不同的特征定义，包括种族、族裔、宗教和性取向。他们说，与其关注文化，不如关注身份可能更可取，因为

身份这个术语在某种意义上涵盖了更多的领域，它可以指代宗教、语言、性别、土著和自我理解的其他维度。(Eisenberg 2009: 2)

2. 少数文化权利主张

上述文化的四种观点构成了个人和团体针对国家提出的文化主张。个人和团体面临的具体威胁以及需要一种保护的情况各不相同，国家对个人和团体提出的主张可能会有不同的回应(Eisenberg 2009: 20–21)。在某些情况下，主张是为了为整个群体提供适应; 在其他情况下，主张是针对特定个人的; 这两者之间可能存在联系。例如，一个群体可能要求语言保护政策，或者一个个人可能要求在法律程序中使用母语。这些权利彼此相关，并且在某些情况下可能是相互衍生的：个人在法律程序中有权使用母语的一个原因可能是因为国家已经承认她的语言是国家的官方语言，或者是某个次级司法管辖区的官方语言。在接下来的讨论中，重要的是要注意何时提出了适用于个人的适应要求，何时提出了适用于团体的适应要求; 尽管一些哲学家热衷于评估文化权利是最好理解为个人权利还是团体权利(Casals 2006)，但下面的分析是基于它们可以同时是两者(参照 Levy 2000: 125)。

值得注意的是，“住宿”这个术语是一个包罗万象的术语，用来包括个人或团体根据文化对国家提出的各种索赔。政治哲学家们已经尝试以多种方式区分这些索赔，以便理解它们。许多这样的权利是由移民群体（通常）向一个国家提出的，他们需要国家做出一定的调整，以更好地融入该国家。在围绕多元文化的价值展开的更大讨论中，人们就哪些调整方式鼓励尤其是文化上有明显区别的新移民融入，哪些方式允许甚至鼓励他们与更大社会分离（例如，Sniderman＆Hagendoorn 2007）进行了广泛讨论。一些学者也担心，专注于如何最好地容纳文化少数群体会忽视（或许是故意的）对那些处境较差者进行再分配的更重要问题（Barry 2001；Fraser 1995）。然而，总的来说，多元文化理论家们一致认为，当支持少数群体的整合，特别是新移民的整合时，以及当旨在纠正多数群体和少数群体之间持续不平等时，住宿权利是最具防御性的。

值得注意的是，并非每个人都立即同意“文化”应被视为独特的法律和政治索赔的来源。例如，Sarah Song 指出，所谓的“多元文化”索赔实际上经常是为了容纳各种群体，包括种族、宗教和民族群体。许多文化权利的政治理论家似乎相信存在着独特和可识别的文化群体，提出独特的文化要求，然而在他们的例证中，他们依赖于“涉及宗教、语言、种族、国籍和种族的广泛例子”（Song 2009：177）。很少有“文化”单独成为对国家的索赔基础。Song 说，所谓的文化索赔实际上经常是对其他被广泛理解和可辩护的民主商品的要求。大多数这类要求是对宗教调整的要求，这些要求得到了标准自由意识辩护的支持；其他要求是对过去和持续不断的错误的赔偿，以积极行动的形式；还有其他要求是对民主包容的要求，通常根植于一个道德上有问题的历史，即蓄意排斥。一旦这些“文化”要求的原因被清楚地揭示出来，我们通常会发现有民主辩护理由来尊重和容纳它们，而无需诉诸于将文化视为一个独特实体，从而产生一套独特的权利要求。结果是，与正确定义文化和识别其成员相关的争议在许多情况下可以避免。然而，这种分析可能会使处理某些情况变得困难，其中所谓的“文化”与宗教、种族和种族索赔相互作用或补充。

就拿瑞士全民公投禁止清真寺尖塔为例。这项禁令的可辩护性一直是政治哲学家们讨论的话题，其中一个争议焦点是清真寺尖塔在伊斯兰教中是否是宗教要求。许多解释者提出，由于根据伊斯兰教的宗教要求，尖塔并非义务性的，因此禁止它们的选择是令人遗憾的（因为它反映了瑞士对伊斯兰教在公共场所的地位），但这并不侵犯瑞士的穆斯林的宗教自由，因此是允许的（Miller 2016）。然而，在提出这一主张时，忽视了尖塔的文化意义。如果不承认文化在某些主张中的独特地位，就无法完全理解尖塔案件。同样的挑战也出现在是否应允许穆斯林妇女在公共场所戴面纱的讨论中。一些评论者认为，因为（根据某些解释）伊斯兰教经文似乎并不要求戴面纱，所以可以拒绝妇女从事这种做法的权利，而不会侵犯她们的宗教自由。辩护者指出，戴面纱的选择实际上是对伊斯兰教要求的（纯粹）文化解释，因为只有一些穆斯林社区才会实行这种做法。对于一些学者来说，有必要区分宗教主张和文化主张——自由民主国家非常重视宗教主张作为良心问题，并且一直热切保护宗教自由的历史悠久。因此，一旦确定某项主张不是宗教自由的主张，这些学者相信他们可以舒适地拒绝在公共场所戴面纱的请求。然而，忽视主张的文化维度，或者将其视为明显不如基础宗教主张重要，都无法正确对待这个案例。特别是，它未能认真对待宗教义务必然有文化解释，全面承认宗教自由意味着承认它们的文化解释，因此将需要特别的文化法律和政治安排（以满足宗教承诺）。

在接下来的内容中，将审查针对国家主要机构提出的不同类型的文化主张。这些主张有时是由个人提出的，有时是由团体提出的。在相关情况下，分析将强调所使用的文化概念是文化作为包容性群体、文化作为社会形成、文化作为叙事或文化作为身份。分析不总是一帆风顺的。在某些情况下，将会有多种对文化权利的辩护，这些辩护依赖于对文化的不同理解。

2.1 豁免权

也许对国家提出的最熟悉的文化主张类型是请求豁免规则和法规，这些规则和法规通常适用于所有公民。豁免权是对事实的回应，在自由民主国家中，法律和实践的目的是真正地平等对待所有公民，但有些法律无意中对某些少数群体造成不利影响。需要解决的担忧是，少数公民在某些法律的正常适用中无意或意外地受到负担（Levy 2000: 130），这种方式对待他们是不公平的，可以通过豁免某些法律和正常实践（Quong 2006; Gutmann 2003）来解决。因此，豁免权的扩展被理解为对差异的承认，试图在法律的合法目标之路上不过分负担少数文化或宗教。（Levy 2000: 130）

例如，一些锡克教徒请求豁免要求佩戴摩托车或建筑工地头盔的法律。尽管锡克教是一种宗教，但锡克教徒描述他们必须戴头巾的要求并不完全是宗教要求，而是作为他们信仰和承诺锡克教价值观的象征，以及他们身份的表达（锡克教信仰常见问题解答在其他互联网资源中）。如果不豁免这些法律，锡克教徒将被排除在应该平等提供给所有公民的机会之外。原住民社区也是如此，他们请求豁免普遍适用的限制狩猎和捕鱼的法律，解释说这些限制破坏了他们的传统生活方式，或者使他们难以（或不可能）维持生计（Levy 2000: 128）。在加拿大和美国废除星期日闭店法之前，宗教少数群体偶尔会获得豁免。在这些情况下，如上所述，如果没有法律规定的豁免，人们（通常是少数群体）必须选择参与应该平等提供给所有公民的机会，或者尊重他们对宗教要求的（文化）理解。

例如，一些锡克教徒请求豁免要求他们戴摩托车头盔或建筑工地安全帽的法律。尽管锡克教是一种宗教，但锡克教徒描述戴头巾的要求并不完全是宗教要求，而是作为他们对锡克教价值观的信仰和承诺的象征，以及对他们身份的表达（见 其他互联网资源 的《锡克教信仰常见问题解答》）。如果不豁免这些法律，锡克教徒将被排除在本应平等对待所有公民的机会之外。同样的情况也适用于原住民社区，他们请求豁免普遍适用的限制狩猎和捕鱼的法律，解释称这些限制破坏了他们的传统生活方式，或者使他们难以（或不可能）维持自己的生计（Levy 2000: 128）。在加拿大和美国废除星期天闭店法之前，宗教少数派偶尔获得了对其豁免的特权。在这些情况下，如上所述，在没有法律提供的豁免的情况下，人们（通常是少数群体）必须在参与应该平等对待所有公民的机会之间_或者_尊重他们（文化上的）对他们宗教要求的理解之间做出选择。

豁免请求可以轻松地与规则修改请求区分开来。正如所指出的，豁免请求是指个人被豁免适用于所有公民的某些要求的请求；修改请求则要求对现有的多数惯例进行更改，以适应某些其他少数惯例。锡克教徒有时会请求豁免法律，否则他们将被要求摘下头巾；在其他情况下，他们请求统一修改，以便头巾被视为执行特定角色的人员可选头部覆盖物之一。穆斯林妇女和犹太男子也会提出统一修改请求，要求他们戴面纱或头巾，而传统上制服要求露出头部或面部，或者要求特定的头部覆盖物（如锡克教徒的情况，它们也可能被提出为豁免请求）。同样，当虔诚的穆斯林请求在工作日中短暂休息，以便在一天中的特定时间祈祷，或者当犹太和穆斯林学生要求在学校餐厅提供食物时进行更改（以适应犹太教和伊斯兰教的饮食规定），请求的是修改而不是豁免。

在大多数情况下，合法法律早期未能修改或豁免新惯例是无意的。也就是说，现行的法律或惯例并非是有意排斥的，而是在假定它们公平对待现有人口的前提下采纳的。但是，广泛的移民使许多人口在实质上多样化。移民通常携带着在抵达时对加入的州陌生的惯例和规范，因此州被要求修改某些法律，并豁免新来者免除其他某些法律。可能存在一些情况，存在合法的公共理由坚持适用某些法律，尽管这些法律对新来者造成了不利。此外，也有一些情况，州坚持要求服从明显对试图融入的新来者不利的法律和惯例，但没有好的缓解因素来证明坚持施加不利是有道理的（例如，当丹麦的兰德斯镇通过一项法律要求在学校餐厅“与其他食物平等地供应猪肉”时）。在这些后一种情况中，法律的排斥性影响不再是无意的，通常会因持续对政治、经济和社会空间的不必要和不合理的排斥而受到谴责。

并非总是个人或团体声称文化权利豁免和修改的移民，但这种情况经常发生。土著社区要求豁免，某些正统宗教社区也是如此。这些情况将在专注于文化保护的部分中讨论。

2.2 援助权利

要求援助呼吁国家保持各种文化元素可以持续甚至繁荣的条件，特别是少数民族语言，或以各种方式促进和保护文化协会，包括向这些文化群体内的艺术家提供财政支持，或提供资源以允许生产和分发民族语言媒体。援助权利的理由与豁免和修改请求的理由相同：它是为了防止对所有公民平等享有的权利或商品的访问中持续存在的不公平。在援助权利的情况下，文化少数群体认为多数群体已经可以访问这些商品，例如强大的语言或媒体空间，因此他们请求国家资源来确保这些商品也能供文化少数群体使用。在这里，尽管理由与为豁免和修改权利辩护提供的理由重叠—以产生公平—但支持这些权利要求的文化理解是不同的。通常，豁免和修改要求将文化视为身份或对话，而在援助要求的情况下，文化的背景理解往往是文化作为社会形成或文化作为包容性群体；文化被视为一个整体，需要援助来保护其各个核心部分，以便很好地塑造成员。

2.3 自决权利

自决权是指赋予次国家司法管辖区对特定领土拥有实质控制权的权利，特别是在该领土上运行主要机构的权利。一个自决社区是指，由于对领土上主要机构的控制，能够在多个政策领域内做出并执行决策，而不受外部干预（I. M. Young 2004）。自决权的理由有时基于赔偿或纠正正义，例如过去国家行为削弱了特定文化群体首先自决的能力（Song 2009: 184）。在其他情况下，对自决的要求是基于保护文化上独特的次国家司法管辖区的自治重要性，即其以符合特定文化偏好的方式运行自己事务的能力。自决权通常依赖于对文化作为包容性群体或文化作为社会形成的理解，这表明如果没有对统治公民生活的主要机构有重大控制权，相关群体将无法自决。

自决权通常归属于国家，因此在次国家层面运作的少数群体的情况下，其含义并不总是清晰的。在次国家司法管辖区中，自决权经常被土著群体以及次国家民族群体，如巴斯克人和苏格兰人所要求，他们的“社会文化”明显不同于多数社会文化。对自决的要求是对如何教育儿童、相关政治当局使用何种语言以及公共空间应如何组织做出选择的要求。所要求的权利至少有三种表现形式：1）至少有权“在更大社会中维持全面的生活方式而不受干扰”；2）被多数人承认其生活方式的权利；3）得到多数人积极支持以支持相关生活方式的权利，使“文化得以繁荣”（Margalit & Halbertal 1994: 498）。这三种解释对国家提出了不同的要求，从简单的不干涉到积极参与维持自决条件。因此，更大的国家有时被要求评估其愿意将资源用于支持特定自决请求的程度，重点是相关的文化保护要求是否合理。这些将在下文中讨论。

2.4 认可权

在法律和政治文件中要求正式承认往往伴随着对自决权的要求，并基于希望让多数人承诺全面和平等尊重文化少数群体的愿望（Mcbride 2009）。在加拿大的情况下，魁北克人长期以来一直在争取被承认为一个“独特社会”的民族。尽管多次尝试承认魁北克在加拿大宪法中的地位都以失败告终，但在 2006 年，一项提议“本院承认魁北克人在一个团结的加拿大内构成一个民族”的动议被下议院通过（尽管引起了相当大的争议）。在这种情况下，对承认的要求是对作为加拿大国家平等、国家、创始合作伙伴的尊重的要求。

在土著社区的情况下，自决权的权利通常不仅包括对特定司法管辖权的行使要求，还包括对承认的要求。例如，他们寻求承认为特定国家的原住民，或者作为自己的国家，或者作为殖民者的各种罪行的受害者，包括违反早期条约的行为，以及要求国家支持维持和，在许多情况下，重建被殖民/定居政府积极摧毁的社区。例如，在加拿大和其他殖民国家，已经成为常态在活动之前（包括作为“公告”的一部分在学校开学第一天宣读）阅读土著土地未割让的承认声明。同样，在澳大利亚，土著社区长期以来一直在争取在澳大利亚宪法中获得官方承认。从澳大利亚土著社区的角度来看，希望，实际上也是期望，是官方承认将带来额外的权利和利益，例如对少数人的更大发声权和政治参与的期望。在某些承认要求案例中存在额外权利和利益的希望，但并非所有案例都是如此（例如，在魁北克的情况中基本上不存在）。

承认以其他形式出现，超越了在法律和政治文件中承认的意图，旨在确认对少数群体的尊重。在一些国家，少数群体的语言可以被正式承认为国家语言。例如，瑞士的罗曼什语被正式承认为国家语言，尽管说罗曼什语的人口不到该国总人口的 1%。相比之下，土耳其法律禁止在公共场所说库尔德语的尝试是为了否认对一个民族少数群体的承认（最终在 1991 年解除）。与在具有约束力的宪法文件中要求官方承认类似，这些承认形式展示了对少数社区的尊重以及对将他们视为更大国家的全面和平等成员的承诺。

2.5 文化保护权

文化保护权是指群体声称对维持其作为一个文化群体的关键的权利。有时将这种权利描述为对“特定文化人民的生存”的权利（Gutmann 2003: 75）。在某些情况下，理由是基于这样的主张：与更广泛社区的接触和参与将导致其成员所重视的文化的侵蚀。在其他情况下，理由是历史性的，比如正统宗教团体逃离欧洲的宗教迫害，同意在加拿大和美国定居以换取宗教自由。在其他情况下，中心理由是文化多样性是有价值且值得保护的，本身就是（Parekh 2000）。（在某些情况下，文化保护权被视为对过去错误的补偿；这一主张将单独考虑。）对文化保护的要求在被非自由主义团体提出时最具争议，稍后将详细介绍。

值得在这里停留片刻注意到，有两种解释文化保护的方式：它可以意味着将一个群体保留为一个独特的文化实体，也可以意味着保留在某一时刻被认为对文化至关重要的某些实践和价值观。文化保护的权利以多种形式出现，包括豁免要求、家长自治权、尊重内部冲突解决机制（主要是在家庭法中）、以及对成员资格的控制。这些权利是为了保护文化而被证明是合理的，并且通常依赖于对文化作为包容性群体或文化作为社会形成的理解，正如它们通常随行的更一般的自决权一样。

许多少数民族的不自由团体只要求对他们所居住的国家保持克制的权利（Spinner-Halev 2000）。作为回应，一个国家可能允许一个不自由的文化团体“独立自主”，认为只要它能在没有任何国家支持的情况下持续存在，它就可以这样做。然而，一个国家可能被要求做更多的事情来保护文化。

例如，一个国家可能被要求豁免社区成员遵守通常要求所有公民遵守的某些要求，包括义务教育和儿童劳动法。考虑这个例子：许多正统的阿米什社区过着与更广泛社区分隔开的生活。他们过着一个由宗教结构化的生活方式，规定成员与谁结婚，如何抚养孩子，如何创造一个允许他们的生活方式继续的经济。在大多数情况下，他们既不要求承认也不要求额外的财政支持来保护他们社区的生活方式。他们以前主要只要求不干涉。但是，在 20 世纪 70 年代，一些美国阿米什社区要求，并获得了，将他们的孩子从 14 岁就义务教育中退出的权利，他们认为如果他们的孩子被要求一直待在学校直到 16 岁，他们更有可能离开社区。他们认为，这种高退出率将导致阿米什的生活方式难以持续下去（Burtt 1994）。阿米什声称的豁免权，在这种情况下，是对更大的文化自我保护需求的衍生；他们说，如果没有这种豁免，文化本身可能会消失。

一个国家也可能被要求尊重某些法律权威领域，也许最常见的是家庭法领域。少数民族社区经常规范婚姻条件、子女监护权以及离婚，并要求法律授权这样做。尊重少数民族社区在家庭法领域行使司法权的法律权威是一种经常令文化少数权利批评者感到困扰的请求，因为这可能会巩固妇女的劣势，例如在离婚协议或监护协议中（Shachar 2001；Bakht 2007）。总的来说，承认少数民族社区在家庭法领域的法律权威的国家也要求参与这些裁决程序的人自愿这样做；因此，多数国家通常保留干预这些程序的许可，以支持那些可能得不到充分保护的人。国家必须在这里尝试一种平衡，既要支持少数群体中最脆弱的成员（例如确保他们的宪法权利得到保护），又要干预一种不注意少数群体合理要求的干预，部分通过在关键领域行使其权威。

另一种常见的文化保护权形式是排斥权，即文化团体拒绝允许他人进入领土或成员资格的权利，因为担心更宽松的准入条件可能会通过稀释效果来破坏它。正如国家有控制其边界的假定权利（在第 3 节下讨论），以及谁可以声称在准入后仍享有成员权利一样，一些次国家司法管辖区声称拥有这种排斥的双重权利，援引文化保护的重要性。土著社区有时声称有权排除非土著个人在其领土上定居或排除其他人（例如土著人的非土著配偶）享有某些成员福利的权利，包括投票权（或以其他方式发表意见）以决定谁将治理。国家法院被要求裁决土著社区对于做出这些决定的合法权威（参见宋 2005）。

上述文化保护权提出了一个困难的挑战，与将文化视为一个包罗万象的群体的批评有关：一些批评者表示，任何对文化保护的要求实际上转化为对成员控制的问题性主张，而且通常对文化团体的女性和 LGBTQ+ 成员最为限制。这种挑战最为强烈地提出在文化保护权被所谓的非自由主义团体（如阿米什人）要求的情况下，以及在他们（在批评者看来）被强加给儿童的情况下。非自由主义团体是那些否认某些关键自由主义价值观的团体，如自治和平等；在许多情况下，这些社区得到鼓励不自主选择的教育系统的支持，通过避免教授通常使之能够实现的技能和能力，并通过实施提升某些成员的等级规则，以一种让平等主义者感到不舒服的方式。担忧是社区不仅想要保持自己作为一个独特的文化团体，而且还想要保护一种文化同质性，不留任何关于其核心价值观和实践的争议或异议的空间。这些后者的等级规则经常使女性容易受到更强大男性的伤害，他们可能要求各种形式的性服从，将她们贬低为照顾孩子的家庭主妇，并对她们实施严格的行为准则，对违反者进行严厉的处罚。对于一些批评者来说，这些所谓的“文化实践”使得任何形式的国家支持保护少数文化团体在很大程度上难以辩护（Okin 1999）。

对这些许多文化保护权利的反对中存在的一个担忧是，女性可能不愿意成为这些文化的参与者，因此尊重文化保护权利会使女性过上她们不选择、不想要且无法摆脱的生活。但对许多人来说，假设女性成员只是在受到压力的情况下才是这样是一个错误，因为许多人会深深珍视社区本身，并尊重它试图保护的规范和价值观，即使他们拒绝其中的某些部分。在这些情况下，以及政治理论家们考虑到它们时，有一种试图从将文化视为包容性术语转向将其视为对话和叙事术语的尝试。文化，即使是压迫性的（对自由主义者来说）少数文化，也是会发生变化的，也许最好的变革源头是那些深深承诺于关键价值观但拒绝其他价值观的成员，包括那些不尊重女性平等权利的价值观。莫尼克·德沃的描述了南非习俗婚姻中的成年女性参与者，她们接受文化的某些元素，但却力图在谈判桌上争取改变其他元素，这种描述将文化视为对话术语（Deveaux 2007）。在这里，关键的激励思想是文化可以随着时间的推移而发生变化，响应于其成员如何参与其中，重要的不是变化本身，而是其源头是谁或是什么。从这个观点来看，文化保护权利的目标不是保护文化本身，这在任何情况下都是不可能的挑战，而是保护群体成员塑造其文化和保护其免受不受欢迎的变革源头的能力的权利。

其他人认为，只要女性和其他受到严格文化要求的人拥有退出社区的权利（或能力），他们选择留下应该被视为这样做（Kukathas 1992）。对于持有这种观点的人来说，努力使退出权利得以真正行使是非常重要的（Kukathas 2012；Holzleithner 2012）。在这样做的过程中，一个国家必须在提供资源给那些可能希望退出但没有能力在更大社会中立足的成员之间做出选择。在一些正统宗教社区中，财产是共同拥有的，个体成员没有任何个人财产或资源；结果，退出者在建立新生活时没有任何依靠。在其他社区中，成员受教育程度低，对自己社区之外的生活不熟悉，因此退出时没有能力在更大社会中维持自己。因此，接收国可以通过各种方式支持退出者，例如为退出的女性（和男性）提供庇护所，提供教育，以便他们最终能够作为主流社会的一员实现自给自足。支持退出者的选择可能会削弱文化自我保存的能力。但支持退出者并不被理解为否认文化保护权利；相反，这样做的选择源于国家保护所有成员权利的承诺，包括最脆弱的成员，尽其所能地保护他们的权利。

2.6 对抗文化丧失的权利

上述文化保护权利应与略有不同的反对被迫文化丧失的权利区分开来，后者侧重于在潜在丧失是由外部力量的强迫行为导致的情况下的保护，而这些外部力量是一个文化群体相对无力对抗的。当然，文化变迁在某种形式上是不可避免的，正如上文所强调的，特别是如果一个人持有文化作为对话的观点，文化实际上从来都不是静态的。相反，一个文化在某个时期定义性的实践、规范和价值观可能会因为一系列原因包括经济、环境和政治而不再是该文化的核心定义。因此，实际上一定程度的文化丧失是不可避免的，而且，它并不总是值得遗憾的。有时，这是对文化无法控制的外部因素的正常反应，有时，这是受欢迎的，因为变化导致了更好地保护人权或更具包容性的文化传统和实践。例如，一个文化群体可能选择调整他们的主要生产方式以应对不断变化的环境因素。因此，正如 Samuel Scheffler 所主张的，文化的强烈保守主义观点——即文化应该免受所有形式的变化影响——必须被拒绝（Scheffler 2007）。

然而，尤其是少数文化可能有时有合理的理由认为他们无法保护自己免受不受欢迎的文化变化，或者他们无法控制变化的速度。他们因此可能有权获得形式的国家支持，以帮助他们创造条件，使他们能够抵抗不受欢迎的文化变化。例如，当语言少数群体请求国家支持以继续用少数语言教育儿童时，有时其理由是为了防止语言在面对采用或流利掌握多数语言的压力时被侵蚀。

在其他情况下，多数群体积极致力于削弱少数文化，通常持续数年甚至数十年。例如，殖民地国家曾追求针对土著社区的灭绝政策，旨在削弱他们作为独特民族的生存能力。因此，在评估文化丧失案例时，一个关键因素是转变是否被强加给少数群体，不一定是由于环境或经济条件的变化，而是由有意削弱文化的代理人所导致，通过积极贬低它并因此采取行动以削弱其强劲延续的条件。外部的恶意因素引发的文化变化不仅令人遗憾，而且为赔偿提供了案例，例如对于土著社区，存在“被剥夺、歧视或屈从历史的证据”（Phillips 2018: 97）。

2.7 文化辩护权利

在法律环境中，犯错者有时会使用文化辩护，解释说少数文化规范和价值观与大多数人的相冲突，这在解释他们为何犯错方面具有因果关系。因此，文化辩护有时被视为在确定惩罚时的相关减轻因素。提出文化辩护的权利通常是基于承认少数群体并不总是按照大多数人法律体系中所代表的价值观和规范行事的重要性，并且这些差异在法律领域中应该得到一定程度的考虑。早期法院的裁决接受了这样的解释，例如，那些谋杀不忠伴侣的男性之所以这样做，是因为羞耻和愤怒与文化规范相关联。例如，声称“团伙强奸”（在文化上称为绑架婚姻）是由苗族文化规定的一种获得妻子的方式，其中妇女不仅是默许的，而且实际上是愿意的伙伴的男性，现在不再被认为在控告他们强奸的法律诉讼中有辩护权（Song 2005）。然而，随着各国意识到许多这些辩护实际上是对持续存在于一些少数群体和更广泛社区中的父权主义、厌女主义态度的掩饰，主流法律领域中“文化”解释的力量随着时间的推移而减弱。

犯罪的“文化”辩护往往意味着将文化视为一个同质整体，以及将犯罪者而不是受害者对其解释视为正确。但“尊重文化不能意味着顺从文化的权威认为正确的任何事物”（Gutmann 2003: 46）。此外，在法律领域中对“尊重文化”的一般要求可能忽视了文化期望类型之间的差异，这些差异可以从允许的行为、鼓励的行为到必须的行为，其中只有一部分可能被合理地视为法律上相关（Vitikainen 2015: 162）。此外，它可能允许并鼓励将少数（尤其是非西方）文化描绘成刻板印象，并且“以一种鼓励对来自特定文化群体的人进行荒谬大概化的方式动员文化”（Phillips 2007: 81 & 99）。对文化辩护的盲目接受所代表的危险在于将文化视为如此全面，以至于将其成员视为无法自主决策。但是，文化辩护的批评者说，这是一个错误——除了许多其他因素外，文化可以解释为参与错误行为的原因，但不应“被误认为是全部真相”（Phillips 2007: 98）。

2.8 独家文化使用权（或反对文化挪用的权利）

一些人声称拥有的最终文化权利是控制文化物品或表达形式的权利，或者一般文化内容的使用（Matthes 2016）。这是最近关注文化挪用的争议中涉及的权利，文化挪用被定义为非成员使用“通常是对其他人有文化价值的东西，通常是符号或实践”（Lenard＆Balint 2020）。被指控从事文化挪用的熟悉例子包括白人编织发辫；将土著服装作为万圣节服装；在高级时尚中戴头巾；由没有南亚背景的教练教授瑜伽。在所有这些情况下，非成员被指控“挪用”了不属于他们自己的特定文化实践或符号。从这个观点来看，文化有权独家使用他们认为合适的文化“产品”，通常是因为这种实践被理解为对他们的身份至关重要。这种观点备受争议，常常被那些观察到历史就是文化实践和符号的交融和共享，包括在烹饪、艺术、服饰和精神实践领域的人嘲笑，他们认为这种权利主张依赖于一个随时间不变和不可改变的文化理解，这在历史上是不准确的，而且是不可取的。相应地，关键的文化物品最好被理解为属于“人类”：“体验和珍视艺术的不是民族：而是男人和女人”（Appiah 2009）。

所声称的权利——对定义文化实践或符号的完全或独家使用权——也许不是最好由国家来强制执行，尽管国家可以并且确实会采取注意到文化挪用所造成的伤害的做法。例如，对艺术的集中支持，以资助制作艺术努力的形式，可以对谁请求支持制作什么进行敏感，并可以将资金指向来自特定传统的艺术家，他们旨在制作具有文化特定性的产品，并相应地拒绝（除非提供非常充分的理由）支持文化外部人士制作“内部”艺术（Rowell 1995；J. O. Young 2008）。在特定文化社区是权力失衡的受害者、文化社区明确要求某种实践或符号被多数社区“放手不管”，以及多数社区成员因其使用特定符号或实践而获利的情况下，所声称的权利相对较强（Lenard＆Balint 2020）。与其他情况一样，文化团体声称的权利在少数申请人与多数群体之间存在持续的不平等时最为强大。

3. 多数文化权利主张

第 2 节考虑了通常由少数群体提出的文化权利主张。多数群体也提出文化主张，特别是关于排斥他人进入其领土以及关于对被允许进入的人可以要求什么的问题。

3.1 文化连续性和排斥权利

大多数社区声称拥有文化权利的领域之一是移民领域。对于一些人来说，国家塑造自己文化的权利可以合理地成为排斥其他人的理由，通常甚至是特定的其他人。这种观点经常被归因于迈克尔·沃尔泽（Michael Walzer），他认为国家控制边界的权利与其控制其人民团结一致并致力于共同生活的能力密切相关。 （沃尔泽 1983 年：39，重点添加）

国家控制其文化的权利因此是保护其“集体意识”的重要权利，如第 1 节所述。

The right of a state to control its culture is therefore an essential one to protect its “collective consciousness”, as noted in Section 1.

这一主张遭到许多学者的反对，原因有多个。其中一个原因是，声称一个国家可能因文化原因而排斥潜在移民的说法往往实际上是试图制定旨在排斥那些据说信仰和实践与大多数文化价值观和规范不兼容甚至破坏的移民的歧视性立法的尝试。基于所谓文化原因的排斥往往是一个国家倾向于保持文化、宗教、种族和种族同质性的主张。历史上，一些国家明确参与了这种歧视性做法，这些做法现在已经被否定，包括例如 20 世纪初在北美实施的亚裔排斥法案的变体。

在一些最近的案例中，同样的指控也是有根据的，比如在美国实施所谓的穆斯林禁令，或者在叙利亚危机高峰期（2015 年）一些国家提出优先考虑基督徒而不是穆斯林难民的提议（Song 2018）。在移民政治理论家中，对歧视性移民政策的明确和隐含的否定是普遍存在的，即使是那些捍卫国家有权排斥潜在移民和难民的人，也有很多理由，包括为了保护文化（Miller 2005）。

反对的第二个来源源于对大多数文化的更一般的怀疑，即使这些文化对其成员确实有价值，也不应被视为足以理由排斥移民，尤其是那些急需帮助的人（“急需”一词取自 Song 2018）。即使承认文化对大多数人有价值，许多学者认为，保护文化不能成为排斥那些急需安全或生计的人的理由。

然而，那些支持文化在某些情况下至少可以用来排斥移民的观点的人说，有理由认为应该将国家视为拥有文化连续性的权利（Miller 2005）。这种声称的权利看起来非常像上面描述的文化保护（或反对文化丧失）的权利，它强调的不是大多数人对自己文化的感情维度，而是其实用解释。根据这种观点，任何特定的国家都是由“共享的公共文化”所定义的，因为是共享的，它支撑着民主国家依靠以追求共同政治和社会目标所依赖的信任。构成共享公共文化的任何特定价值并不是本身有价值的。相反，是一组价值观、规范和实践的结合，产生了有价值的“我们”的文化，在其存在的情况下，信任更高；因此，愿意合作支持需要一些牺牲的政策的意愿也更高，包括例如，致力于重新分配社会政策，特别有利于那些最不幸的人（例如，参见 Gustavsson＆Miller 2019 中的论文）。因此，根据那些支持这些观点的人，一个试图以“文化”原因控制入境的国家既不是种族主义也不是歧视，而是寻求受控入境（而不是封闭边界），以便新来者可以在足够的时间内采纳足够多的定义价值观、规范和实践的集合，以便获得并扩展支撑这些客观有价值物品的政策的信任。

3.2 文化连续性和整合执行权

那些在国家入境层面上捍卫文化连续性权利的国家通常也会部署采纳和执行“整合”政策的权利，鼓励新来者采纳大多数规范和价值观，认为这种采纳发生得越快，入境本身就越快。整合政策要求新来者采纳大多数社区的规范和实践，而容纳政策要求大多数人容纳与定义大多数文化不同的实践。根据这种传统的多元文化观，移民被允许进入领土，然后成为成员的过程是一个“双向”街道，要求新来者和东道国家都要根据彼此做出调整（Kymlicka 1998）。

新移民融入文化的要求合理吗？要求移民采纳他们加入文化的核心规范、价值观和实践合理吗（这里我将不讨论经济和政治融合的问题）？请注意，在移民融入的政治和社会学文献中，融入（文化上）通常与同化区分开来，前者侧重于欢迎新移民带来的独特规范和价值观（并在可能的情况下接纳他们），而后者要求移民尽可能完全地采纳主流社会核心的规范和价值观（Brubaker 2001；另请参阅 Modood 2007）。然而，在多元文化主义的政治理论文献中，普遍认为对完全同化的要求在规范上存在问题（它要求移民付出太多，放弃他们的历史和身份，作为加入新社区的一部分），但对融入的某种形式的鼓励是可以接受的。

然而，融入的要求是否合理取决于至少两个相关因素：首先，取决于共享公共文化的内容，其次，取决于讨论这种公共文化内容的场所的可及性。文化讨论的空间既模糊又广阔。关键规范、实践和价值观的来源多种多样：有些是历史性的，有些是通过政治过程有意采纳的，有些是在应对偶发情况时无意中采纳的。在公共空间中讨论这些文化内容的要求，在新移民可以公开访问并因此可以听到多种声音的情况下更具有辩护性。对于那些未明确定的空间的“可及性”的确切含义，以及进入这些空间的方式没有受到任何正式监控或监管，是具有挑战性的。但关键点在于，只要文化欢迎并认真对待新声音——在公共媒体、政治空间等领域——它们就可以被描述为公开可访问的。因此，在要求遵守主流文化规范和实践作为融入过程的一部分的合法性与新移民对这些讨论空间的真正访问之间存在联系。

在考虑第二个问题时，关于大多数共享公共文化的内容，我借鉴了民族主义政治理论的文献（尽管我并不认为民族主义本身的语言对于理解其与这里讨论的相关性是必要的）。文化可以通过更或少包容的特征来定义。当文化被定义为通常用来描述民族的特征，包括共同的历史、宗教、种族/种族，新来者不太容易加入它们并被认可为全面成员。另一方面，当文化被定义为通常用来描述公民国家的特征，包括对政治制度的共同承诺，通常还包括对自由民主原则的承诺，那么它们对新来者更加友好。在本条目早期采用的语言中，被排他特征定义的文化更有可能将文化视为包容的，而采用包容特征并强调其内容在其中进行讨论的论坛的可访问性的文化，则将文化视为对话或身份术语。然而，这并非必然如此，因为那些将文化视为对话术语的人可能仍然认为历史或宗教的关键元素对其至关重要（尽管他们愿意就这些元素是否至关重要进行讨论），同样，身份也可以基于排他性特征来制定。

另一种定义包容性的方式是关注文化的主要规范、实践和价值观在新来者不放弃他们所重视的东西的情况下能否被接受（Lenard 2019）。关键在于定义一个包容性文化的可容许轮廓，同时又能够以解决哲学家所称的“特殊性”问题的方式将其与其他文化区分开来。如果文化仅仅被定义为对自由民主原则和实现这些原则的制度的承诺，那么一个人必然会致力于任何被这样定义的国家。但这个结论并不能解释这样一个现实，即许多公民对其国家对这些价值观的解释感到依恋——基本的、抽象的、自由民主原则以一种文化特定的方式被采纳、尊重和实施。因此，重要的是界定可容许的文化内容的边界，这可以包括对关键历史时刻、政治对话或文化偶像的认可。没有国家可以要求新来者情感上对其新国家有承诺；但它可以合理地传授关于可学习的关键文化标志的信息，鼓励新来者采纳相关的实践和规范，并希望随着时间的推移，他们的情感认同至少部分地转向东道国家（Carens 2005）。在东道国家的公共文化内容合理可访问的条件下，以及其中进行讨论的论坛同样合理可访问的条件下，东道国家可以合理地鼓励新来者的融入。这种权利或许最好被理解为国家在移民问题上声称的文化连续性权利的派生权利，只有在上述可访问性条件得到满足时才能被合理地主张。

当然，并非所有学者都同意这一点，有些人完全拒绝了新来者可以被要求适应他们加入的国家文化的建议。那些持有这种观点变体的人将多数人的文化几乎总是同质化和压迫性地对待，这种方式对新来者不尊重，并将至少在某些方面要求融入的做法视为过去歧视和种族主义移民政策的“清理”变体（Abizadeh 2002）。这是一个真正的担忧。当荷兰要求来自多数穆斯林国家的潜在移民观看一部视频并通过测试才能进入其领土时——视频中展示了同性恋男子接吻和一个赤裸女人——它因其歧视意图而受到广泛谴责，而不是（如所声称的）试图确保移民能够接受据说是该国文化特征的自由价值观。更普遍地说，鼓励学习和采纳多数文化价值观的机制，除了上述的实际内容外，以及未能这样做的后果，必须对其合理性进行审查。这种评估显然是一项棘手的工作，因为在许多（如果不是大多数）移民情况下，潜在的新来者在与东道国的关系中处于脆弱的境地：他们进入的兴趣非常强烈，因此在许多情况下，他们将接受强制促使他们融入的强硬尝试而不抱怨。

4. 结论

少数群体（其中许多是移民群体）和多数群体都声称“文化”是重要的，值得以多种方式予以照顾。本文从审视文化被理解的多种方式开始，以揭示在主张特定文化权利时如何运用文化。重要的是要注意，双方的这些文化主张往往是相互关联的：少数群体要求特定的文化权利，而多数群体则通过主张不同的文化权利做出回应。在许多情况下，尊重或忽视所声称的文化权利的选择是以这样的方式框定的，即这样做将对多数文化产生什么影响，例如，通过陈述要求照顾的特定做法与多数文化普遍不兼容，或者有时更具体地说与被认为特别重要的特定做法或规范不兼容。例如，在法国，“头巾事件”期间就曾提出过这种主张——作为伊斯兰（或犹太）宗教信仰表现的戴头巾的权利被否定，因为这种做法被认为损害了法国对世俗主义的承诺（Laborde 2008；Benhabib 2004）。

本条目试图提供必要的资源来裁决这些冲突，以认真对待那些要求文化权利的人和那些抵制尊重这些权利的人。希望未来的政治理论能够利用这一分类法，在这些冲突出现时找到令人满意的结论。

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