快乐 pleasure (Leonard D. Katz)

首次发表于 2005 年 11 月 23 日；实质性修订于 2016 年 6 月 17 日。

快乐，在关于幸福、体验和心灵的思考中，包括所有喜悦、快乐、喜好和享受的情感积极性 - 所有让我们感觉良好或快乐的东西。它经常与同样包容的痛苦或苦难相对比，即我们感觉不好的一切。[1] 现在，“幸福”经常被类似地使用，这导致了与旧有用法混淆，旧有用法表示整体的好运或生活中的成功，在幸福的自我报告和对这些多样化来源的“幸福研究”中起作用。

快乐呈现为好和有吸引力 - 当它引起我们的注意时，以及在它的光芒中出现的一切。这表明了为什么人们追求快乐以及为什么有理由这样做的简单解释。我们可能因为快乐而更喜欢和选择某些事物，这表明有关快乐的事实使得某些选择比其他选择更好。哲学家们进一步提出了这个建议，有时将快乐视为一种单一的简单（特征），它使得体验在存在时变得好和有吸引力。这种简单的观点经常与更广泛的规范和心理学主张相关联，都含糊地称为“享乐主义”。这些主张认为快乐的好和吸引力（以及痛苦的坏和厌恶）可以（在它们之间）解释人类价值、规范实践理由和动机的所有内容。如果这三种观点都是真实的，快乐和痛苦将是人类（以及相关的类似动物）生活中唯一的最终好和坏的特征，也是唯一的实际最终目标和我们所有自愿追求和避免的正当最终目标。这种简单的观点和相关的享乐主义主张和解释在十八和十九世纪的心理学、经济学和哲学中尤为突出，但在二十世纪被广泛拒绝。

当代科学在一定程度上恢复了快乐的重要性，但也表明快乐与意识和动机吸引的关系比许多享乐主义者和普通思维所认为的更加多变。当代哲学家继续争论快乐是什么，但他们才刚刚开始探讨科学进展，这些进展正在逐渐填补古老使用精神活性物质来提高情绪和新型抗抑郁药物疗法所预设的东西 - 快乐是一种生物现象。

内容指南：典型读者应省略注释；请参阅前面的建议。§1 讨论了简单的图像（上面的黑体字，两段落）。§1.3 建议如何减轻早期考虑的异议，以便将简单图像的体验核心作为一个活跃的理论可能性保存下来。呼吁使用内省的困难和易错性，也许尤其是内省情感状态。§2.3.2 讨论了 Fred Feldman 发展的最新态度方法。详细讨论了它的困难，并提出了新亚里士多德主义和更类似简单图像的替代方案（§2.3.3）。还注意到了更复杂的中世纪关于快乐的意向关系的描述（§2.3.1），并与更非二元观点进行了对比。尤其是 §3 旨在整合哲学和科学、历史和当代的贡献。

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1. 瞬间体验的特征

快乐在朋友的微笑、姿势或举止中似乎是显而易见的，甚至亲密的，当我们注意到自己正在度过愉快的时光并享受自己的时候。对于那些被简单的观点所束缚的人来说（见上文第 2 段），快乐在内省上显然是明显的，它是我们在瞬间的意识体验中直接知道的一种简单感觉，几乎显而易见的是，它是我们经常做到并且应该追求的东西。但是，吉尔伯特·赖尔（Gilbert Ryle）在行为主义统治心理学时期写道，快乐根本不是任何一种意识体验的片段（1949 年，IV，6），弗雷德·费尔德曼（Fred Feldman）（2004 年，在下文 §2.3.2 中讨论）认为，快乐是一种纯粹的命题态度，其中感觉并不是必要的部分。简单观点的其他反对者认为，与简单观点相比，快乐需要更大的认知背景。伊丽莎白·安斯康姆（Elizabeth Anscombe）因此帮助重新引起哲学家们对基础问题的关注，这种对简单观点的盲目接受导致许多现代哲学家忽视了什么是快乐这个问题。

1.1 快乐作为一种简单但强大的感觉

快乐最常见于性情开朗或心情愉快的人的体验背景。这种基线情感和微小的偏差对生活的情感质量最为重要（Watson 2000 年；Diener，Sandvik 和 Pavot 1991 年；参见 Coan 和 Allen 2003 年，Rachels 2004 年）。快乐包括这些方面已经被广泛注意到（例如：Duncker，1941 年，404 页；Alston，1967 年，341 页；Gosling，1969 年，135 页等），但往往会被忽视。过于关注由通常愉快的刺激引起的急性发作的显著情节，例如糖果和抚摸，可能会让人误以为这些情节或感觉是快乐讨论的主要话题，或者误读他人对此的错误理解。

快乐既不容易适应，也没有被理论家广泛认为适应感觉的标准范例，无论是外物的质量还是局部或弥散的身体感觉的质量，因为似乎任何典型的愉快感官状态或质量在某些场合可能会减少甚至完全没有，而其感官质量和强度仍然基本相同（Ryle 1949 年，第 109 页；1954a 年，第 58 页；1954b 年，第 136 页）。口味的愉快程度受营养状态和经验的调节（Young 1959 年，Cabanac 1971 年，Bolles 1991 年）。而情绪、气质、个人历史以及对特定社交背景下的某个人的感受可能会在感觉相同的情况下产生极大的愉悦或极大的痛苦（参见 Helm 2000 年第 93-94 页；2002 年第 23-24 页）。因此，科学和对日常经验的反思将纯粹的感觉与快感反应区分开来（参见 Aydede 2000 年）。承认可能存在“快乐的感觉”，它偶尔伴随的身体症状，与这种感觉，狭义上理解的感觉和情感反应之间的区别是一致的。约翰·洛克（John Locke）（1700/1979，II，xx，1）将快乐和痛苦描绘为“简单的观念”，只能通过“我们在自己身上感受到的经验”来学习和理解，与任何可能伴随的“仅仅是感觉本身”的感觉相区分，似乎与后来更为突出的情感感受和纯粹感觉之间的区别是一致的。

洛克和他那个时代的许多人和传统似乎持有与快乐的简单图景（本条目第二个引言段落）相近的观点，将我们对快乐和善的概念视为同样简单，因为它们是从快乐的简单经验中获得的。他们认为快乐是一种（至少在认知上）可分离的意识事件或特征的观点，在那些将快乐视为某种平滑或温和的刺激、运动或生理变化的古代享乐主义唯物主义哲学家中也有相应的观点（参见 Gosling 和 Taylor 1982 年，第 41 页，第 394 页），在当今将其视为大脑的某种短期活动的人中也有相应的观点。享乐主义的观点认为，人类的价值、动机和善恶概念是以这种被认为是简单的情感感受（如快乐和痛苦）来解释的（例如，洛克 1700/1979 年，第二篇，第 20 和 21 章，第 31 页等），在接下来的两个世纪中，这种观点在英国的作家中尤为普遍。快乐被广泛认为是行为科学和社会科学的基础，直到更严格的内省标准和更客观的方法（在这里指的是不基于实验对象对该主题的判断）被采用为止。[3]

1.2 对简单图景的拒绝

19 世纪末的伟大功利主义道德哲学家亨利·西奇威克（Henry Sidgwick）未能在他对快乐的体验中找到任何持续的感受特征。因此，他提出“快乐”并不是通过任何特定的内省质量来选择瞬间体验，而是通过它们的内在可取性来认知地理解（Sidgwick 1907，第 125-31 页，111-5 页）。因此，他认为快乐的概念是不可约的评价性和规范性，但仍适用于体验；体验在多大程度上令人愉快，完全取决于它在感觉上如何激发欲望、追求或实现。20 世纪中叶的英美哲学家进一步偏离了简单的观点，并受到心理学中行为主义的影响。

吉尔伯特·赖尔（1949 年，1954a，1954b）因此认为，“快乐”根本不指代任何发生的经验，而是（在一个核心用法中）谨慎执行的活动，满足无阻碍的倾向性倾向和（在其他情况下）同样是倾向性的干扰，或者是对这些倾向的责任。[4]首选的第一个是亚里士多德关于快乐（在 NE VII 中）作为活动的无阻碍进行的近似转换，转换为行为或行动的语言（因为谨慎或注意力也是以倾向性方式进行的）。赖尔的逻辑倾向主义很快被拒绝（Nowell-Smith 1954，Penelhum 1957，Armstrong 1968，Lyons 1980）。他建议将快乐理解为一种谨慎、注意力或兴趣的形式，这是建立在亚里士多德的观察基础上的，亚里士多德观察到快乐加强了与其他活动竞争的特定活动，并从此推断出快乐的种类因其所依赖的不同活动而异，每种活动都会因其自身的快乐而得到加强，但会因其他活动的快乐而减弱，并且也会因其自身的痛苦而减弱（NE X，5:1175b1–24）。在赖尔的观点中，这是因为以快乐做某事就是全心全意地做，并且专注于此，不受其他活动或任何感觉的干扰。

贾斯汀·高斯林（Justin Gosling）在对受莱尔启发的文献进行深入评估时指出，它在快乐的伦理和心理重要性方面大多忽视了概念上的核心情感和心境。他得出结论，我们以这些方式感到快乐表明快乐实际上是一种感觉，并且这个概念从这些情况扩展到包括可能在当时使人愉悦或者在以后引起或者使人愉悦的享受。对于自身的事物有所需求，快乐主义者经常试图解释为它们的愉悦性，实际上是通过对某种前景感到愉悦而引起的。虽然高斯林使用这些区别来阻止一些快乐主义论题的论证，但他也捍卫了快乐在道德心理学和伦理学中的重要性（1969 年，第 9 章和第 10 章）。

伊丽莎白·安斯康姆（Elizabeth Anscombe），像莱尔和他的追随者一样，拒绝了任何将快乐视为上下文无关的“内部印象”的解释，无论是情感的还是感官的。但是，虽然莱尔用新亚里士多德主义的享受解释来适应他的“反笛卡尔”心灵哲学，她的主要原因是任何这种感觉或感觉都与她认为的该概念的解释和理由暗示的用途无关。她有影响力地认为这个概念非常模糊和有问题，因此应该毫不犹豫地拒绝那些对其给予重视的理论，比如快乐主义的功利主义。约翰·罗尔斯（John Rawls）更有影响力地引用了她的观点，他放弃了功利主义，转而采用了一种更具建构性和较少现实主义的伦理学方法。[5]

安斯康姆（解释和扩展她在快乐方面非常简短的言论，以她 1963/1957 年的更大背景和她后来的 1981d/1978 年为指导）推理道，由于归因于快乐给出了行动的理由，而行动的理由只有在可理解的评估和动机的背景下才能理解，而这种感觉只能在当下提供，而不考虑其更大的背景。将快乐归因于主体，相反，涉及理解主体将某物视为好（无论是非概念性地表示）并对其行为的方式，这反过来又涉及了某物可能被合理地认为是好的和自愿追求的方式的背景知识。因此，拥有快乐的概念预设了一个丰富且与上下文相关的好的概念，而这种瞬间的感性体验无法提供。因此，这样的体验不能作为我们对快乐概念或好概念的起源，正如试图从快乐感中获得这些概念的经验主义者所假设的那样。

本内特·赫尔姆从 1990 年代开始，以安斯康姆稀少的批评言论为基础，发展出一种积极的观点，尽管在细节上可能有所不同。对于赫尔姆（2002 年），快乐和痛苦都是“感受评价”，它们通过评价、情绪和动机的更大模式部分构成，对我们的感觉产生影响（与我们在评价判断中的活动相对）。我们感受到快乐或痛苦只是我们以这种方式引导我们的注意力和动机（1994 年，2001a 年，2001b 年，2009 年）。

在 Helm 对快乐和痛苦的观点中，他适应了安斯康姆对快乐提供整体可理解的行动原因的限制，并符合他更大的议程，但这种观点不合理地使得小猫或婴儿因受伤或从哺乳中获得快乐取决于他们是否具有适当的背景关注模式，包括他告诉我们的，在身体疼痛的情况下，对身体完整性的背景关注（2002 年，第 24-27 页）。如果这种对身体的更大关注模式对于疼痛的情感成分是必要的，那么在一个希望主要是迅速自然死亡而不是继续保持身体完整性的晚期病人身上，这两者应该一起消失。在这种观点上，如果某人主要具有这种欲望和情感模式，那么感官疼痛（或者如 Helm 所说，本来会疼痛的刺激）必须作为预示所期望的结果的信号，至少在平衡上是愉快的。在没有适当的更大欲望和情感模式的情况下，我们不需要提供镇痛药来缓解疼痛，因为体验疼痛据说是不可理解的。正如 Helm 在重新提出古代斯多葛派关于受折磨的智者的说法时所声称的那样，缺乏这一点，一个人的扭动和尖叫无法表明他正在遭受疼痛（2002 年，第 24 页）。似乎不需要吗啡来缓解我们患者的这种表面上的疼痛。理查德·莫兰还会补充说，吗啡对于提供快乐的安慰同样无用，因为这同样取决于与患者认知复杂的规范空间的技能和理由适当地连接（莫兰，2002 年，第 209-214 页）。这些观点可能具有可测试的后果。 他们可能预测到，在有效的抗抑郁疗法中，会伴随着广泛的态度变化，而且，虽然不太可信，所有短暂的快乐和情绪的轻松也会伴随着。

但是，正如 Helm 所提到的生物限制，我们可能并不像他所官方提出的那样，是一个统一的、由一致的情感、欲望和评价判断所支配的整体。快乐和痛苦有时似乎会在没有与我们可以识别的任何大型评价模式的联系的情况下强加给我们，而是从下方出现，与任何合理的在更大范围内的既有关注和立场欲望的模式不成比例，就像我们在芳香、日落或风景中自然地感到快乐，或者不可理解地处于一个好心情中。至少在这种情况下，我们的相关关注和实际理由似乎是小而局部的，集中在快乐和可能的善良感知（Sidgwick 1907, 127-31, 110-113; Goldstein 1980, 1989, 2002）或外观（根据 Jessica Moss 2012 所说的柏拉图和亚里士多德）。而不是必然嵌入在一个更大的套餐中。即使快乐是或涉及某种功能角色，这可能只是一个相对较小和局部的角色，与更简单的动物共享，由大脑和心灵的内在功能构成。[7]

在简单图像的掌握中，享乐主义者认为寻求快乐是独特可理解的，并要求所有的行动动机和行动理由都适应这种模式。而倾向于整体评估和思考的对手可能要求，所有的感受都要以其术语来理解。我们对这两种要求以及它们所依赖的特殊和独占的可理解性的主张都应持怀疑态度。似乎情感体验存在于尚未形成任何大型欲望和关注模式的婴儿以及已经失去任何相关模式甚至无法容纳它们的垂死者中。在许多情况下，例如普通的“简单快乐”和提升的情绪，似乎不需要获得相关的大型整合评价态度或审美能力。因此，我们有理由回到更接近保留其瞬时体验核心的简单图像。

1.3 经验的更加谦虚的角色

孩子获得指称快乐的能力时，比起经验主义者未经教导的内在认知，在学习将糖果、拥抱和游戏归类并给它们命名时，有更多的依据来描述这些通常引起或维持这些快乐的事物。中世纪伟大的抒情诗人瓦尔特·冯·德·福格尔韦德将快乐解释为“跳舞、笑声、歌唱”[8]。达尔文写道：“我听到一个不到四岁的孩子被问到什么是好心情时回答说，‘就是笑、说话和亲吻。’很难给出一个更真实、更实用的定义。”[9] 正如达尔文所观察到的，“对于所有人种，表达好心情的方式似乎是相同的，并且很容易被认出。”[10] 与负面情绪的对比在儿童的表达行为中很早就开始发展，并且也很早和很容易被察觉到。成熟的概念会将行为表达与其内在原因区分开来（正如瓦尔特在第 28-29 行中所做的，引用见注 8），而非常年幼的孩子可能拥有一个较少区分的概念，其中积极和消极情绪之间的显著对比更为突出，例如微笑或笑声与哭泣之间的对比（瓦尔特，第 29 行），以及一般来说积极和消极情绪的外在表达之间的对比。自我快乐状态的标记和报告可能与对他人的归因同时发展，源自天生具备的情感感受、表达和感知能力，这些能力必须在早期共同发挥作用，以促进婴儿与父母之间的早期情感沟通和结合，以及与他人的相互理解[11]。对于稍大一点的孩子来说，快乐可能同时意味着良好的感受和表达这种感受的行为，以及生活的美好不仅仅是这些。 从这样一个自由化的洛克基础出发，不仅仅基于现象的相似性，而是经验得出的，一个孩子可以逐渐形成对善的更成熟的概念，然后形成成年人对快乐的共同概念，即感觉良好（西奇威克在 §1.2、¶1；§2.3.1、¶1；n. 5、¶4；和 n. 18 中讨论）或至少自然地呈现为这样（亚里士多德根据莫斯，上述 n. 7），快乐的经验在这些概念的来源中占有一定的地位。

然而，以某种方式保留简单图像的核心，将快乐视为相对非中介的瞬间体验，可能会放弃快乐的本质、善良和在动机中的作用的明显性，完全内省的透明度和可理解性原本应该提供这些。因此，快乐的经验可能在允许直接引用快乐的同时，也在形成我们对善的概念时起到一定的作用，但并不会给我们带来任何关于善或正当信心的深入知识。甚至是否实际上存在快乐这样一种类型，正如它所表现出来的那样，都可能被新科学所反驳。但如果内省是不可靠的，那么西奇威克未能找到单一的快乐感觉，赖尔发现它是一种行为倾向，费尔德曼则认为它是一种纯粹的命题态度，类似于信念（§2.3.2），与任何感觉完全分离，这些都不是对快乐感觉像某种东西或至少某些东西（Labukt 2012）的决定性反对意见。感觉经验的直接性可能不会导致对认知的明显性（§2.3.4、¶2），就像简单图像的充分经验主义解释所认为的那样。（关于这种经验主义方法对快乐的最近辩护，请参见，例如，Crisp 2006、Labukt 2012 和 Bramble 2013）。

此外，有理由相信对情感的内省，与例如感觉经验相比，更容易出现遗漏错误。长期以来，特定信息内容的焦点意识和情感体验一直被认为是相互竞争的 - 不仅仅是不同的感觉或认知内容。两种体验模式之间的竞争性交替是过去心理学的常见现象，并得到了越来越多的证实。Marcus Raichle 及其合作者发起的持续研究表明，大脑活动的默认、休息状态或监控模式，可能包括对当前愉悦状态的表征，通常会被需要注意力的任务所抑制（Gusnard 等，2001 年；Gusnard 和 Raichle，2004 年；Fox 等，2005 年），甚至可能被某些尝试内省当前情感状态的方式所抑制。如果是这样，那么将内省的注意力集中在要准确报告快乐上，有时可能会降低参与其表征的系统的增益。如果是这样，这可能解释了前一段提到的观点的不一致性，以及上世纪 30 年代内省主义心理实验室的观点。然而，快乐似乎通常会将注意力和动机集中在显著的刺激上，尤其是对于愉悦的想象，而不是集中在自身上（例如，Schlick 1930/1939，第二章，§§4-10，第 36-55 页）。这种观点可能回答了对于快乐的体验观点的反对意见，即如果感受到快乐，它会将我们的注意力从我们正在享受的事物（如音乐）转移到自身上（Ryle 1954a，Madell 2002，第 90-93 页）。快乐通常更容易从侧面注意到，而不是正面。 当任务需求增加时，这些可能会降低我们甚至在认知上注意到我们情感状态的能力，以至于我们感受到的快乐超出了（我们有限容量的认知意识）的范围（参见 §2.3.4，第 2 段）。

从当代的可疑论者对内省的观点来看，我们不应该对其失败感到惊讶，也不应该认为它们对快乐作为一种单一的体验类型具有决定性的证据，就像西奇威克所做的那样。即使它不是，它仍然可能包含有限的异质性（参见 Labukt 2012，下面的 §3.3）。同样，不应该让人惊讶的是，内省心理学家（注 3，第 3 段）和哲学家们无法就快乐是否具有一种显著的感受、多样性或根本没有达成一致意见，而身体感觉（不同于内省的抵抗力）可能会代替出现。如果某些类型的勤奋内省倾向于使瞬间感觉在认知上无法接近，那么这种内省通常会比关于它的未经训练的经验更糟糕。我们不应该仅仅依赖内省（并且不知不觉地依赖可能塑造其报告的天真或训练有素的直觉和偏见），而应该将我们的全部证据综合考虑，借鉴心理学和生物学以及直接经验，就像现代经验主义和内省主义盛行之前的最好的哲学家们所做的那样。

2. 在异质性中寻找统一

阿富汗男人之间有一句话说，有四种主要的快乐：洗热水澡的快乐，与朋友在一起的年轻人的快乐，与女人在一起的男人的快乐，以及看到自己的儿子成长为男子汉的快乐。这些快乐除了彼此之间，还与其他性别社交和性快乐以及恐怖电影观众在恐惧中感到的喜悦和辣味的快乐有什么共同之处呢？

2.1 寻求普遍的解释

在简单的观点中，快乐本身始终是相同的；当它与甜食或哲学的不同快乐联系在一起时，它只是以不同的方式（无论是认知上、相互作用上还是反复出现上）引起。哲学家们经常试图尊重快乐在其场合中所表现出的多样性，与快乐模糊感统一性一样。因此，柏拉图推测快乐是一种感知、察觉或意识到自身状况改善的体验，其改善程度在不同方面有所不同；亚里士多德认为快乐源于各种生活能力在其特征性不同活动（例如：感知特定事物，理论上思考它们的本质）中的无阻碍功能实现；当代作家认为快乐是一种对不同内容的欢迎态度（对不同对象的态度），或者是一种对经验的开放姿态，可能在不同对象之间摇摆，甚至没有对象。至少从柏拉图让苏格拉底暗示快乐是如此极端多样化以至于对它的任何简单概括都不成立的时候起，这些问题就已经明确受到争议了，尤其是考虑到非常不同类型的人所享受的事物之间的巨大差异（Philebus 12C-13B）。

2.2 古典解释/原理：功能统一与差异

柏拉图和亚里士多德旨在以整合的方式理解快乐的价值、生物学以及在心理学和经验中的位置，这是在当时科学的背景下进行的。

2.2.1 柏拉图：注意到恢复到生活的自然状态的不同方式

柏拉图在古代常识的基础上建立了快乐与满足感官渴望或欲望（epithumia）的联系，也基于早期的科学推测，将快乐与满足身体需求等同起来。他观察到简单的个人报告级别的动机解释是不准确的，因为我们有时会在没有任何先前的痛苦、欲望或需求的情况下体验到快乐，比如看、听、闻或学习时。同时，我们也可能在满足生理需求的过程中没有体验到快乐（Philebus 51A–52C）。因此，他对当前受生理影响的快乐解释进行了改进和概括，将其从恢复身体不平衡或缺乏的过程转变为从（可能未察觉的）缺乏状态返回到自然健康状态的感觉、知觉或意识（希腊语中的 aisthēsis）[13]。知觉和感知的“纯粹”（“不伴随痛苦”）快乐显然被解释为对我们不知道的需求的满足的信号，因此我们不会因获取或拥有而感到痛苦。因此，实现了对所有快乐的统一解释，系统地解释了快乐的统一性和多样性。快乐可以在我们这样的有着反复需求但有时意识到它们的部分和暂时满足的不完美存在中找到其在最佳生活中的位置。但绝对最佳的生活将是一种永久完美的神圣生活，没有进一步学习或任何其他改进的可能性，因此根本没有快乐——我们应该尽力接近这种生活（Philebus 33B）。 笛卡尔对快乐的功能或内容的看法以及斯宾诺莎将快乐定义为向更完美过渡的情感的官方定义与柏拉图的观点接近，康德的某种描述也是如此，[14]埃利亚·米尔格拉姆（2000 年，第 122-26 页）和蒂莫西·施罗德（2001 年，2004 年，在 §3.1 中讨论）的描述也是如此。这种改进指标观点可以解释快乐内部的多样性，通过不同种类的改进指示。但它们不必将对需求或其满足的明确意识归因于体验主体。现代版本可能仅归因于生物学功能，而不需要在个人或亚个人层面上对离开或恢复自然状态的明确表示。

2.2.2 亚里士多德：完善不同的活动

亚里士多德拒绝了柏拉图将欣赏景色、声音、气味和智力活动归类为满足稳态服务的欲望，并且也拒绝了他对最好的、神圣的、不变的生活的看法，即我们应该努力接近无快乐认知的生活。然而，他采纳了柏拉图的项目，即寻找一个统一的快乐解释，以适应他从柏拉图那里继承的目的论形而上学和知识主义价值理论，并且也采用了柏拉图的策略，即给出一个通用的形式解释，允许特定的变化。因此，他完全拒绝了柏拉图的恢复过程解释，而是用自己同样普遍的解释来解释快乐，即当动物或它们的部分或能力已经至少在某种程度上处于良好状态时，快乐就会产生。

亚里士多德对生命的解释是一个目的论和等级统一的生物能力系统，使他能够统一解释快乐，同时根据它们在他价值层次体系中的地位和功能进行系统区分。在他看来，每种活动在没有阻碍和完善的情况下，都会产生自己特定的“随附”快乐，其种类与其他活动所属的快乐有所区别（《尼各马可伦理学》第十卷第五章）。因此，这些不同的快乐具有一种通用的统一性，作为发展生命能力的完善活动的一部分 - 这种统一性最终源于生命本身的通用统一性。不同种类的快乐具有不同的因果能力，每种能力都支持参与其自身特定活动，但会干扰其他活动，因此可以通过将快乐的实例视为生命或灵魂在其构成性完善活动的特定活动中成功的体验来解释它们的高层功能和感知相似性 - 但是在不同的活动中，根据其生命能力和对象的不同目的论等级，具有相应不同程度的快乐和价值。因此，快乐不是生活的偶然附加物；它自然地反映和追踪生活的成功和价值。这种价值在目的论上解释了我们的生物发展以及我们所共享的较低级别的动物欲望，但也赋予了人类生活和理性人类行动自己特有的更高终极目标和意义。过上一种能够使其生物最高构成能力完全发展并在其自然最佳和最适宜的对象上无障碍地运用它们的生活是成功的生活，并带来最愉快的快乐。 那些在高级活动能力上受限、未能发展出所需的智力和道德美德以善用这些能力的人，而寻求琐碎或卑微的快乐，因此无法达到最高的自然人类满足和目标。这就是完全的人类幸福，它包括善用理性，最接近上帝纯粹智力活动的最佳和最愉快的生活形式。我们的快乐与我们当前活动的完美程度以及与此相近程度息息相关，这是我们认知最清晰、最清醒、最好的生活（《劝导篇》B87-B91，1984 年，第 2414 页；VII，11-14 和 X，1-6）。

亚里士多德的理论，我们可以称之为功能完善观，通过使快乐及其价值与动物的各种生活活动的不同性质和价值以及它们的对象或目标的不同性质和价值相对应，从而适应了快乐的通用统一性和特定多样性。它对后来的理论产生了应有的巨大影响，从古代晚期到近代哲学和福利经济学。最近，社会心理学家米哈伊·奇克森米哈伊的研究主要是关于参与活动中的“流体体验”的自我报告，为流体体验与享受之间的联系提供了一些实证支持，但也许并非如其广告所说的完全相同的东西-正如他在改进的劝导中有时似乎希望它成为的那样。

约翰·斯图尔特·密尔追随亚里士多德，赞同理性地偏爱与“低等”动物分享的“更高级”的快乐，但反对亚里士多德将快乐与客观功能标准联系在一起。他和更近期的作家提出了简单的反例，证明这些条件即使是足够的或必要的快乐条件，使用亚里士多德在阐述他的理论时使用的感知例子。密尔的反对意见可以解释和扩展如下。亚里士多德的理论暗示，其他条件相等的情况下，两种感知或认知中更精确和更具信息量的感知必定更愉悦。但是，这似乎可能是两种恶臭中更糟糕的一种。嗅觉系统的卓越敏锐度，甚至其无阻碍的运作和能力与对象的相互适应性（NE X，4:1174b14–1175a3）似乎并不排除这一点。因此，如果对象的卓越性在认知或功能方面而不是快乐方面得到填充，那么亚里士多德的条件似乎是不足够的快乐条件。（在放松和懒散的心情下，也没有任何这样的条件是快乐的必要条件。）当然，我们可以临时降低或提升感官互动，将我们享受的互动视为卓越的，但这样我们只是在一个小圈子里转圈，并没有对快乐进行独立的描述。[17]也许准-新亚里士多德主义者可以承认所有这些，并放弃导致被证明是错误的预测的主张，同时仍然相信快乐是某种方式的活动（需要根据经验填充）。但是，是否可以找到任何合理的方式仍有待证明。对于亚里士多德试图通过某种在生物功能中独立定义的更基本的价值来解释快乐的价值，情况更是如此。

2.2.3 伊壁鸠鲁：品味生活自然状态的活动

依据爱利亚学派的观点，快乐并不是一种精英主义和知识主义的观念，而是任何没有身体和情感痛苦的动物都能够以最大程度地享受到的。在原则上，并不需要高度发展的人类特有能力或功能。然而，爱利亚学派培养哲学，是为了使人们摆脱对来世苦难和死亡的无端恐惧，并灌输一种简单生活的习惯，从而能够安全地生活，因为不需要也不害怕失去奢侈品。此外，他们还建议进行各种愉快的活动，可能是因为这有助于保持对我们稳定自然状态的无阻生活活动的必要意识（参见 Gosling 和 Taylor，1982 年，374 页；Erler 和 Schofield，1999 年，653 页以及引用的其他参考文献；有关支持各种解释的进一步参考文献，请参见下面的注释 30）。亚当·斯密在强调与爱利亚学派的差异时（根据他的解释）（1790/1976 年，294-300，307 页），他也相似地认为，“身体健康，没有债务，良心无亏”的人处于“人类的自然和普通状态”，这种状态普遍幸福，没有什么重要的东西可以增加（45 页）。

2.3 一种对对象或内容的指向？

许多常识所认可的普通心理状态，如特定的信念和欲望，本质上是指向它们的对象或内容的。快乐的统一是否可能是这种类型的统一，它的多样性是否源于其有意识的内容或对象的多样性？如果不总是指向我们享受的亚里士多德式的活动，或者真实的人或物，也许是抽象的前景、命题或不可能性，或者仅仅作为思维对象存在的抽象物？根据基督教哲学传统，快乐在本质上依赖于一种有意愿或有爱的心理行为，这种行为可以指向不同的认知呈现的事物。根据当代分析哲学家弗雷德·费尔德曼的观点，快乐本身是一种单一的命题态度，就像信念一样，同样可以指向不同的命题内容。这些解释的可行性不仅关系到对快乐感兴趣的哲学家，也关系到对心灵本质更普遍关注的人。布伦塔诺声称所有的心灵都是有意向的，一些最近的分析哲学家声称经验的现象特性是由其表象内容构成的（例如，莱肯 2005 年）。如果存在没有表象内容但有现象意识的愉快情绪，这些主张和理论就是不正确的。

2.3.1 喜欢、爱、品味

对于快乐本质的缺乏确切解释并不令人震惊，只要将快乐视为一种体验，无论多么多变和普遍，其典型的原因可能可以粗略地描述，但不应期望有明确的口头定义（洛克和康德，见注 2；米尔 1872/1979，第 430 页）。也许这个解释缺乏生物学或计算细节，以及这些细节可能提供的深层功能洞察力。然而，将内省视为科学知识的来源，当内省者在体验快乐时未能就他们是否发现了任何独特的内省对象达成一致时，引起了不安。即使在这种方法在心理学中发展到极致之前（见上文注 3），哲学家亨利·西奇威克在自己对快乐的体验中未能找到任何独特的统一品质。他对快乐的规范解释是“感觉，在感觉时被有感知能力的个体视为可取的”（1907 年，第 129 页；见上文注 5，第 4 段），这使得 C.D.布罗德偶然提出愉快的体验可能只是我们喜欢的那些体验。[18]在学术界对“喜欢”这种口语化语言的使用中存在歧义，导致文献中出现了模棱两可的情况。一些作者将其用于区分与欲望或渴望不同但与快乐相区别的内在快乐状态。其他人则将其用于表示一种态度（如欲望），他们认为这种态度要么从内部构成，要么从外部挑选并统一体验快乐，并有时错误地坚持认为他们的对手通过使用相同的语言已经承认了他们的观点。（Zink 1962，90-2；Trigg 1970，52-3，116-19；Katz 2008，414-17；Tanyi 2010；Labukt 2012，158 已经指出了这种语言的问题，但仍然困扰着伦理学文献。这个问题通常与相关原因是基于价值还是欲望有关，但被 Heathwood 2011 所区分。)

弗朗茨·布伦塔诺（Franz Brentano）是西方哲学家中关注意向结构（行为/对象或态度/内容）的明确问题的人，他与西德威克（Sidgwick）是同时代的人，他将这个问题引起了西方哲学家的注意，超越了持续的天主教知识传统。快乐和情感与信念和欲望的关联是柏拉图（Philebus 36ff.）和亚里士多德（修辞学 II，2-11）讨论的起点。在接下来的传统中，快乐通常被视为部分属于我们真正的非物质自我或真正的善的身体现象。西方基督教中世纪的斯科拉哲学家因此认为身体的快乐发生在感知灵魂或力量中，直接由感知意识引起。他们就思维介导的快乐的因果关系和意向性进行了辩论，这种快乐被认为发生在智慧灵魂或力量中。根据奥卡姆的威廉（William of Ockham）的说法，这种快乐在因果上直接依赖于意志对智力呈现的对象的爱的接受，因为它本身是好的。对于奥卡姆来说，这种快乐与它所依赖的爱的接受是不同的，正如一个认知上满意但情绪低落的学者的例子所示（这个例子早先由约翰·邓斯·斯科特斯（John Duns Scotus）使用），在这种情况下，通常会产生的快乐没有发生。其他人否认这两者是不同的。其中一些人允许，然而，一个独立的二阶爱将原始的爱作为其对象，并因此成为其快乐的对象；另一个人认为这种高阶爱和快乐可能包含在原始的爱行为中。[ 20] 笛卡尔拒绝了这种二元论，将所有的快乐（以及其他一切心理活动）视为本质上是思想（具体而言，至少经常涉及到认为某种好处与自己有关的思考），而感官或身体的快乐则是通过向非物质的思维心灵传达其身体足以承受感官刺激所带来的轻微挑战，从而使其感到愉悦（参见注 2，第 2 段，有关参考资料）。对于布伦塔诺来说，感官的快乐的意向内容实际上是感官质量的感性体验。它是对感官行为的爱的指向。在由思想引起的快乐中，我们纯粹的精神（非身体的）对思想的内容的喜爱（似乎是非情感的喜欢、赞同或满意）导致我们情感上爱上了感官的体验-即经历身体感官的快乐。[ 21] 布伦塔诺在这些观点中似乎遵循了他的中世纪斯科拉学派的模式，而没有接受标准的现代情感意识的概念，这种意识既不是意欲的，也不是感官的，也不是冷冰冰的理智的（康德 1790/2000 及其参考文献注释）。

在当代非斯科拉哲学使用中，适当运用中世纪的意向性语言时需要谨慎。在上述考虑的旧部署中，在亚里士多德的目的论心灵和自然形式的背景下，心灵和自然形式是为彼此而造的，并且它们朝着完美的认知行为发展的过程中起到了解释性的作用，对于内容归属的天真实在论有着根本的地位。在当代认知科学和分析哲学中，它们有时被理解为更具工具性，而不是表达精确的基层真理[22]。往往不清楚将内容或对象归属于快乐等事物涉及什么。在学术哲学中，也没有标准的态度语言使用。在分析语言哲学中占主导地位，因此在心灵哲学中通常涉及与命题的关系，关于这一点有很多文献，但没有关于它们是什么或将关系归属于它们涉及什么的标准解释。信念是一个标准的例子。受心理学影响更大或更狭窄的用法在伦理学中普遍存在，涉及到动机、情感或评价（而不是认知）的支持或反对（例如，Nowell-Smith 1954, 111–115，将快乐归类为其中之一）。

2.3.2 一个涉及内容的态度，像信念一样？

弗雷德·费尔德曼将快乐（在相关的包容性使用中）与布伦塔诺的爱相类比，将其视为一种发生的命题态度。如果一个行为/对象分析适用于所有快乐，并且我们必须在对象和我们对它们的看法之间进行选择，那么选择我们对它们的看法似乎是正确的选择。因此，根据费尔德曼的观点，行为或态度类型而不是它们多样的对象或内容是所有快乐的共同点，并使它们成为快乐，而它的对象，包括“感官快乐”的实例（在注 1 的用法 2 中，第 8 段），仅通过与它的关系将它们聚集和统一起来，因此这种态度在重要意义上就是快乐（参见费尔德曼 1997a，2004 年）。

与布伦塔诺不同，对他来说，即使是人类的智力快乐最终也是感官的、身体的和情感的，费尔德曼试图提出一个类似统一的解释时，却朝着相反的方向发展；他的态度快乐并不是本质上涉及任何感觉的。（因此，他说它是一种像信念一样的态度，比他有时补充希望和恐惧更清楚地传达了他的意图，而没有明确表示他也打算将后者纳入纯粹的命题态度中，这些后者也不本质上或核心地涉及感觉，就像他可能像斯多葛派一样那样。）喜欢简单图像的经验核心，将快乐理解为涉及感受的瞬时情感体验的朋友们，将会抵制这种否认感觉在快乐中的核心地位的观点。但是，对于统一态度方法的怀疑也有其他理由，因为行为/对象或态度/内容的解释似乎也无法适应享受愉快的小睡、白日梦或心情愉快的人的现象学，如果它要成为包容性快乐的解释，那么它必须符合费尔德曼将快乐形式化为伦理学理论中“美好生活”的更大目标。将所有快乐视为一种特殊的命题或 de se（直接将属性归因于自己）态度，如费尔德曼 1997c/1988 中所述，无论是人类还是动物的快乐，都对命题表达或自我参照的认知能力提出了要求（如费尔德曼 2002 年第 607 页所述），如果不否认这些能力，就不能否认它们的快乐。而且，我们必须在快乐感觉像某种东西和它具有意向性之间做出选择的信念似乎也是值得怀疑的。正如我们所见（§1.2），以及其他当代哲学家，包括杰弗里·马德尔（2002 年，第 5 章和第 6 章）和蒂莫西·施罗德（§3.1）拒绝这两者的排他性选择，提出两者都属于快乐的解释，正如许多中世纪人和随后的布伦塔诺所做的那样。

单一统一态度方法也面临着直观动机和技术适应性之间的问题紧张关系。将内容合理地解释为快乐有时作为一种具有命题内容的态度的直观分配，在将其扩展为所有快乐的统一命题态度理论时会遇到问题，正如安斯科姆（1981c/1967）首次观察到的那样。使用并进一步发展她的推理线索，使用她的原始例子：她与某人一起骑行的享受与她反思她正在这样做的事实是不同的，可以分开的（如果后者与此不同，则也与她当时感到高兴的情况不同）。但是在单一统一态度分析中，以似乎是自然和直观的方式应用时，似乎这些应该包括她对同一命题的同一态度的指导（或者，或者对她自我归属相同属性的指导）。但是这似乎不允许她可能喜欢其中一个而不喜欢另一个，而她肯定可以。技术问题可能有技术解决方法。也许可以将反思的活动视为安斯科姆更直接享受的相同命题内容的不同展示方式（或类似方式），同时保留该方法直观动机的一些内容。然而，更自然和直观的说法是，态度主要是针对这些不同的活动，包括一些自然描述为具有命题或 de se（属性自我归属）内容的活动，例如安斯科姆反思她正在与某人一起骑行，但也包括其他不具备这些内容的活动，例如她只是骑行。

安斯康姆早期的工作，显然是受到类似费尔德曼的提议的刺激，她提出了一种解决办法。正如她所指出的，被描述为享受一个命题或事实的情况似乎涉及我们对其进行思考或处于某种状态或类似的活动或体验（1981c/1967）。这些似乎是我们可以（遵循亚里士多德）将其视为活动的活动或体验，至少在目前的目的上是如此。然后，我们可以让不同的活动进行必要的区分，例如说享受骑行是一回事，享受反思自己正在骑行是另一回事。这种方法还可以处理小狗蹦跳和婴儿吮吸的快乐，而不会似乎将它们归因于一般和逻辑组合的表征能力，这些能力可能涉及对命题持有态度、将属性归因于自己等，小狗和婴儿可能缺乏这些能力，即使是成年人在享受午睡或温暖的沐浴时也不一定总是会行使这些能力。因此，快乐最自然和统一的态度观似乎不是费尔德曼的命题观，而是一种观点，即享受感觉就是享受感知它，类似地，享受任何认知内容或思维对象就是享受思考它或类似的活动，而这些都是实际的活动。但这似乎至少非常接近一种“副词”（依赖于活动）的新亚里士多德主义观点，即快乐的特定实例是它们活动的方式（无需任何特殊的单一态度）。

费尔德曼在一篇百科全书的论述中，可能比上述引用他自己的命题版本更广泛地呈现了态度方法对快乐的态度，允许态度快乐将活动、感觉以及事实作为其对象或内容之一（2001 年，第 667 页）。在其他地方，他允许态度命题快乐的对象包括非实际的事态（2002 年，第 608 页）。可以推测，他需要明确的不可能命题，以便区分霍布斯对（假设的）几何事实（实际上是数学上的不可能）即圆可以被平方的快乐，与他对（同样不可能的）发现这一事实的快乐。（毫无疑问，他对这两者的快乐程度可能会相反地改变，随着他的关注点转移，他首先在数学中失去了对自己的所有思考，但后来却因自我关注的骄傲而膨胀。）关于是否存在这样明确的不可能事态或命题（费尔德曼可能无法区分），似乎存在争议。费尔德曼告诉我们，快乐是一种像信念一样的态度，因此，如果像费尔德曼在 2001 年中所说的那样，它不仅以信念的内容为对象（通常被认为是抽象实体，我们已经看到，它们至少需要表示，如果不包括，非实际甚至不可能的对象），而且还包括我们必须享受的感觉和活动，那么快乐必须比信念更加普遍。因此，这种被认为是单一的快乐态度似乎沿着这条线分裂开来，部分对应于中世纪和布伦塔诺所尊重的感官和智力快乐之间的区别，通过在这一点上使他们的理论复杂化，而费尔德曼则没有这样做。 从洛克独特的快乐感到费尔德曼规定的独特态度的转变，显然并没有明显地帮助解决他所认为的快乐的统一问题；对于快乐的统一以及其他更多问题也产生了类似的疑虑。

此外，快乐与信念和类似的非情感命题态度不同，它似乎更多地与生物学有关，而不是广泛的功能。它经常似乎从一个对象溢出到另一个对象，而信念在逻辑上不能这样做；它通常被抑郁情绪压制，而一般的信念则不会；抑郁情绪可能通过抗抑郁药物和其他疗法恢复快乐的能力，而信念则没有特定的缺陷，只影响所有信念（但不影响其他态度，其内容范围类似）也没有特定的治疗方法。因此，信念等等可以合理地被认为至少在很大程度上是广泛功能状态，既不仅仅局限于任何单一离散神经系统，也不容易被所有生理上相似的个体通过类似的化学干预直接引起。如果心理现实主义和简洁性约束我们的理论，证据似乎更有利于像奥卡姆的解释那样的解释，其中思想呈现的对象可能因此而被爱，快乐经常是其结果。因此，我们可以更合理地推测，复杂的意向性主要属于心智的认知表征能力，也属于使用这些能力指称和行动于其对象的爱，但只是通过功能上适当的因果联系，通过这些和类似的方式派生给快乐。然后，我们可以通过相关活动的差异来区分霍布斯的两种快乐，以及安斯康姆的骑行和反思的派生快乐，无论我们对思考及其内容持何种观点。

2.3.3 欢迎一切可能自由漂浮的事物？

另一方面，如果 Feldman 欢迎态度的精神中的某些东西被解放出来，不再需要始终具有内容或对象，并且可以独立存在，那么它不仅可以涵盖上述所有情况，还可以涵盖我们似乎在什么都不做和对什么都不关心时感到快乐的情况。也许，快乐是一种情感开放、欢迎或即时喜欢的立场（暂时用这个词来代替），我们可以全心全意地参与我们喜欢的活动和体验，从思考到游泳，甚至只是躺着“无所事事”，但它也可以（不像普通的命题态度或自我[自我中心]态度）在没有任何对象或内容的情况下存在。像许多体验特征和心理过程一样，它可能有时与其他特征和过程整合和绑定在一起，但有时不会，而同一事件实例可能在变量绑定和整合发展、衰减和转变的同时存活（也许在快乐不增加的情况下变化，正如伊壁鸠鲁派所说的），而底层的情绪或准备好愉快参与的立场则保持不变，而不是根据其内容或对象来个体化，就像特定的有意识的心理行为一样。快乐本身可能是一种中心状态，独立于这些态度而存在，也许作为它们共同的内在基础。

经验证据表明，情感可以与通常情况下与之相关的对象分离存在，这支持了将情感以较少与对象相关的方式来思考。在实验中，将快乐与对象绑定的非意识机制可以被欺骗，对快乐的来源产生个人层面的无知或错误（这些机制可能进化出来用于追踪快乐的来源），甚至通过实验操作形成任意新的偏好，而无意识地形成任意新的偏好。例如，实验对象可能在没有意识到看到笑脸的情况下，通过初次接触一张笑脸的照片后更喜欢某种饮料。这可能是因为无意识的认知机制“错误地归因”了愉悦感，它们无法意识到更合适的正面情感来源，因此将愉悦感归因于它们找到的下一个显著刺激，从而导致对该饮料的持久喜好。类似的情感溢出现象在日常生活中似乎很常见，例如，未被关注的身体不适导致对显著目标的愤怒。所有这些现象都可以通过情感过程与在认知上更优化的条件下本应与之相关的对象分离来解释。[24]

根据这一科学基础和其他科学（例如 Shizgal 1997, 1999），似乎情感可能像颜色和许多其他特征一样，在大脑中与任何对象的表示分开处理，这些特征（例如颜色或愉悦感）实际上属于或稍后被分配给的对象。然而，这种分配可能需要主动绑定到对象表示，然而在我们对喜好或希望的体验中，我们的情感似乎经常与这些对象融合在一起。在无对象的“散漫”情绪的情况下，情感的绑定并没有转移到没有引起它的对象上，而是情感本身保持无对象和未绑定（只是因为缺乏适当的认知可接近的对象），这种情况在不寻常的经历中似乎是明确且常见的，甚至在日常梦幻生活中也是如此，以在个人层面上建立对象独立性，即使对于情感错位的实验证据被拒绝。在情绪心理学中，正向情感通常是散漫的（无对象）这一点似乎是毫无争议的（Watson 2000; Thayer 1989, 1996）。在行为神经科学的理论化中，也有人认为快乐本身是无对象的（例如 Robinson 和 Berridge，1993，第 261 页）。这一假设也是心理学家和情绪专家詹姆斯·拉塞尔（James Russell）关于核心情感的概念的基础，该概念将一个本身无对象的良好感觉置于构建更复杂的正面情绪的基础层面上（Russell 2003）。

我们可以称所有持有快乐是一种欢迎态度的观点（其中实例部分由其内容或对象个体化）或者是一种潜在的独立欢迎立场的观点为“欢迎观点” - 只有后者，其中它是一种可以自由漂浮的立场，才是“欢迎任何事物的观点”。[25] 后者捕捉到了生物学家和心理学家与行为途径的联系，以及过去的哲学家和常识与欲望的联系，同时仍然允许快乐有时是一种独立的欢迎心情和非意向性的，但具有成为与表征状态和呈现物体为好的绑定的潜力。这样的立场可以通过经验核心部分来统一和认可。

2.3.4 意向性、主观性和意识

布伦塔诺有影响力地声称所有心理现象都表现出意向性作为它们的独特标志（Jacob 2014）。（布伦塔诺所借鉴的哲学概念的古老根源是认知的。）寻求统一解释西方现代概念中涵盖的所有现象的哲学家们通常会追随布伦塔诺的脚步，希望以表征性的术语来做到这一点，并以此解释意识。在这方面，他们可能会寻求神经科学关于信息从外周感受器重新映射到大脑以及从一个脑区到另一个脑区的解释的支持和指导。因此，迈克尔·泰在讨论心情时，引用了安东尼奥·达马西奥关于感觉代表身体状况的解释（Damasio 1994, 1999, 2003; Tye 1995, pp. 128–30; Craig 2002, 2009, 2015）。

故意结构也受到了主体/客体二元性的激励，这种二元性在形而上学上可能是必要的，甚至在主观意识本身中也是给定的。快乐经常被认为是立即、本质上甚至完全自觉的。然而，一些哲学家区分了快乐和对快乐的意识。这可能引入了一层意图结构，否则在快乐本身中找不到。7 世纪的印度出现了尼亚亚和瓦伊舍什卡对一些自我否定的佛教徒的观点的批评，即所有意识，因此所有快乐，都是自我揭示的，不需要更高级的认知行为。G·E·摩尔（G. E. Moore）继续了柏拉图的观点，认为我们必须决定快乐或认知意识（或者，正如摩尔所说的，“对快乐的意识”）是快乐价值的所在，这恰当地位于对快乐的意识中，而不是裸露的快乐本身。也许我们对意识的概念在这个关节处分裂开来，快乐可能是立即或“现象上”体验的，同时又不被注意到，也没有普遍的认知可及。对于应用布洛克（Block）的这种区分（Block 1995, 1997, 2002; Katz 2005b; cp. Haybron 2007）的简单图景持有同情态度的人，可能会将快乐的价值定位在裸露的快乐中，而不是在对其的任何认知意识中。然后，我们可以通过允许非二元的现象体验来调解佛教徒和他们的对手之间的分歧，而不坚持认为它需要是认知自我揭示的，并回应摩尔的说法，即即使在未经监测的情况下，愉悦体验也可能是现象意识和有价值的。事实上，科学家们越来越认为，快乐，就像许多认知状态和过程一样，是可以与意识分离的。

3. 快乐、动机和大脑

快乐的简单图景因其自身的体验性质而被认为是有价值和有吸引力的，至少在理论上可能会抵挡到目前为止的反对意见。然而，更仔细地观察我们对快乐的体验，它与动机之间长期以来已经被注意到的但是变化多端的联系，以及研究这些联系的科学，引发了进一步的问题。快乐本身，或者至少是与之通常相结合并容易混淆的动机形式，经过更深入的分析可能会分离开来。对真正好像看起来那么好的真正快乐的追寻，超越了强迫性渴望或生物幻觉的玷污，现在在大脑研究中继续进行。这些研究使我们有理由认为，如果存在某种单一的真正快乐的体验，它与动机的关系可能比简单图景、享乐主义和常识所假设的更多样化、复杂化和依赖于情况。但也许更深层次的哲学家和瑜伽士早已知道这一点。

3.1 基于动机的分析及其问题

快乐传统上与动机有关联，尽管不同的传统对此有不同的看法。柏拉图（《魅力篇》167e1-3），亚里士多德（《修辞学》I，11:1370a16-18；《动物学》II，3:414b2-6 和 II，9:4332b3-7；《伦理学》II，7:1223a34-35），以及他们所代表的常识在人类动机方面是多元论的。对于所有这些人来说，虽然一种显著的动机涉及对快乐或愉快事物的渴望，但人们也有其他终极目标。他们争夺荣誉和其他纯粹竞争的物品，寻求报复，并追求和回避其他事物。有时，他们这样做是基于最终非快乐的评价判断。快乐主义者认为，自发地寻求快乐是快乐作为我们终极目标和善的独特地位的证据，这可以从婴儿的未受文化影响和因此未被腐化的欲望和价值观中看出。古代斯多葛派对这些现象的解释阻止了快乐主义者对自然权威的诉诸：快乐实际上是实现其他目标的副产品，从婴儿的先天冲动开始，而这些冲动并不是指向快乐，而是指向食物等生物性物品，由指向其保存的自然本能引导，这种本能可能会被理性动机所取代（朗和塞德利，1987，65A3-4；布伦施维希，1986）。奥古斯丁在将快乐归因于意志方面对斯多葛派产生了重要影响（《上帝之城》XIV，6）；后来的西方基督教思想主要遵循了他的观点。

现代西方哲学家们，遵循亚里士多德对动机统一的解释（DA 433a30–b13）以及奥古斯丁将所有动机视为意愿的爱（但常常忽视他们和他们的传统同样坚持的动机种类多元主义），通常将“欲望”视为包括所有动机，并以相同模式解释。在 1600 年至 1900 年间，他们经常将欲望视为统一地指向自己的快乐，沿着简单的图景所暗示的线路。约瑟夫·巴特勒（1726 年）对人性的这种享乐主义自私观念作出回应，重新强调了斯多葛派对动机优先于快乐的坚持，以及相关的中世纪观点，即快乐总是由满足某种欲望（用他的语言来说就是“激情”）来构成。因此，他可以主张，没有先前的动机，寻求快乐是不可能的，因为快乐总是由某种动机（在他的语言中是“激情”）的满足构成，而利他主义动机从原则上讲与其他任何动机一样能够导致高度满足的欲望水平，从而导致快乐。

然而，将满足欲望视为快乐的必要条件存在明显的反例，正如柏拉图早在很久以前指出的那样（菲勒伯斯 51A–52C）：我们经常享受一些令人惊讶的事物，如景色、声音和香气，而在之前我们并没有想要它们，当它们与我们在一起时，我们会紧紧抓住它们，但在它们消失后我们并不渴望它们。但是，巴特勒显然遵循了柏拉图及其中世纪的继承者，暗示地将无意识内部表达的需求视为与欲望相同的一种。蒂莫西·施罗德今天也是如此（2001 年，2004 年），但在他的解释中，快乐并不需要实际存在的欲望或满足，而是一种感知到其净满足度增加的可废除的感觉。然而，所依据的神经科学中的信息解释似乎非常薄弱（卡茨 2005c）。关于快乐的旧的欲望满足解释容易受到基于在满足之前就消失的欲望的反例的影响（布兰特 1982）。最近的一些作者通过提出满足当前欲望，如对当前经验的情感欲望（马德尔 2002 年，第 97-98 页），来避免这些问题。其他当代关于快乐的作家，在民间心理学（戴维斯，1981a，1981b，1982）和元伦理学（希思伍德 2006 年，2007 年）中进行分析还原主义项目时，声称快乐可定义为对当前欲望的满足的信念。然而，我们经常不会享受我们继续渴望的事物，至少在一段时间内是这样。而沉溺则是这种渴望长时间存在而不会在放纵时带来快乐的显著案例。而区分相信或感知我们现在正在得到我们想要的东西与现在实际得到它并不能解决这类问题。 因此，似乎不能仅仅将欲望、满足感、感知或对满足感的信念作为快乐的充分条件，更不用说将它们与快乐等同起来，正如这些哲学家们曾经提出的那样。

一个不禁怀疑，对于快乐的欲望满足相关观点的吸引力，可能是因为在感到满足和欲望被满足（即实现）之间存在一种无意识的模棱两可，仅仅是因为满足条件的实现，可能是在欲望者死后很久才发生。 （后一种用法类似于逻辑学家谈论满足的方式，而不涉及所考虑的语言对象的满足感或幸福感。）人们可以以一种使纯粹的项目实现计入其中的方式来看待某人的成功，但很难理解为什么像那样的事情，或者感知（Schroeder 2001, 2004）或相信（Davis and Heathwood）它，应该直接成为某人快乐的解释之一，即使在他还活着的时候。为了适应柏拉图的苏格拉底的例子（Gorgias 494A–495A），以适用于马德尔，一个人可能强烈而情感地渴望继续体验挠痒或搓搓自己的感觉，这种欲望同时得到满足，但自己并没有在这样做中体验到快乐。在适当的时间内满足强迫性或成瘾性的渴望并不一定令人愉快。为了避免所有这些反例，适当限制欲望的种类似乎需要将与快乐或类似的东西建立起关系，从而放弃还原的项目。与前述相一致，几十年来，社会心理学研究使用幸福的自我评价（例如，Strack, Argyle, and Schwarz 1991）表明，存在一个快乐的组成部分（或两个，一个用于积极情感，一个用于消极情感），这些自我报告追踪人们的感觉有多好，但与追踪他们对所期望或重视的目标实现的信念的组成部分是独立的。人们关心这两个方面，但出于不同的原因。

除了与行为更密切相关的“欲望”之外，以动机术语分析快乐也面临问题。亨利·西奇威克拒绝了将快乐简单地解释为“我们寻求进入意识并在那里保留的感觉”或者“动机力”这样的关系解释，认为这种解释无法正确回答有关任何严格定义所要求的快乐程度的“数量”问题。他认为，虽然“休息、热水浴等快乐”可以通过转向以动机性倾向为基础的解释来处理，但兴奋往往会增加与快乐不成比例的动机，这个反对意见也适用于当今类似的行为和动机解释。[28]

3.2 快乐的善与动机无关吗？

另一方面，如果快乐与动机之间没有密切联系，为什么快乐更有可能成为追求的对象，而不是回避或漠视的对象，这似乎是个谜。自然选择可以解释为什么已经追求快乐并避免痛苦的动物会喜欢有营养的食物，并在受伤时感到疼痛。但是，它并不清楚如何解释为什么动物追求快乐和回避痛苦，而不是相反。哲学家们对于在一个由全知、全能和全善的上帝或任何类似的以善为导向的目的论秩序中创造的世界中存在邪恶的问题非常熟悉。很难解释为什么在这样的世界中会有任何邪恶。但是在对自然完全非目的论的观点上，看到为什么动物特别追求自己或任何善（参见柏拉图《费多篇》97B8-99C6）似乎同样困难。这两个问题都取决于我们对相关规范概念的独立把握。如果邪恶只是上帝不愿意的任何事情，而动物的善或快乐只是它倾向于或被自然选择追求的任何事情，这两个难题都将消失。

这个善的问题在过去的一个世纪中，特别针对与快乐的简单观念相似的观点提出，根据这种观点，快乐是由于其内在本质的原因而有价值的，也许仅仅是因为它在当下的感受方式，而与我们或其他动物实际上是否渴望或追求它无关。有人认为，这种关于快乐的观念使我们对快乐的追求成为一种明显的奇迹般的巧合，需要解释。这并不是为了支持神学或目的论，而是在论证快乐必须与动物的冲动或欲望本质上相连时提出的（Alston 1967，第 345-46 页；Findlay 1961，第 175-78 页；McDougall，1911，第 324-25 页）。将这个难题看作是苏格拉底对于尤西弗洛的问题的人类对应物可能有所帮助，这个问题是关于虔诚行为的正义和神圣之爱哪个逻辑上先出现（柏拉图，尤西弗洛，6E11-11B1）。哪个逻辑上先出现，快乐的价值还是动机？也许科学通过揭示快乐的构成以及它与动机的纠缠关系，将告诉我们对这个人类尤西弗洛问题给出哪个答案，或者提出一些第三种解决办法。一些价值快乐主义者倾向于回答我们和其他动物仅仅通过理性地理解并相应地追求快乐来回应快乐的价值（Goldstein 1980, 1989, 2002）。然而，古代和中世纪的人们生活在一个目的论的世界观中（在这个世界观中，对善的吸引力不需要进一步的解释），他们可以这样回答，从这个意义上说，似乎他们没有面临善的问题，而这个问题在于放弃了未解释的目的论。然而，原则上，非揭示性的解释是可能的。 例如，也许快乐和痛苦与良好和不良的营养或代谢状态之间的原始身份或自然关系为自然选择提供了基础，从能量和疲劳的感觉开始，仅代表它们自己，使其能够逐渐与更多的事物连接并代表更多的事物，然后将这些代表与动机奖励系统纠缠在一起，从而导致下一节讨论的生物学。

3.3 分割快乐或寻找真正的快乐？

柏拉图和后来的希腊思想家，以及古代印度的许多人，区分了与渴望某种欲望相关的快乐与不涉及任何欲望或需求以及与之相关的痛苦、紧张或压力的快乐。类似的问题也出现在解释当今情感、动机和成瘾的神经科学中。

根据亚当·斯密（1790/1976）的观点，“快乐包括宁静和享受。没有宁静就没有享受；而完全的宁静几乎没有什么不能让人愉悦的。”（III, 3, 30, p. 149）而在功利主义中，约翰·斯图尔特·密尔将兴奋和宁静区分为两种满足的来源，前者使我们能够忍受痛苦，后者则是没有快乐的缺失（1971 年，第二章，第 13 段）。他们因此借鉴了希腊化时期传统中的区别，比如享乐主义和斯多葛主义思想，后者（与密尔不同）建议避免更加激活和欲望驱动的快乐形式，并将最幸福的生活视为平静和宁静的生活。（参见 Haybron，2008 年关于调适和宁静的论述。）这样的建议在柏拉图对与强烈欲望相关的快乐的敌意以及亚里士多德将回顾已经拥有的知识所带来的平静快乐排在获取和创造新知识、竞争成就以及满足世俗欲望的快乐之上的观点中有前例。（参见 Ivar Labukt 最近的观点（2012 年），即关于快乐的经验观点可能在经验性方面出错，而是忽视了快乐可能是多种体验的可能性。）

印度教传统不仅丰富地推崇无执着作为通往宁静之道，而且在分析与传统冥想实践相关的体验状态方面也有着悠久的历史。南传佛教的巴利经典，在其他佛教传统中也有类似的段落，描述了冥想专注的逐渐深入阶段（禅定），通过这些阶段，人们首先停止引发和维持思维，然后也停止激发愉悦兴趣（pīti），最后甚至失去了底层的愉悦、喜悦或舒适感（狭义上的 sukha），从而进入了一种平静、全然接纳的 upekkha 状态（从词源上来说，是“观看”），有时被传统描述为没有快乐（sukha）或痛苦（dukkha），但偶尔也被描述为愉快（sukha）。在注释传统中，愉悦兴趣和（纯粹的）快乐之间的区别（传统上被归类为感受，而不是以愉悦兴趣为主的意向状态）是通过对比一个炎热疲惫的沙漠旅行者第一次听说并看到一片阴凉树林中的水池时的状态，以及一个实际享受或使用后休息的状态来解释的。冥想者更喜欢后者，因为它更加纯粹和宁静，可能因为它是一种更纯粹、更宁静的快乐，没有被渴望的兴趣和动机所混杂，这些似乎带有压力、紧张或痛苦。类似的区别，在至少过去一个世纪的行为和心理科学研究中，已经被用来区分为预期、准备或工具性行为而准备动物的欲望状态，以及功能上较晚的完成行为并结束这些行为并进入休息状态的行为（Sherrington 1906/1947，第 329 页以下；W. Craig 1918；Davidson 1994）。

在当代情感神经科学中，出现了类似的解释性问题。在这里，我们也发现了一种激活的兴趣和动机状态，许多人倾向于将其与快乐等同起来。大脑的中脑多巴胺系统的激活组织了许多特别是带来我们生活中不仅是外在奖励，而且是意义的工具性追求。然而，它似乎也驱动着我们的强迫症和渴望，这种渴望在戒断可卡因成瘾者身上常常没有缓解的欣快感。对于这种多巴胺活动的一般快乐解释所面临的明显悖论，许多科学家，包括以前的支持者，都已经放弃了这种解释和类似的解释（例如，Wise 1994）。快乐和痛苦之间的区别可能在大脑的其他地方产生。

理论倾向的情感神经科学家肯特·贝里奇几十年来一直有影响力地主张，中脑边缘多巴胺本身并不能带来真正的快乐，但意识快乐中涉及的一种“喜欢”状态的核心神经基础是通过其他脑活动介导的，包括一些涉及阿片受体和有时也涉及大麻素受体的活动。这些似乎参与组织电路和网络活动，使得在用餐、性活动、个人关系的满足和放松阶段更加突出的品味成为可能，就我们所知，所有其他的快乐和享受也是如此，即使中脑边缘多巴胺的“渴望”在这些阶段的早期、探索性、欲望、工具性和接近性阶段通常更加突出。贝里奇及其合作者有力地主张，在没有局部愉悦“热点”活动的参与下，就没有真正的快乐，这些小区域中的特定递质活动总是必需的。尽管据我们所知，这些结果可能具有普遍性，但迄今为止的大部分证据来自对啮齿动物的侵入性实验，因此依赖于表达和自愿行为来指示快乐。（有关贝里奇的参考文献和他的网站，请参阅下面的新评论文章、Kringelbach 的参考文献以及他们共同编辑的 2010 年论文。有关相关阿片受体系统的补充观点，请参阅 Depue 和 Morrone-Strupinksy 2005 年的第 6.1.2 节，第 323-325 页）。新出现的画面似乎不是“快乐中心”或“快乐递质”的画面，而是多样的神经元能够灵活地行为，以不同的方式，并因此能够集体自组织成不同的电路和不同的网络，具有不同的输入和神经调节，其中一些差异造成了感到快乐、一般或悲伤的差异。 但我们必须记住，这门科学仍然是一个正在进行中的工作，而且在这个时候，情况变得更加复杂，而不是更简单。

或许，Berridge 的“喜欢”和“渴望”这两种通常功能集成的活动模式，组织了根本不同的情感、动机和体验状态，无论它们经常混合或时间上交织在一起，都应该被视为对我们天真和不加区分的快乐的明显继承者。然而，只要相关的快乐概念是一种规范性的概念，这个继承问题也将如此。当 Berridge 的“喜欢”没有与“渴望”和痛苦混合在一起时，我们很容易将其视为没有驱动力的、纯粹和真实的快乐，这是沉思者和哲学家长期以来一直在寻求的，而且按照 Berridge 的观点，这种“喜欢”可以与任何对象分离（参见上面的 3.3 立场），被视为（真正的）快乐 - 多巴胺的“渴望”则是愚人的快乐渣滓，我们理想情况下应该从中解脱出来，像伊壁鸠鲁的神一样生活。然而，在实践中，我们可能仍然需要在这两者之间交替占主导地位（参见米尔，1871 年，第二章，第 13 段）。因此，快乐通常可能是一个相对脆弱和短暂的生物综合症的产物，这种综合症是追求和暂时达到的一个更大的生物综合症，就像亚里士多德将快乐的完善比作青春的绽放“在生物成熟的基础上出现”，使用了一个术语，epigignomenon，早期应用于医学中由于基础疾病状态引起的加重症状（NE X，4:1174b31-33，Liddell 和 Scott，1940 年，ad loc. epigignomai）。

基于科学证据，如果快乐分离，它将沿着这样的线路，而不是那些与意向结构（态度和对象之间）或感官快乐、享受活动和所谓的命题快乐之间的关注所暗示的线路。但这应该不会让人感到惊讶。情绪障碍及其治疗也不会沿着这样的先验线路进行区分（Millgram 1997，124 引用 Katz 1986，119）。

4. 结论：内观，展望未来

也许只有一种真正的快乐，即从压力中解脱的幸福快乐，存在于所有看似多样的快乐中，包括热水浴、性满足、青春友谊和摆脱对孩子的责任，这些都在第 2.1 节的阿富汗简短名单中提到-它与恐惧和辣味的灼痛的混合只是由于它可以通过我们的生物学和过去的条件反射引起的方式。或许还会有更多内在的、而不仅仅是因果关系的多样性。我们和我们的快乐体验在我们的大脑和有机体中的位置和构成仍有待观察。在新兴的生理学中运用规范智慧可能是必要的，至少在快乐的概念上，至少在天真的体验者（他们似乎通过快乐呈现为对他们有益）的主要使用中，它是一种评价性和规范性的概念，然而，当科学家和哲学家对其进行理论化时，这可能是合法的（参见 Sidgwick 1907，129，关于斯多葛派认为这种外观总是具有欺骗性，而不仅仅是像柏拉图[Moss 2006]和亚里士多德[Moss 2012]那样偶尔可矫正的外观）。

这样做的目的是在保留早期观点的同时，要记住快乐是一种生物学、心理学和体验性的东西，其中大部分仍然是未知的，不适宜事先规定其性质或类别。也许快乐表达了我们自然无忧无痛的状态（亚里士多德）的畅通无阻的功能，通过这种功能，我们能够从快乐的核心向外延伸，与更多的代表性脑过程以及通过这些过程与爱接触到整个世界（见注 25）。但也许快乐具有更复杂的反身意向结构，正如第 2.3.1 节和注 20 所提到的一些中世纪文献所暗示的那样，对于反复出现的神经活动的自组织的理解将有助于我们更好地内省这一点。至少这些建议和其他建议是相容的。或许快乐分为两种，也许沿着前一节讨论的“渴望”和“喜欢”的界线分开，没有一种自然种类能够回应我们直观追求的一切，直到我们准备好追求阿片类的极乐和安宁，都需要多巴胺奖励来组织我们的探索快乐。但我们也不应忘记更加谦逊和基本的生物学事实：情绪随能量变化而变化，因此随着影响体温的昼夜节律以及血液中营养物质的当前可用性而变化（Thayer 1989, 1996）；我们体验到的快乐程度也取决于获得足够和足够好的睡眠；快乐增强免疫反应（Rosenkranz 等，2003），我们的感受如何在一定程度上可能源于监测身体稳态（Craig 2002, 2009, 2015）。这些事实对于可能最终成为通常因果相关特征综合症而不是简单或统一的心理生物现象的特征是有启示性的，这种特征更适合哲学家对简单种类和简单解释的偏好。

对于快乐以及它在大脑中的组织方式，新的深入科学理解的前景似乎很好。我们可能会从这种新理解的实际结果中获益良多 - 尤其是如果像沃兹涅辛斯基所说的那样，

生活中最重要的是人的感受：你快乐吗？还好吗？还是悲伤？[33]

但是，即使对于那些对价值或情感不太感兴趣的心灵哲学家来说，快乐也应该是特别感兴趣的，部分原因是显然没有内容的情绪对心灵的表征性解释提出了强烈的挑战。我们经验中深层次的主观或现象学方面，在心灵哲学的其他领域可能更容易被忽视，在这里却似乎直接面对着我们，问题的核心似乎不是信息内容或广泛的功能角色，而只是“你是快乐还是悲伤”。然而，在心灵研究中，裸露的内在事实和被视为坚实基础的简单图景的表象经常被证明是误导性的。随着心灵和大脑科学的发展成熟，它们将提供关于快乐及其在我们和类似心灵中的作用的新证据，以及关于这些作用是否可能分离、以及如何分离的证据，也许会使快乐成为不止一种自然类型。对于关于快乐的统一性、多样性和本质以及其与痛苦、动机、意识和价值的关系的重大问题的真正答案，可能需要进一步的科学研究结果以及对这些结果进行科学和哲学敏感的解释。

Bibliography

This will gradually be supplemented by linked lists of suggested readings divided by subject.

Canonical Religious Texts, by Tradition

• Buddhist Canon (Theravadin, Pali in original), 1974 translation, (1st ed. this trans., 1900), A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, Being a Translation, now made for the First Time, from the Original Pali, of the First Book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka entitled Dhamma-sangani, Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids (ed.) and Introductory Essay and Notes, 3rd ed., London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the Pali Text Society.

• Buddhist Canon (Theravadin, Pali in original), 1995 translation, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, trans. Bhikkhu Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Boston: Wisdom Publications.

• Christian Bible.

• Hebrew Bible.

• Upanishads.

References, by Author

• Adolphs, Ralph and Damasio, Antonio, 2001, “The Interaction of Affect and Cognition: A Neurobiological Perspective”, in Forgas 2001, pp. 27–49.

• Algra, Keimpe; Barnes, Jonathan; Mansfield, Jaap; and Schofield, Malcolm, 1999, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Alston, William, 1967, “Pleasure”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards (ed.), London and New York: Macmillan, Vol. 6, pp. 341–347. A clear and concise account of some reasons driving changes in philosophers’ and introspectionist psychologists’ views of pleasure through the preceding century and also of some main competing views and objections to them, as seen at the time of writing.

• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1963/1957, Intention, 2nd ed. (1st ed., 1957), Oxford: Blackwell. Seminal work in philosophy of action by a leading disciple of Wittgenstein. A very short but deep and influential discussion of pleasure leads up to a dismissal of ethical hedonism in particular, and perhaps of any appeal to pleasure in theory quite generally, on p. 77.

• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981a, The Collected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, 3 vols., Oxford: Blackwell.

• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981b/1958 “Modern Moral Philosophy”, in Anscombe, 1981a, Vol. III, pp. 26–42. A summary version of the relevant 1963/1957 passage is in this paper’s seventh paragraph at p. 27. Original publication: Philosophy, 33(124) (1958): 1–16.

• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981c/1967, “On the Grammar of Enjoy”, in 1981a, Vol. II, pp. 94–100. Original publication: Journal of Philosophy, 64(19): 607–614.

• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981d/1978, “Will and Emotion”, in 1981a, Vol. I, pp. 100–107. Original publication: Grazer Philosophische Studien, 5 (1978): 139–148.

• Aquinas, Thomas, 1975 (written 1268–71), Summa Theologiæ (‘ST’) 1a 2æ (first division of second part), questions 31–39. The Blackfriars edition, vol. 20, “Pleasure”, has the Latin text and an English translation of these by Eric D’Arcy. New York: McGraw-Hill and London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. Also relevant is question 11 in vol. 17, on fruitio, enjoyment in possession of something prized as ultimately valuable (correctly, only of God, as by the saints in Heaven, in their beatific vision of God), following Augustine (see n. 20, para. 4).

• Argyle, Michael, 2001 (1st ed., 1987), The Psychology of Happiness, 2d ed., New York: Taylor and Francis; Hove, East Sussex: Routledge. Chs. 2 and 3 are cited as especially relevant; its subject is broader than ours.

• Aristotle, 1984, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.

• Aristotle, De Anima (‘DA’).

• Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics (‘EE’).

• Aristotle, Magna Moralia (‘MM’). II, 7.

• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. (‘NE’) VII, 11–14; X, 1–6.

• Aristotle, Politics.

• Aristotle, Protrepticus. Fragment B87 in its context, a reconstruction from quotations of this presumably relatively early popular work of Aristotle’s. B87 may be found in the 1984 Complete Works at p. 2414.

• Aristotle, Rhetoric I: 11 gives a version of the standard Platonic-Academic definition of pleasure rather than that of the ethical works listed just above. Book II: 1–11 discusses specific emotions, characterizing most as forms of pleasure and pain.

• Aristotle, Topica.

• Armstrong, D.M., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: The Humanities Press. Pp. 175–79 on pleasure and pp. 85–89 identifying dispositions with their categorical basis.

• Ashby, F. Gregory; Isen, Alice M; and Turken, And U., “A Neuropsychological Account of Positive Affect and Its Influence on Cognition”, Psychological Review, 106(3): 529–50. A dopamine-pleaure interpretation lies, in part, behind the title.

• Augustine, De Civitate Dei contra Paganos (The City of God, ‘CD’). XIV,vi on pleasure as belonging to the Will and XIV,vii elaborating this ethically and theologically as a form of love (into which is packed not only all motivation but all natural motion and a tie to the Holy Spirit of Trinitarian theology as well). Augustine’s sparse remarks here and elsewhere were taken as authoritative in the ensuing Western medieval Christian tradition. There are many editions and translations.

• Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana (On Christian Instruction/Doctrine/Teaching).

• Augustine, 1963, De Trinitate, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Trinity, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. This translation is now available in a paperback edition from Cambridge University Press, 2002, with an editor’s note by Gareth Matthews on the merits and demerits of this and other English translations, p. xxxii.

• Aydede, Murat, 2000, “An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-à-Vis Pain”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXI(3): 537–70. Distinguishes affective reactions from sensory states in this discussion only of physical (bodily) pleasure, with reference especially to the 1949–1973 Anglo-American philosophical literature.

• Aydede, Murat, 2013, “Pain”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Pain (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring 2013 Edition)>. §§5 and 6.1 contain discussion of the distinction between pain sensation and pain affect discussed in n. 1; comprehensive pain bibliographies are linked to at that entry’s end.

• Bain, Alexander, 1876, The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed., New York: D. Appleton and Co.

• Bargh, John A. and Deborah K. Apsley, 2002, Unraveling the Complexities of Social Life: A Festschrift in Honor of Robert B. Zajonc, Washington: American Psychological Association.

• Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Niedenthal, Paula M; and Winkielman, Piotr (eds.), 2005; Emotion and Consciousness, New York and London: The Guilford Press.

• Bartolic, E.I.; Basso, M. R.; Schefft, B.K.; Glauser, T.; Titanic-Schefft, M., 1999, “Effects of experimentally-induced emotional states on frontal lobe cognitive task performance”, Neuropsychologia, 37(6): 677–83.

• Beebe-Center, J.G., 1932 , The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness, New York: Russell and Russell. Summarizes and discusses results and controversies in the introspectionist academic experimental psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

• Beebe-Center, J.G., 1951, “Feeling and Emotion,” in Harry Helson (ed.), Theoretical Foundations of Psychology, New York: D Van Nostrand & Co., pp. 254–317.

• Berridge, Craig W.; España, Rodrigo A.; and Stalnaker, Thomas A., 2003, “Stress and Coping: Asymmetry of Dopamine Efferents within the Prefrontal Cortex”, in Hugdahl and Davidson 2003, pp. 69–103.

• Berridge, Kent C., 1996, “Food Reward: Brain Substrates of Wanting and Liking”, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 20(1): 1–25.

• Berridge, Kent C., 1999, “Pleasure, Pain, Desire and Dread”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 525–557. Excellent and accessible review emphasizing the distinction between consciously reportable affect and underlying ‘core processes’ that are supposedly in themselves unconscious. One wonders, however, whether Block’s (1995, 2002) phenomenal consciousness might be present in the activity of some of these.

• Berridge, Kent C., 2003a, “Comparing the Emotional Brains of Humans and other Animals,” in Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith 2003 (Handbook), pp. 25–51,

• Berridge, Kent C., 2003b, “Pleasures of the brain”, Brain and Cognition, 52: 106–128. Sophisticated review of the case for a distinction between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ within the supposedly unconscious ‘core processes’ of the brain.

• Berridge, Kent C., 2004, “Pleasure, Unfelt Affect, and Irrational Desire”, in Manstead, Frijda, and Fischer 2004, pp. 243–62.

• Berridge, Kent C. and Morten L. Kringelbach, 2015, “Pleasure Systems in the Brain”, Neuron 86:646–664.

• Berridge, Kent C. and Robinson, Terry E., 1998, “What is the role of dopamine in reward: hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience?” Brain Research Reviews 28,3:309–69. After Robinson and Berridge 1993, perhaps still the best place for a rigorous statement of the theoretical approach behind the developing research program discussed in §3.3, last three paragraphs.

• Berridge, Kent C. and Robinson, Terry E., 2003, “Parsing Reward,” Trends in Neurosciences, 26(9): 507–13.

• Berridge, Kent C. and Winkielman, Piotr, 2003, “‘What is an unconscious emotion?’ (The case for unconscious ‘liking’)”, Cognition and Emotion, 17(2): 181–211.

• Block, Ned, 1995, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–47. This is here followed by many peer commentaries and the author’s reply. Block’s paper is updated in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press, 1997.

• Block, Ned, 1997, “Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20: 159–65. Contains responses to additional commentaries.

• Block, Ned, 2002, “Concepts of Consciousness”, in David Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 206–18. Abridged and revised from Block 1995.

• Bolles, Robert C. (ed.), 1991, The Hedonics of Taste, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

• Bourdon, 1893, “La Sensation de Plaisir”, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 36: 225–37.

• Bramble, Ben, 2013, “The distinctive feeling of pleasure”, Philosophical Studies, 162: 201–17.

• Brandt, Richard B., 1979, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Brandt, Richard B., 1982, “Two Concepts of Utility,” in Richard B. Brandt, 1992, Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 196–212. Original publication: Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Its Limits, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, pp. 169–85. An objection to desire-fulfillment views of pleasure is based in desires’ changing over time.

• Brandt, Richard B., 1993, “Comments on Sumner” in Brad Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules, and Utility: New Esssays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 229–32. A reply to objections in a volume with a useful bibliography and critical papers, among which that by L.W. Sumner, “The Evolution of Utility: A Philosophical Journey”, pp. 97–114, traces changes in, and appraises, Brandt’s views bearing on our subject.

• Brentano, Franz, 1907/1979, Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie, 2nd ed., with additions, Roderick Chisholm and Reinhard Fabian (eds.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (1st. ed.: Leipzig: von Duncker & Humblot, 1907). Note 39 on pp. 235–40 (pp. 119–25 of 1st ed.), referenced here, is key for a precise interpretation of Brentano’s views on pleasure and their divergence with those of his former protegé Karl Stumpf. The Brentano-Stumpf controversy obviously bears a close analogy and historical relation to medieval debates on pleasure such as those, mentioned in §2.3.1, ¶2 and in n. 20 ad loc., discussed in McGrade 1987. Many of the same questions explicitly or implicitly arise: Is pleasure a distinct act? If not, what is its relation to the acts to which it belongs? What are its relations to sensation and thought? Does a conscious act always or sometimes take itself as an object (in a different way from any others it has) or is another act always required to reflect on or take pleasure in it?

• Brentano, Franz, 1921/1969, “Loving and Hating”, Appendix IX, in his The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, (Oskar Kraus, ed., 3rd German edition, 1934), Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind (trans.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: Humanities Press, pp. 137–60. Original German publication: “Vom Lieben und Hassen”, Anhang, IX, in Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 2nd ed., Oskar Kraus, (ed.), Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921; this was dictated by Brentano in 1907. A source especially for Brentano’s view of bodily pleasure being involved even in cognitive pleasure, by being caused by one’s judgment or loving, exposited with further references in Chisholm 1987.

• Brentano, Franz, 1929/1981, Sensory and Noetic Consciousness: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint III, Oskar Kraus (ed.), Margarete Schättle and Linda L. McAlister (trans. ed.), Linda L. McAlister (trans.), London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: Humanities Press. Original German publication: Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtein, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929. Pp. 14, 16, 59 in Part I, iii, 5 & 7 and Part II, i, 28 are a source for Brentano’s complex intentional theory of pleasure as loving one’s loving of one’s experiencing and also that experiencing itself, exposited with further references in Chisholm 1986 and 1987.

• Brink, David O., 1989, Moral realism and the foundations of ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Contains critical discussion of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy charge against value hedonism, at pp. 151–54.

• Broad, C.D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

• Bruder, Gerard E., 2003, “Frontal and Parietal Asymmetries in Depressive Disorders: Behavioral, Electrophysiologic, and Neuroimaging Findings”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 719–42.

• Brunschwig, Jacques, 1986, “The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism,” in Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker (eds.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, pp. 113–44.

• Buddhaghosa (c. 400 CE Buddhist), 1920–21, The Expositor (Atthasālīni: Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on the Dhammasangani, the First Book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka), 2 vols., Maung Tin (trans.), Mrs. Rhys Davids (ed. and rev.), London: Oxford University Press, for the Pali Text Society.

• Buddhaghosa (c. 400 CE Buddhist), 1979, The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), tr., Ñâṇamoli, 4th ed., Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.

• Butler, Joseph, 1726, Fifteen Sermons Preached in the Rolls Chapel. There have been full and partial reprintings of these sermons. Using the Augustinian language of love, he argues that self-interest (the object of self-love) is dependent on there being specific passions (i.e., desires, but perhaps in a richer than functionalist sense) to satisfy. Classic refutation of drawing selfish consequences from hedonistic egoism: satisfying altruistic desires may advance one’s happiness as much as any self-regarding project does.

• Cabanac, Michel, 1971, “Physiological role of pleasure”, Science, 173(2): 1103–1107.

• Cabib, Simona and Puglisi-Allegra, Stefano, 2004, “Opposite Responses of Mesolimbic Dopamine Neurons to Controllable and Uncontrollable Aversive Experiences”, The Journal of Neuroscience, 14(5): 3333–40.

• Cacioppo, John T., 1999, “Emotion”, Annual Review of Psychology, 50: 191–214.

• Campos, Belinda and Keltner, Dacher, 2014, “Shared and Differentiating Features of the Positive Emotion Domain”, in Gruber and Moskowitz 2014, 52-71.

• Caston, Victor, 2003, “Intentionality in Ancient Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Intentionality in Ancient Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2003 Edition)>.

• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1986, Brentano on Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 3, pp. 17–32, is mainly a shorter, earlier version of his 1987; the rest provides context.

• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1987, “Brentano’s Theory of Pleasure and Pain”, Topoi, 6: 59–64. Accessible exposition of Brentano’s theory.

• Christiano, Thomas, 1992, “Sidgwick on desire, pleasure, and the good”, in Essays on Henry Sidgwick, Bart Schultz (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 261–78.

• Churchland, Paul M., 1979, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Cicero, de finibus bonorum et malorum (On Ultimate Goods and Ills). A recent translation is entitled On Moral Ends, Julia Annas (ed.), Raphael Woolf (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

• Clore, Gerald L. and Colcombe, Stanley, 2003, “The Parallel Worlds of Affective Concepts and Feelings”, in Musch and Klauer, 2003, pp. 335–69.

• Clore, Gerald L.; Gasper, Karen; and Garvin, Erika, “Affect as Information”, in Forgas 2001, pp. 121–44.

• Coan, James A. and Allen, John J.B., 2003, “The State and Trait Nature of Frontal EEG Asymmetry in Emotion”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 681–715.

• Cooper, John M., 1996a/1999, “An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions”, in Essays in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Berkeley and London: University of California Press, pp. 238–57, repr. in Cooper 1999b, pp. 406–23.

• Cooper, John M., 1996b/1999, “Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral Value”, in Rationality in Greek Thought, Michael Frede and Gisela Striker, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 81–114, repr. in Cooper 1999b, pp. 253–80. See pp. 101–2/269–70 for citations on pleasure as an apparent good.

• Cooper, John M., 1998/1999, “Posidonius and the Emotions”, in The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 71–111; repr. in Cooper 1999b, pp. 449–84.

• Cooper, John M., 1999a, “Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus”, in 1999b, pp. 485–414.

• Cooper, John M., 1999b, Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

• Craig, A.D., 2002,“How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3: 655–666.

• Craig, A.D., 2009, “How do you feel – now? The anterior insula and human awareness“, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(1): 1059–70.

• Craig, A.D., 2015 , How Do You Feel? An Interoceptive Moment with Your Neurobiological Self, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

• Craig, Wallace, 1918, “Appetites as Constitutents of Instincts”, Biological Bulletin, 34: 91–107.

• Crisp, Roger, 2006, Reasons and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1990, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, New York: Harper and Row.

• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1996, Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, New York: Harper Collins. A list of nine characteristics of ‘flow’, his longest I know of, is at pp. 123–24.

• Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1997, Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement with Everyday Life, New York: Harper Collins. Also published as: Living Well: The Psychology of Everyday Life, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997.

• Dalgleish, Tim and Mick J. Power (eds.), 1999, Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, Chichester, England and New York: Wiley.

• Damasio, Antonio R., 1994, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York: G.P. Putnam.

• Damasio, Antonio R., 1999, The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace.

• Damasio, Antonio R., 2003, Looking for Spinoza: joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain, Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt.

• Darwall, Stephen; Gibbard, Allan; Railton, Peter, 1992, “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends”, Philosophical Review, 101(1): 115–189. Reprinted in: their (as editors) Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 3–47.

• Darwin, Charles, 1998, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 3rd ed., with Introduction, Afterword and Commentaries by Paul Ekman, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Now widely thought correct in its main direction, although of course dated in evidence and detail. But a great Darwin read! And Ekman brings the science almost up to date in his notes.

• Davidson, Richard J., 1994, “Asymmetric brain funtion, affective style and psychopathology: the role of early experience and plasticity”, Development and Psychopathology, 6: 741–758.

• Davidson, Richard J., 2000a, “Affective Style, Mood and Anxiety Disorders“, in Davidson 2000b, pp. 88–108.

• Davidson, Richard J. (ed.), 2000b, Anxiety, Depression and Emotion, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Davidson, Richard J., 2000c, “The Functional Neuroanatomy of Affective Style,” in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 371–88.

• Davidson, Richard J., 2001, “Toward a Biology of Personality and Emotion”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 935: 191–207.

• Davidson, Richard J., 2002, “Toward a Biology of Positive Affect and Compassion”, in Visions of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhists Examine Human Nature, Richard J. Davidson and Anne Harrington, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 107–130.

• Davidson, Richard J., 2003, “Seven sins in the study of emotion: Correctives from affective neuroscience”, Brain and Cognition, 52(1): 129–32.

• Davidson, Richard J. and Irwin, William, 1999, “The functional neuroanatomy of emotion and affective style”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3: 11–21.

• Davidson, Richard J.; Jackson, Daren C.; and Kalin, Ned H., 2000, “Emotion, Plasticity, Context, and Regulation: Perspectives From Affective Neuroscience,” Psychological Bulletin, 126(6): 890–909.

• Davidson, Richard J.; Pizzagalli, Diego; and Nitschke, Jack B., 2002, “Depression: Perspectives from Affective Neuroscience,” Annual Review of Psychology, 53: 545–74

• Davidson, Richard J.; Scherer, Klaus R. and Goldsmith, H. Hill, 2003, Handbook of Affective Sciences, New York: Oxford University Press. (‘Handbook’)

• Davidson, Richard J. and Sutton, Steven K., 1995, “Affective neuroscience: The emergence of a discipline”, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 5: 217–24.

• Davis, Wayne, 1981a, “A Theory of Happiness,”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18(2): 111–20. An analysis in terms of beliefs about the satisfaction of desires. However, while the self-report literature on subjective judgments of happiness often shows one component depending on beliefs about how well one’s life is objectively going, there are also other components reflecting how one feels that this analysis does not account for, and these others seem to be pain and pleasure (or feeling happy, where this is the same as experiencing pleasure). See Bibliography annotation to Strack, Argyle, and Schwarz 1991.

• Davis, Wayne, 1981b, “Pleasure and Happiness,” Philosophical Studies, 39: 305–17. (Identifies the two, so the analyses of the other papers, too, apply to our subject.)

• Davis, Wayne, 1982, “A Causal Theory of Enjoyment,” Mind, XCI: 240–56. Extends his 1981 to analyze enjoyment as experiences causing beliefs about the satisfaction of one’s desires.

• Depue, Richard and Paul F. Collins, 1999, with commentaries by others, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: dopamine, foundations of incentive motivation and extraversion”, with extensive peer commentary, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 491–569. Defends a dopaminergic view of all these and, in part, of positive affect as well.

• Depue, Richard A. and Jeannine Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005, “A neurobehavioral model of affiliative bonding: implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation”, with extensive peer commentary by many others, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(3): 313–95. Defends a μ-opioid-system theory of the trait of affiliation, while suggesting, more tentatively, such a view of similar consummatory-phase pleasure more generally. (Typesetting errors resulted in “u-opiates” and the like here for “μ-opiates” and the like in most places.)

• Descartes, René, 1984–91, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (also, for Vol. III) Anthony Kenny, trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3 vols. (‘CSM’ in citations, where ‘AT’ precedes page numbers of the standard edition of the original French and Latin, often noted in the margins of this and other recent editions: Oeuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, eds., J. Vrin, 1908–1957.)

• Diener, Ed; Sandvik, Ed and Pavot, William, 1991, “Happiness is the frequency, not the intensity, of positive versus negative affect”, in Strack et al. 1991, pp. 119–139.

• Diener, Ed (ed.), 1999, Special Section on the Structure of Emotion, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(5): 603–64.

• Drevets, Wayne C. and Raichle, Marcus E., 1998, “Reciprocal Suppression of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow during Emotional versus Higher Cognitive Processes: Implications for Interactions between Emotion and Cognition”, Cognition and Emotion, 12(3): 353–385.

• Duncker, Karl, 1941, “On Pleasure, Emotion and Striving,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1(4): 391–430. Classic paper on the relations of pleasure and motivation, by a psychologist well-versed in the history of thought about this topic generally and especially in the traditions of introspectionist psychology and phenomenology. His many distinctions seldom connect obviously to later neuroscience; any validity may come at higher levels of brain/mind organization than this has yet reached. A source for some early twentieth century psychological literature in German. Through this paper this German literature may have influenced philosophers writing in English in the following decades, and what they found to be obvious in experience or in ordinary English.

• Edwards, Rem B., 1979, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

• Ekman, Paul, 1999a, “Basic Emotions”, in Dalgleish and Power 1999, Ch. 3, pp. 45–60.

• Ekman, Paul, 1999b, “Facial Expressions”, in Dalgleish and Power 1999, Ch. 16, pp. 301–20.

• Ekman, Paul and Davidson, Richard J., eds., 1994, The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, New York: Oxford University Press. Question 8: “Can Emotion Be Nonconscious?”, pp. 283–318, affords a mix of empirical and conceptual considerations.

• Ellsworth, Phoebe C. and Klaus R. Scherer, 2003, “Appraisal Processes in Emotion”, in Davidson et al. 2003, Handbook, pp. 572–95.

• Emilsson, Eyójolfur Kjalar, 1998, “Plotinus on the Emotions”, in Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, (eds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 339–63.

• Empedocles (c. 500 B.C.), Fragments, in Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983). Fragment 17, cited here, and others may be found also in other collections including selections from the presocratic Greek philosophers‘ surviving writings and in editions of Empedocles.

• Epicurus (d. 300 B.C.E.), 1994, The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia, Inwood, Brad and L.P. Gerson, eds. and trans., Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing Company.

• Erler, Michael and Malcolm Schofield, , 1999, “Epicurean Ethics”, in Kempe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld & Malcolm Schofield (eds.), Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 642–674.

• Feldman, Fred, 1997a, “On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures”, in Feldman 1997c, pp. 125–47. Original publication: Ethics, 107 (April 1997): 448–466.

• Feldman, Fred, 1997b, ”Two Questions about Pleasure,“ reprinted in Feldman, 1997c, pp. 79–105. Original publication: Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example, David Austin (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988, pp. 59–81. Clearly reviews some main kinds of account given by twentieth century philosophers and proposes that the central kind of pleasure is a special attitude and that others are its intentional objects.

• Feldman, Fred, 1997c, Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Feldman, Fred, 2001, “Hedonism”, in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2d edition, 3 vols., New York: Routledge, Vol. II, pp. 662–669. Clearly reviews some kinds of twentieth century philosophers’ views of pleasure including his own ‘attitudinal’ view, before going on to expound versions of hedonism based on them.

• Feldman, Fred, 2002, “The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV(3): 604–28. Part of a 2000 symposium at Brown University.

• Feldman, Fred, 2004, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Findlay, J.N., 1961, Values and Intentions, New York: Macmillan. Pp. 175–78 argues against the mere feeling view of pleasure as nonexplanatory and running into what is here called ”the problem of good“. The argument is strongly reminiscent of one used by the psychologist William McDougall (e.g., in his 1911), on behalf of his Stoic-influenced hormic psychology, against the simple picture of pleasure.

• Forgas, Joseph P., ed., 2001, Handbook of Affect and Social Cognition, Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

• Fox, Michael D., Abraham Z. Snyder, Justin L. Vincent, Maurizio Corbetta, David C. Van Essen, and Marcus E. Raichle, 2005, “The human brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated functional networks”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102: 9673–9678.

• Fredrickson, Barbara, 1998, “What Good Are Positive Emotions?” Review of Positive Psychology, 2(3): 300–19. Claims there are many positive emotions, although not as well discriminated as negative ones; joy, interest contentment and love (as a complex of these and others) are mentioned. Plausible but vague view that positive emotions serve to broaden attention and cognitive style, which seems to fit a broader range of phenomena than cited. While repeated in later publications, the view seems not yet to have been worked out in greater detail.

• Frijda, Nico, 1993, “Moods, Emotion Episodes and Emotions”, in Handbook of Emotions, Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland, eds., New York and London: The Guilford Presss, pp. 381–403. Not in the 2nd ed. of this.

• Frijda, Nico, 1999, “Emotions and Hedonic Experience”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 190–210.

• Frijda, Nico, 2001, “The Nature of Pleasure”, in Bargh and Appley, 2001, pp. 71–94.

• Frijda, Nico and Marcel Zellenberg, 2003, in Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theories, Methods, Research, Klaus R. Scherer, Angela Schorr and Tom Johnstone, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 141–55.

• Fuchs, Alan E., 1976, “The Production of Pleasure by Stimulation of the Brain: An Alleged Conflict between Science and Philosophy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 36: 494–505.

• Gardiner, H.M., Ruth Clark Metcalf and John G. Beebe-Center, 1937, Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories, New York: American Book Company. The most thorough historical account to date in English.

• Gardner, Eliot L. and James David, 1999a, “The Neuorobiology of Chemical Addiction”, in Getting Hooked: Rationality and Addiction, Jon Elster and Ole-dørgen Skog, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–136.

• Gardner, Eliot L., 1999b, “The Neurobiology and Genetics of Addiction: Implications of the ‘Reward Deficiency Syndrome’ for Therapeutic Strategies in Chemical Dependency”, Addiction: Entries and Exits, Jon Elster (ed.), New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 57–119.

• Gazzaniga, Michael (ed.), 2004, The Cogntive Neurosciences, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press.

• Gibbard, Allan, 2003, Thinking how to live, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. Ch. 2 has an excellent treatment of Moore’s criticism of value hedonism, distinguishing his well-supported claim for a conceptual distinction between pleasure and good from his further claim that these are distinct properties.

• Ginsborg, Hannah, 2014, “Kant’s Aesthetics and Teleology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kant-aesthetics/. §2.31 discusses aesthetic judgment’s relation to aesthetic pleasure and §2.33 whether, on Kant’s view of this, aesthetic pleasure is intentional. References to recent philosophical literature on these controversial questions are provided.

• Glare, P.G.W. (ed.), 1968–82, Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Good on etymology, too.

• Goldstein, Irwin, 1980, “Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain”, Philosophy, 55: 349–62.

• Goldstein, Irwin, 1985, “Hedonic Pluralism”, Philosophical Studies, 48: 59–55.

• Goldstein, Irwin, 1989, “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50(2): 255–276.

• Goldstein, Irwin, 2000, “Intersubjective Properties by Which We specify Pain, Pleasure and Other Kinds of Mental States,” Philosophy, 75: 89–104.

• Goldstein, Irwin, 2002, “The Good’s Magnetism and Ethical Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 108(1–2): 1–14.

• Gosling, Justin, 1998, “Hedonism”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, ad loc.

• Gosling, J.C.B., 1969, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The best introductory book on pleasure, too. Uncluttered and engagingly written, but with only a short select bibliography by way of references. The aim is to distinguish disparate uses and claims run together in the hedonist tradition, without denying the existence or importance of occurrent positive affect in our emotional or active lives. Distinctions made in the course of the twentieth century reaction against hedonism are used to dissect hedonist claims and arguments while excesses of the ordinary language literature (mentioned especially toward the end of n.1 above), then near the end of its run, are largely corrected. A work for undergraduates that wears its wisdom and scholarship lightly while attentive to the intuitive sources and motivations of hedonism in human life.

• Gosling, J.C.B. and Taylor, C.C.W., 1982, The Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thorough and scholarly, but sometimes the interpretations are controversial.

• Gruber, June and Moskowitz, Judith Tedlie, 2014, Positive Emotion: Integrating the Light Sides and Dark Sides, New York:Oxford University Press.

• Gusnard, Debra A., Erbil Akbudak, Gordon L, Shulman, and Marcus E. Raichle, 2001, “Medial prefrontal cortex and self-referential mental activity: Relation to a default mode of brain function”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., 98: 4259–4264.

• Gusnard, Debra A., and Marcus E. Raichle, “Functional Imagery, Neurophysiology, and the Resting State of the Brain”, in Gazzaniga 2004, pp. 1267–80.

• Haber, Suzanne N., Julie L. Fudge, and Nikolaus R. McFarland, “Striatonigrostriatal Pathways in Primates Form an Ascending Spiral from the Shell to the Dorsolateral Striatum”, The Journal of Neuroscience, 20(6): 2369–2382.

• Haidt, Jonathan, 2003, “The Moral Emotions,” in Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith (Handbook), pp. 852–70. Claims there are distinct moral emotions reflected to differing extents in different enculturated moralities.

• Halbfass, Wilhelm, 1997, “Happiness: A Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Perspective, in Mohanty, J.N. and Bilmoria, P., eds., Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 150–163.

• Hamlyn, David, 1978, “The Phenomena of Love and Hate”, Philosophy, 53: 5–20.

• Harkins, Jean and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.), 2001, Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

• Haybron, Daniel, 2001, “Happiness and Pleasure,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII(3): 501–28.

• Haybron, Daniel, 2007, “Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall”, Noûs, 41(3): 394–428

• Haybron, Daniel, 2008, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Heathwood, Chris, 2006, “Desire satisfactionism and hedonism”, Philosophical Studies, 128: 539–63.

• Heathwood, Chris, 2007, “The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire“, Philosophical Studies, 133: 23–44.

• Heilman, Kenneth M., 2000, “Emotional Experience: A Neurological Model”, in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 328–44. Well-informed hypotheses on where to look in brain systems’ activity for dimensions of affect, similar to Wundt’s (1896/1897).

• Hejmadi, Ahalya, Richard J. Davidson and Paul Rozin, 2000, “Exploring Hindu Indian Emotion Expressions: Evidence for Accurate Recognition by Americans and Indians”. Psychological Science, 11(3): 183–187. Suggests there are a plurality of basic positive affects. Requires corroboration by other methods, if additions are to be regarded as affects and as basic, rather than just as social signals; e.g, of submission, which may secondarily feel good to people who have been socialized to regard it as appropriate to their age, sex, class or caste status. The classical Sanskrit treatise on dramaturgy Nāṭyaśāstra, cited as a source, may not support the whole list of principal affects it is credited with here, at least in all versions; its Chapter Seven seems not to mention dhyana, contemplation or meditation, translated as “peace” in this paper. See Nāṭyaśāstra: English translation with Critical Notes, rev. ed., 1996 (1st ed., 1986), trans. and notes, Adya Ragacharya, New Delhi: Munishiram Manoharlal, pp. 66ff..

• Heller, Wendy; Koven, Nancy S.; and Miller, Gregory; 2003; “Regional Brain Activity in Anxiety and Depression”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 533–64.

• Helm, Bennett W., 1994, “The Significance of Emotions,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31(4): 319–31.

• Helm, Bennett W., 2001a, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Helm, Bennett W., 2001b, “Emotional and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation,” Noûs, 35(2): 190–213.

• Helm, Bennett W., 2002, “Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 39(1): 13–30.

• Helm, Bennett W., 2009, “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings”, Emotion Review, 1(3): 248–55.

• Hirvonen, Vesa, 2004, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

• Hobbes, Thomas 1651/1994, Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, Edwin Curley (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett.

• Hobbes, Thomas, 1658/1991, Charles T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert, trans., De Homine (in part), in Man and Citizen: Thomas Hobbes’s De Homine and De Cive, Indianapolis: Hackett. Contains translation of De Homine, chs. x–xv, drafted 1641, published 1658.

• Hoebel, Bart; Rada, Pedro V.; Mark, Gregory P.; and Pothos, Emmanuel N., 1999, “Neural Systems for Reinforcement and Inhibition of Behavior; Relevance to Eating, Addiction and Depression” in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 1999, pp. 558–77.

• Houk, James C.; Davis, Joel L., and Beiser, David G., 1995, Models of Information Processing in the Basal Ganglia, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

• Hugdahl, Kenneth and Davidson, Richard J., eds., 2003, The Asymmetrical Brain, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

• Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature.

• Hundert, E.J., 1994, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Hursthouse, Rosalind, 2002, “Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value”, Mind, 111: 418–422. A review of Helm 2001a.

• Ikemoto, Satoshi and Jaak Panksepp, 1999,“The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in motivated behavior: a unifying interpretation with special reference to reward-seeking”, Brain Research Reviews, 31: 6–41.

• Isen, Alice. M., 2002, “A Role for Neuropsychology in Understanding the Facilitating Influence of Positive Affect on Social Behavior and Cognitive Processes”, in Handbook of Positive Psychology, eds., C.R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 528–40.

• Ito, Tiffany A. and Cacioppo, John T., 1999, “The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals”, in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 1999, pp. 470–88.

• Ito, Tiffany A. and Cacioppo, John T., 2001, “Affect and Attitudes: A Social Neuroscience Approach”, in Forgas 2001, pp. 51–74.

• Izard, Carroll E., 1991, The Psychology of Emotions, New York and London, Plenum.

• Jacob, Pierre, 2014, “Intentionality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intentionality/

• Johnston, Victor S., 1999, Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions, A review of some relevant science by a research psychologist written for a general audience. More daring in its interpretations and evolutionary speculation than the literature written for scientists.

• Kagan, Shelly, 1992, “The Limits of Well-being”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 9: 169–89. Also published, with identical pagination, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.); The Good Life and the Human Good, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 169–189. Section II, Hedonism, discusses well some options for relating pleasure and desire.

• Kahneman, Daniel, 1999, “Objective Happiness”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 3–25. A program for getting from momentary self-reports to somethingmore. Excellent and accessible. See §3.1, last ¶, n. 5 last ¶, and n. 28 on Kahneman’s motivational definition of “instant utility” (p. 4), which seems subject to the objections Sidgwick raised against its Victorian predecessors, 1907, p. 127.

• Kahneman, Daniel, 2000, “Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach”, in Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, pp. 673–92.

• Kahneman, Daniel; Diener, Ed; and Schwarz, Norbert (eds.), 1999, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Contains contributions from psychologists and others representing different subfields and literatures, generally more accessible than papers written for specialists. Probably the best single place to start reading scientfic literature on the subject.

• Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (eds.), 2000, Choices, Values, and Frames, New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Kahneman, Daniel, Wakker, Peter P., and Sarin, Rakesh, 1997, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of experienced utility”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 2: 375-406.

• Kant, Immanuel, 1790/2000, Kritik der Urteilskraft, trans. as Critique of the power of judgment, Paul Guyer (ed.); Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. See especially, with pages in the Academy edition, referenced in the entry just below, in parentheses: p. 33 (20: 231) from the First Introduction; pp. 105 (5: 220, 222) and Guyer’s notes at p. 361, n. 24 and p. 366, notes 3 and 4 for citations to other writings of Kant’s. For references to recent secondary literature on the relations of aesthetic judgment and aesthetic pleasure in Kant, and on the latter’s possible intentionality, see Ginsborg 2005. Kant’s First Introduction (which some editions follow Kant in omitting) gives his fullest account of the influential division of mind into Cognition, Conation or Desire, and Feeling (involving pleasure or pain). Adding the last of these formally to the medieval Intellect and Will may be new with him, although eighteenth century predecessors, perhaps especially J.G. Sulzer, came very close (Gardiner, Metcalf, and Beebe Center, 1937, ch. ix, pp. 244–75).

• Kant, Immanuel, 1800/1974 (first ed., 1798), Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, English trans.: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary Gregor, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. The relevant passage is on p. 100 there and at vol. VII, pp. 231–2 of the standard complete edition of Kant’s works, Gesammelte Schriften, Prussian/German Academy of Sciences, Berlin: G. Reimer/W. de Gruyter, 1902– , the pagination of which is often included in the margins of later editions and translations.

• Kapur, Shitij, 2003, “Psychosis as a State of Aberrant Salience: A Framework Linking Biology, Phenomenology, and Pharmacology in Schizophrenia”, American Journal of Psychiatry, 160(1): 13–23.

• Katkov, G., 1940, “The Pleasant and the Beautiful”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XL (1939–40): 177–206. Pp. 179–87 may provide the account in English closest to Brentano’s intentions, based on the relevant passage of Brentano’s untranslated 1907 and other works that may yet be unpublished (Katkov’s note, pp. 178–79). The loving is itself part of the act of sensing at which it is directed. One suspects this may be all the reflexivity intended; Chisholm has a loving of a loving in his analysis, which seems a permissible, but not a mandatory, reading of other Brentano texts.

• Katz, Leonard D., 1982, “Hedonic arousal, memory and motivation,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5(1): 60. A commentary on Wise 1982 by a philosopher, showing how to interpret and state Wise’s scientific views in a way friendly to elements of the simple picture of pleasure.

• Katz, Leonard D., 1986, Hedonism as Metaphysics of Mind and Value. Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, published and distributed through ProQuest/UMI (URL = http://www.umi.com/umi/dissertations). An attempt to revive and reform pleasure-centered theorizing in both areas, in the spirit of the simple picture of pleasure. Includes discussion of the ancients, utilitarians, and of neuroscience through 1985. The last is updated in §3 below. Some points are used and some improved upon or corrected here.

• Katz, Leonard D., 2005a, Review of Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005.03.02. [Available online]

• Katz, Leonard D., 2005b, “Opioid bliss as the felt hedonic core of mammalian prosociality – and of consummatory pleasure more generally?”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(3): 356. (Short commentary on Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005 by a philosopher).

• Katz, Leonard D., 2005c, Review of Timothy Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005.09.09. [Avaialble online]

• Katz, Leonard D., 2008, “Hedonic Reasons as Ultimately Justifying and the Relevance of Neuroscience”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders and Development, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, pp. 409–17.

• Kenny, Anthony, 1963, Action, Emotion and the Will, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ch. VI, pp. 127–50, is most relevant and includes a pithy statement of Anscombe’s central point.

• Kirk, G.S.; Raven, J.E.; and Schofield, M., 1983, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with Selected Texts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1st ed., 1957.

• Knuuttila, Simo, 2004, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Kraye, Jill (ed.), 1997, Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, Vol. I, Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Part VI translates extracts from works of Petrarch, Filelfo, Raimondi, and Quevedo partially rehabilitating Epicurean hedonism in a Christian context.

• Kringelbach, Morten. L., 2009, The Pleasure Center: Trust Your Animal Instincts, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Kringelbach, Morten L. and Kent C. Berridge (eds.), 2010, Pleasures of the Brain, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Kringelbach, Morten L. and Kent. C. Berridge, 2015, “Motivation and Pleasure in the Brain”, in Wilhelm Hofmann and Loran F. Nordgren (eds.), The Psychology of Desire, New York and London: The Guilford Press, 129–45.

• Labukt, Ivar, 2012, “Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure”, Utilitas, 24(2): 172–99.

• Lamme, Victor A. F., 2003, “Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(1): 12–18.

• Lamme, Victor A. F., and P. R. Roelfsema, 2000, “The Distinct Modes of Vision Offered by Feedforward and Recurrent Processing” Trends in Neurosciences, 23(11): 571–579.

• Landfester, Manfred, 1966, Das griechische Nomen «philos» und seine Ableitungen, Hildesheim: Olms.

• Lane, Richard D., 2000, “Neural Corelates of Emotional Experience”, in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 345–70.

• Lane, Richard D, and Nadel, Lynn, eds., 2000, Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Lane, Richard D., Lynn Nadel and Alfred Kaszniak, “Epilogue: The Future of Emotion Research from the Perspective of Cognitive Neuroscience”, in Lane and Nadel, 2000, pp. 407–12.

• Larue, Gerald A., 1991, “Ancient Ethics”, in A Companion to Ethics, Peter Singer (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 29– 40.

• LeDoux, Joseph, The Emotional Brain : The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life New York: Simon & Schuster.

• LeDoux, Joseph, 2002 The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, New York and London: Viking Penguin. Ch. 9, pp. 235–91 has further discussion and references on relevant neuroscience, especially of dopamine ‘reward’, by an affective neuroscientist who takes a fairly dim view of it – an eminent amygdala specialist who thinks that what pays off is studying specific emotion systems, such as that supposed to be specifically for fear conditioning in the amygdala. (Many now take a less specific view of amygdala function.)

• Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott, rev. Henry Stuart Jones, 1940, 9th ed. (1st ed., 1843), A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Lieh-tzu, 1960, The Book of Lieh-tzu: A Classic of the Tao, trans. A.C. Graham, New York: Columbia University Press. Reports of the naive libertine hedonism of Yang Chu, apparently rare in extant ancient Chinese prose, are in chapter 7.

• Locke, John, 1700/1979, reprinted with corrections from 1975 edition; following mainly 4th ed., 1700; 1st ed. 1689), An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. II,xx and xxi are most relevant.

• Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (eds., trans., commentary and notes), 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Vol. I containing English translations and Vol. II containing Greek texts. Texts and notes in §21 (Epicurean) and in §§57 and 65 (Stoic), in both volumes, are relevant.

• Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus, 1st c. B.C.E.), De rerum natura. This exposition of Epicureanism in verse is available in many editions and translations.

• Lycan, William, 2015, “Representational Theories of Consciousness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/consciousness-representational/>.

• Lyons, William, 1980, Gilbert Ryle: An Introduction to his Philosophy, Brighton: Harvester and Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Humanities. Chapter 11 critically discusses Ryle 1954a and 1954b but overlooks the relevant chapter in his 1949.

• Madell, Geoffrey, 1996, “What Music Teaches about Emotion,” Philosophy, 71: 63–82.

• Madell, Geoffrey, 2002, Philosophy, Music and Emotion. 2002, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

• Manstead, Antony S. R.; Frijda, Nico and Fischer, Agneta (eds.), 2004, Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Matilal, Bimal Krishna, 1986, Perception: An Essay in Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

• McDougall, William, 1911, Body and Mind, New York: Macmillan. There have been several identically paginated reprint editions.

• McGrade, Arthur Stephen, 1981, “Ockham on Enjoyment: Toward an Understanding of Fourteenth Century Philosophy and Psychology,” Review of Metaphysics 33: 706–28. “Enjoyment” is the traditional but misleading translation of the technical use of “fruitio” and cognates in these medieval texts. In the text I prefer “valuing” for this act of the Will distinguishable from pleasure and arguably antecedent to and dissociable from it, as on Ockham’s own view.

• McGrade, Arthur Stephen, 1987, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” in Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, eds., From Ockham to Wyclif, Oxford: Blakwell, pp. 63–88. An excellent and clear discussion of the alternatives to Ockham’s view in the fourteenth century debates. But see note on his 1981 above.

• Merlan, Philip, 1960, “Hēdonē in Epicurus and Aristotle”, in his Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle (Klassich-Philologische Studien, Volume 22), Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, pp. 1–37.

• Mill, James, 1829/1869, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2nd ed., 1869, John Stuart Mill (ed. and annot.) (1st ed., London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829), London: Longmans Green Reader & Dyer, 2 vols.

• Mill, John Stuart, 1872/1979 (1st ed., 1865), An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of the Principal Questions Discussed in his Writings, 1872 4th ed. text, J. M. Robson (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. Chapter XXV, pp. 430–436, is the classic rejoinder to Aristotelian views in a principal but now little-read work of Mill’s.

• Mill, John Stuart, 1871 (1st ed., 1861), Utilitarianism, 4th ed., London: Longmans Green Reader & Dyer. Many recent editions based on this are available.

• Millgram, Elijah, 1997, Practical Induction Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6, pp. 105–40, gives an indicator of well-being theory of pleasure.

• Millgram, Elijah, 2000, “What’s the Use of Utility?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29,2:114–36. An indicator of change for the better account of pleasure.

• Mitsis, Phillip, 1987, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

• Monier-Williams, Monier, 1899, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with special reference to Cognate European Languages, new ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. This standard is available in both British and Indian reprints.

• Moore, George Edward (G.E.), 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. III, “Hedonism”, pp. 59–109 and especially the distinction between pleasure and consciousness of pleasure at pp. 87–89, influenced by Plato’s discussion in Philebus 21A. Plato’s distinction there between pure pleasure and cognition, however, may differ from Moore’s in leaving what Block calls “phenomenal consciousness” on the pleasure side. Moore uses an undifferentiated concept of consciousness.

• Moran, Richard, 2002, “Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life”, in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, pp. 189–217. Pp. 209–14 contain a sensitive discussion of ways pleasure may be regarded as norm-governed and active, much in the spirit of Aristotle and of Anscombe. A controversial inference that pleasure cannot be the sort of thing that could be directly caused by drug action is drawn.

• Morillo, Carolyn R., 1990, “The Reward Event and Motivation”, Journal of Philosophy, 87(4): 169–186. Material from this is included in her 1995.

• Morillo, Carolyn R., 1992, “Reward Event Systems: Reconceptualizing the Explanatory Roles of Motivation, Desire and Pleasure,” Philosophical Psychology, 5(1): 7–32. Material from this is included in her 1995.

• Morillo, Carolyn, 1995, Contingent Creatures: A Reward-Event Theory of Motivation and Value, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Includes material from her 1990 and 1992 in Chapter 2. Defends a hedonistic view of motivation and value (but an avowedly nonnormative and naturalist one) in the light of the brain reward and conditioning literature. Clearly develops a view of motivation like the motivation by pleasant thoughts view put forward by Schlick (1930/1939) and discussed by Gosling (1969), while also emphasizing that pleasure is itself intrinsic and nonrelational, as in her 1992.

• Moss, Jessica, 2006, “Pleasure and Illusion in Plato”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 503-35,

• Moss, Jessica, 2012, Arisotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, & Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Mulligan, Kevin, 2004, “Brentano on the mind”, in Dale Jaquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 66–97. Pp. 83–86 summarize and reference Brentano’s views on pleasure and pain – his earlier views as well as the mature ones discussed in §2.3.1, ¶2 and n. 21.

• Murphy, Sheila T., Jennifer L. Monahan and R.B. Zajonc, 1995, “Additivity of Nonconscious Affect: Combined Effects of Priming and Exposure”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(4): 589–602.

• Murphy, Sheila T. and R. B. Zajonc, 1993, “Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming With Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(5): 723–739.

• Murray, James Augustus Henry; Henry Bradley, William Alexander Craigie and Charles Talbut Onions (eds.), 1884–1928, The Oxford English Dictionary (original title: A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles), Oxford: Oxford University Press. ‘OED’. A uniform corrected edition appeared in 1933, a 2d ed. in 1989.

• Musch, Jochen and Klauer, Karl Christoph, 2003, The Psychology of Motivation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion, Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

• Nader, Karim; Bechara, Antoine; and van der Kooy, Derek, 1997, “Neurobiological Constraints on Behavioral Models of Motivation”, Annual Review of Psychology, 48: 85–114.

• Nettle, Daniel, 2005, Happiness: The Science behind Your Smile, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Neumann, Roland; Förster, Jens; Strack, Fritz, 2003, “Motor Compatibility: The Bidirectional Link between Behavior and Evaluation”, in Musch and Klauer, 2003, pp. 371–391.

• Nichols, Herbert, 1892, “The Origin of Pleasure and Pain, I”, The Philosophical Review, 1(4): 403–432.

• Nowell-Smith, Patrick Horace, 1954, Ethics, Harmondsworth: Middlesex. Especially pp. 111–115 on ‘pro-attitudes’, including pleasure, as explanatory (i.e., involving conation of various kinds, as it seems) and pp. 127–32 on enjoyment. He seems thus to seek some middle way between Ryle’s dispositional view and older experiential episode views, but to leave any filling out of the details to psychology.

• Nussbaum, Martha C., 1994, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

• Nussbaum, Martha C., 2001, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Nyanatiloka, 1980, Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, 4th ed., Nyanaponika, Kandy (ed. and rev.), Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society Valuable for its doctrinal summaries and translation suggestions, such as “joyful interest” for pīti, p. 168, adopted here; the work of Theravadin Buddhist monks of German and German-Jewish origin, respectively, a teacher-student pair; the original version was done by Nyanatiloka during their World War II internment as enemy aliens in British India.

• Ockham, see William of Ockham.

• Olds, James, 1958, “Self-Stimulation of the Brain: Its Use to Study Local Effects of Hunger, Sex, and Drugs”, Science, 127: 315–24.

• Olds, James, 1965, “Pleasure Centers in the Brain”, Scientific American, 195: 105–16.

• Olds, James, 1977, Drives and Reinforcements: Behavioral Studies of Hypothalamic Functions, New York: Raven Press.

• Olds, James and Milner, Peter, 1954, “Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of septal area and other regions of rat brain”, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 47: 419–27.

• Oliver, Alex, “Facts,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, Vol. 3, pp. 535–37.

• Onions, C.T., 1966, The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Owen, G.E.L., 1971–72,“Aristotelian Pleasures,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72: 135–52. Reprinted in his Logic, Science and Method: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Martha Nussbaum (ed.), Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.

• Panksepp, Jaak, 1998, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Panksepp, Jaak, 2000a, “Emotions as Natural Kinds within the Mammalian Brain”, ch. 9, in Handbook of Emotions, 2nd ed., Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (eds.), New York and London, The Guilford Press, pp. 137–156.

• Panksepp, Jaak, 2000b, “The Riddle of Laughter: Neural and Psychoevolutionary Wellsprings of Joy”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(6): 183–186.

• Panksepp, Jaak, 2014, “Understanding the Neurobiology of Core Postive Emotions through Animal Models: Affective and Clinical Implications“, in Gruber and Moskowitz, 116-36.

• Panksepp, Jaak, Brian Knutson and Jeff Burgdorf, 2002, “The role of brain emotional systems in addictions: a neuro-evolutionary perspective and new ‘self-report’ animal model,” Addiction, 97: 450–469.

• Panksepp, Jaak, and Biven, Lucy, 2012, The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions, New York: Norton.

• Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Peciña, Susana and Berridge, Kent C., 2000, “Opioid site in nucleus accumbens shell mediates eating and hedonic ‘liking’ for food: map based on microinjection Fos plumes”, Brain Research, 863: 71–86.

• Peciña, Susana; Cagniard, Barbara; Berridge, Kent C.; Aldridge, J. Wayne; and Zhuang, Xiaoxi, 2003, ”Hyperdopaminergic Mutant Mice Have Higher “Wanting” But Not “Liking“ for Sweet Rewards,” The Journal of Neuroscience, 23(28): 9395–9402.

• Penelhum, Terence, 1957, “The Logic of Pleasure”, Philosophy and Phenomenlogical Research, XVII: 488–23. Classic critical discussion of Ryle, accepting his positive account of enjoyment as a form of effortless attention but rejecting his claim that this is always a disposition rather than an episode.

• Perry, David L., 1967, The Concept of Pleasure, The Hague: Mouton. Uses the method of British ordinary language philosophy but often takes issue with predecessors in it, as well as with the earlier hedonist tradition.

• Pfaffmann, Carl, 1960, “The pleasures of sensation”, Psychological Review, 67: 753–68.

• Pizzagalli, Diego; Shackman, Alexander J.; and Davidson, Richard J.; 2003, “The Functional Imaging of Human Emotion: Asymmetric Contributions of Cortical and Subcortical Circuitry”, in Hugdahl and Davidson, 2003, pp. 511–32.

• Plato, 1997, Complete Works, trans. by many hands, with notes by John M. Cooper (ed.); D. S. Hutchinson (assoc ed.), Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing Company.

• Plato, Definitions. Generally regarded as not by Plato himself, but a record of work done by those in his circle. It is included in the 1997 Complete Works in a translation by D.S. Hutchinson.

• Plato, Gorgias, in Plato 1997.

• Plato, Philebus, trans. with notes and commentary by J.C.B. Gosling, London: Oxford University Press, 1975. A large and ongoing secondary literature debating the interpretation of the section on false pleasures exists.

• Plato, Protagoras, 1991/1976, trans. and notes, C.C.W. Taylor, Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev. ed., 1991 (1st ed., 1976). 352B–357E apparently adopts a summative hedonism about individual welfare and prudential rationality in this supposedly relatively early work, but likely only for the purposes of the argument, ironically or to lead protreptically toward views defended later; this hedonism seems to be rejected in the Gorgias and most explicitly at Phaedo 68Ef. and also seems clearly inconsistent with what are thought to be Plato’s later writings. A large and continuing secondary literature exists on the interpretation of this latter section of the dialogue and on whether and how it can be reconciled with view defended inj other dialogues.

• Plato, Republic, in Plato 1997.

• Potter, Karl (ed.), 1977, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol., II, Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṇgeśa, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.

• Preston, Stephanie D. and Frans B.M. de Waal, 2002, “Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25: 1–72. With peer commentaries and the authors’ reply.

• Preuss, Peter, 1994, Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism, Lewiston, New York; Queenston, Ontario; Lampeter, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press. Ch. Six: Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasure, pp. 121–77, critically reviews earlier interpretations and presents his own at pp. 162–77.

• Prinz, Jesse, 2004, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Provine, Robert J., 2000, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation, New York: Viking.

• Puccetti, Roland, 1969, “The Sensation of Pleasure”, The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 20(3): 239–245.

• Putnam, Hilary, 1975, Mind, Language and Reality (Philosophical Papers, Volume 2), London: Cambridge University Press.

• Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Moore, Charles A., eds., 1957, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

• Rachels, Stuart, 2004, “Six Theses about Pleasure”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 247–67.

• Rainville, Pierre, 2002, “Brain mechanisms of pain affect and pain modulation,” Current Opinion in Neuorbiology, 12: 195–204.

• Rawls, John, 1999, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (1st ed., 1971); Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. §84 is most directly relevant.

• Rhys Davids, T.W. and Stede, William, Pali-English Dictionary, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1921–1925, repr. 1998. There are also other reprint edition, British and Indian, of this old standard; a new dictionary in progress has not yet reached the terms of most interest here.

• Rilling, James K., David A. Gutman, Thorsten R. Zeh, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Gregory S. Berns, and Clinton D. Kilts, 2002, “ A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation”, Neuron, 35(2): 395–405. A study purporting to show how cooperating in a seeming Prisoner’s Dilemma really pays off because it makes cooperators happier than defectors. Based on interpretation of functional brain imaging supported by subjects’ self-reports.

• Robinson, Terry E. and Kent C. Berridge, 1993, “The neural basis of drug craving: an incentive-sensitization theory of addiction”, Brain Research Reviews, 18(3): 247–91. Probably their most explicit and interesting to philosophers; a useful Glosssary clearly explains both the standard uses of relevant terms in their field and their innovations, pp. 279–81.

• Robinson, Terry E. and Kent C. Berridge, 2000, “The psychology and neurobiology of addiction: an incentive-sensitization view”, Addiction, 95 (Supplement 2): S91–S117.

• Robinson, Terry E. and Kent C. Berridge, 2001, “Incentive-sensitization and addiction”, Addiction, 96: 103–114. A shorter version of their 2000.

• Rolls, Edmund T., 1999, The Brain and Reward, New York: Oxford University Press. This book is not really about emotion, as conceived by philosophers or in ordinary language, but mainly about brain systems for reward (what an animal can be trained to perform an operant task in order to get) and motivation, thoroughly reviewed by a senior experimenter on the brains of nonhuman animals – roughly, in older psychological jargon, the territory of reinforcement and drive. Chapter 9 is on pleasure.

• Rolls, Edmund T., 2000, ”The Orbitofrontal Cortex and Reward,“ Cerebral Cortex, 40: 284–94.

• Rosenkranz, Melissa A., Daren C. Jackson, Kim M. Dalton, Isa Dolski, Carol D. Ryff, Burt H. Singer, Daniel Muller, Ned H. Kalin, and Richard J. Davidson, 2003, “Affective style and in vivo immune response: Neurobehavioral mechanisms”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., 100: 11148–11152.

• Russell, Bertrand, 1921, The Analysis of Mind, London: Unwin and New York: Macmillan. Pp. 69–72 are relevant; Russell defines pleasure behaviorally and, quoting the neurologist Henry Head, adopts his distinction between pain and ‘discomfort’, based on observations of soldiers wounded in World War I.

• Russell, Bertrand, 1930/1968, The Conquest of Happiness, New York: Liveright, 1930 (New York: Bantam Books reprint, 1980). Ostensibly written as a self-help book free of deep philosophy, it is still worth reading, not only for its wise practical advice, nonetheless.

• Russell, Daniel, 2005, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

• Russell, James A., 1991, “Culture and the Categorization of Emotions”, Psychological Bulletin, 110(3): 426–50. Survey of wide array of evidence supporting positive/negative categorization of affect, by a major and sophisticated proponent. Wierzbicka’s later synthesis of the linguistic data (1999) should be more up-to-date on that.

• Russell, James A., 2003, “Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion,” Psychological Review, 110(1): 145–72. Russell’s core affect is supposed to be in itself objectless but always conscious, whereas Berridge’s core affective processes are supposed to be in themselves unconscious as well.

• Russell, James A. and Barrett, Lisa Feldman, 1999, “Core affect, prototypical emotional episodes, and other things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(5): 805–819. A sophisticated attempt to show how apparently competing approaches to the classification of emotion, the dimensional approach to which Russell is a major contributor and the discrete emotions approach supported, for example, by Ekman and Panksepp, can fit together. This special journal section (Diener 1999), mainly on the dimensional approach, is a good place to see the state of play then on Russell’s ‘bipolar’ (positive vs. negative affect on the same dimension) approach.

• Ryle, Gilbert, 1949, The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, 1949. Chapter IV, ”Emotion“, and especially its §6, “Enjoying and Wanting”, started the mid-century Anglo-American literature with its quasi-behaviorist strong denial that there are occurrent episodes of pleasure. Often in an assertive rhetorical tone.

• Ryle, Gilbert, 1951, “Feelings”, Philosophical Quarterly 1,3:193–205, repr. in his 1971, pp. 272–86.

• Ryle, Gilbert, 1954a, “Pleasure”, Ch. 4 in Dilemmas: The Tarner Lectures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54–67. His largest collection of considerations against the view that pleasure is an occurrence in experience, mainly at pp. 58–61. Some strong claims taken by followers to be obvious and based on ordinary English usage may, perhaps, be traced to other sources. That pleasure is inseparable from its object (p. 61) may derive (aside from grammatical transitivity) from the supposed results of intropectionist psychology reported in Duncker 1941 (see annotation there). The very strongly hedged claim, that pleasure is not an episode since it cannot be independently clocked and one cannot be pleased quickly (pp. 58–60), seems to draw a conclusion that pleasure is not an occurrent state in part from Aristotelian premises that do not, at least obviously, support it. The relevant Aristotelian view is that pleasure is not a process but an activity that, like seeing, is complete in each of its (experiential?) moments. E.g., at any moment of seeing or enjoying one can truly say that one has already seen or enjoyed oneself, while it is not generally true that when one is building a house that one has already built it (e.g., NE 1174a13–b14). It has not, apparently, been similarly argued on such grounds that there are no experiential episodes of seeing (an example of Aristotle’s which he sees as parallel to pleasure) or of tasting, or that a dispositionalist rather than an occurent state account of these is therefore true, although these would seem equally to follow. But Ryle may be more influenced by the difficulty of attending to describable features of pleasure (on which see §1.3, last two paragraphs) and by its consequences in introspectionist psychology.

• Ryle, Gilbert, 1954b, “Pleasure”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 28 (Supplementary Volume): 135–146; repr. in his 1971, pp. 325–35. Ryle’s most tentative yet most constructive treatment, emphasizing more than his other writings on pleasure his positive view that pleasure is a manner or kind of attention or interest. It is strongly reminiscent of Aristotle.

• Ryle, Gilbert, 1971, Collected Papers (Volume II: Collected Essays, 1929–1968), London: Hutchinson & Co.

• Scanlon, T.M., “Replies” Social Theory and Practice, 28(2): 337–58.

• Scherer, Klaus R., 2003, Introduction to “Cognitive Components of Emotion” section in Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith 2003, (Handbook), pp. 141–55

• Schlick, Moritz, 1930/1939, Fragen der Ethik, Vienna: Springer, 1930. Trans. by David Rynin as Problems of Ethics, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. The classic statement of the motivation by pleasant thoughts variety of hedonist motivation psychology is in Ch. II.

• Schroeder, Timothy, 2001, “Pleasure, Displeasure and Representation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31(4): 507–30.

• Schroeder, Timothy, 2004, Three Faces of Desire, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Schultz, Wolfram, 2000, “Multiple Reward Signals in the Brain”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 1: 201–7.

• Schultz, Wolfram and Dickinson, Anthony, 2000, “Neuronal Coding of Prediction Errors,” Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23: 473–500. Leading scientists review the literature on how dopamine neurons serve as teachers or critics in learning and also show this function is not unique to dopamine neurons but is widespread.

• Scitovsky, Tibor, 1992/1976, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction, rev. ed, New York: Oxford University Press. An economist’s case against what he takes to be the counterproductive contemporary pursuit of stable comfort at the expense of pleasure, which he takes to be felt transition toward optimal arousal level. The revised edition contains no updating of the old science. Kahneman 1999, pp. 13ff., provides some discussion and references toward updating the science and reappraising Scitovsky’s claims, discussed briefly in n. 31.

• Sen, Amartya, 1985, Commodities and Capabilities Amsterdam: North-Holland. An Aristotelian-type view of well-being is deployed to produce a measure of social distributive justice.

• Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, 1917–25 (1st century B.C.E.), Ad lucilium epistolae morales, with trans. by Richard M. Gummere, 3 vols., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and London: Heinemann. The influential Roman Stoic’s mature reflections on ethics in the form of letters to a young friend.

• Shackman, Alexander J., “Anterior Cerebral Asymmetry, Affect, and Psychopathology: Commentary on the Approach-Withdrawal Model”, in Davidson 2000b, pp. 104–32.

• Sherrington, Charles, 1906/1947, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, New Haven, Yale University Press. (Original publication: New York: Scribner, 1906.) Later reprints follow the pagination of the 1947 edition, which prefixes a new author’s Foreword to the reset 1906 text.

• Shizgal, Peter, 1997, “Neural basis of utility estimation”, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 7: 198–208.

• Shizgal, Peter, 1999, “On the Neural Computation of Utility: Implications from Studies of Brain Stimulation Reward”, in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, pp. 500–524.

• Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., London: Macmillan; 1st ed. 1874. The culminating work of the British hedonistic utilitarian tradition and one of the all-time greats of moral philosophy. Book I, ch. iv and Book II are especially relevant.

• Siewert, Charles, 2011, “Consciousness and Intentionality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2011 Edition)>.

• Smith, Adam, 1790/1976, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, eds., London, Oxford University Press.

• Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, Bernard, 1973, Utilitarianism: for and against, London: Cambridge University Press.

• Smuts, Aaron, 2011, “The feels good theory of pleasure”, Philosophical Studies, 155: 241–65.

• Sobel, David, 1999, “Pleasure as a Mental State”, Utilitas, 11(2) (July 1999): 230–234. Criticism of Katz 1986 and Kagan 1992 from a desire-based standpoint on both pleasure and reasons.

• Solomon, Robert C. and Stone, Lori D., 2002, “On ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Emotions”, Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior, 32(2): 417–35. While many of their complaints about failures to distinguish different psychological and evaluative distinctions in the softer psychological literature and about the misleading terminology (seeming to presuppose these are opposite poles or contraries) are well-placed, the seeming rejection of the centrality of a single distinction between positive and negative affect in the affective sciences is at least very premature. The harder evidence supporting it (e.g., opposite immune system effects, cerebral asymmetries in studies of mood, temperament [see Rosenkranz et al. 2003 for recent results and earlier references] and psychopathology [Davidson and Pizzagalli 2002]) is not even considered here.

• Sorabji, Richard, 2000, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation: The Gifford Lectures, New York: Oxford University Press. Part I, Emotions as Judgments versus Irrational Forces, pp. 16–155, summarized in the Introduction at pp. 2–7, is a good discussion of whether all affect can be reduced to judgment. While Sorabji emphasizes the important ancient debate provoked by the claim of Chrysippus that emotions (including pleasure and joy) are judgments, there is some discussion of recent philosophical and scientific literature as well.

• Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch), 1677, Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata in Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols., Spinoza Opera, Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925. Cited passages in Vol. II, pp. 148–49, 191. Of the recent English translators, Richard Shirley (Hackett, 1982) and G.H.R. Parkinson (Oxford, 2000) translate Spinoza’s “laetitia” by “pleasure”, but Edwin Curley by “joy”, following the “joie” of Descartes’ Les Passions de l’Âme (Princeton University Press, in Collected Works, Vol. I, 1985, pp. 500–501, 531; also in his A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, Princeton, 1994).

• Stocker, Michael with Hegeman, Elizabeth, 1996, Valuing Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Strack, Fritz; Argyle, Michael; and Schwarz, Norbert, eds., 1991, Subjective well-being: an interdisciplinary perspective, Oxford: Pergamon. Provides an entry into the social psychology self-report literature, some of which deals with pleasure. This literature tends to show subjects’ self-ratings of well-being or happiness are based partly on pleasure, partly on the absence of negative affect, and partly on their views of how well they are achieving the ends they regard as important in life (their ‘life satisfaction’). For new publications in this literature, check the Journal of Happiness Studies, (Kluwer, 2000+).

• Strick, Peter L., 2004, “Basal Ganglia and Cerebellar Circuits with the Cerebral Cortex”, in Gazzaniga 2004, pp. 453–61.

• Striker, Gisela, 1993, “Epicurean Hedonism”, in Passions and Perceptions; Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind; Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, Jacques Brunschwig and Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–18. Reprinted in her Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 196–208.

• Sumner, L. W., 1996, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 4, “Hedonism”, pp. 81–112 defends an attitude view (of ‘enjoyment’) and opposes others on the way to theses in ethics.

• Sutton, Steven K. and Davidson, Richard J., 1997, “Prefrontal brain asymmetry: A biological substrate of the behavioral approach and inhibition systems”, Psychological Science, 8(3): 204–10.

• Sutton, Steven K. and Davidson, Richard J, 2000, “Prefrontal brain electrical asymmetry predicts the evaluation of affective stimuli”, Neuropsychologia, 38(13): 1723–1733.

• Tanyi, Attila, 2010, “Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 14: 101–15.

• Taylor, C.C.W., 1963, “Pleasure”, Analysis, 23 (Supplement): 3–19. Refines Ryle’s account of enjoyment while admitting other supposedly less central or important kinds of pleasure as well.

• Thayer, Robert E., 1989, The Biopsychology of Mood and Arousal, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Thayer, Robert E, 1996, The origin of everyday moods: understanding and managing energy and tension, New York: Oxford University Press.

• Titchener, Edward Bradford, 1908, Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention, New York: Macmillan. Ch. IV, “The Tridimensional Theory of Feeling and Emotion”, is a long, chatty, account of the evolution of Wundt’s writings and views, with extensive quotations in his original German, by the last major representative of the introspectionist school of early academic experimental psychology.

• Tomkins, Silvan S., 1962, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Vol. I: The Positive Affects, New York: Springer Publishing Company.

• Tracy, Jessica L. and Robins, Richard W., 2004, “Show Your Pride: Evidence for a Discrete Emotion Expression”, Psychological Science, 15(3): 194–97.

• Trigg, Roger, 1970, Pain and Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. VI, “Is Pleasure a Sensation”, pp. 102–24, is most relevant. The most substantial contribution of the ordinary language tradition to the study of affect. An excellent, underread book, perhaps still the best philosophical discussion of the dissociation of emotional reactions from sensory pain, which neurologists and some philosophers became saliently aware of in result of reactions to battlefield injury and evacuation in World War I. What he says about pain seems mainly to be consistent with science to date.

• Tye, Michael, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Pp. 128–30 are on our topic.

• Urry, Heather L.; Nichols, Jack B; Dolski, Isa; Jackson, Daren C.; Dalton, Kim M.; Mueller, Corrina J.; Rosenkranz, Melissa A.; Ryff, Carol D., Singer, Burton H.; and Davidson, Richard J., “Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlates of Well-Being”, Psychological Science, 15(6): 367–71.

• Van Riel, Gerd, 1999, “Does a Perfect Activity Necessarily Yield Pleasure? An Evaluation of the Relation between Pleasure and Perfect Activity in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII and X”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 7(2): 211–24.

• Van Riel, Gerd, 2000a, Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists, Leiden: Brill, 2000. Especially pp. 7–37 on Plato and 43–78 on Aristotle. Concise account of the Epicureans and Stoics, too.

• Van Riel, Gerd, 2000b, “Aristotle’s Definition of Pleasure: a Refutation of the Platonic Account”, Ancient Philosophy, 20(1): 119–138.

• Vasubandhu (c. 400 C.E. Buddhist), 1923–31. L’abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. and annotated in French by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris and Louvain: Paul Geuthner, 1923–31, 6 vols., repr. Brussells: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971. A less satisfactory translation into English from this French translation, itself based mainly on an ancient Chinese translation from the original Sanskrit which has since been largely recovered, is that of L.M. Pruden, Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, Berkeley, California: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–90.

• Vasubandhu (c. 400 C.E. Buddhist), 1984, “A Discourse of the Five Aggregates” (Pañcaskandhaka), in Stefan Anacker (trans. and ed.), Seven Works of Vasubandhu, The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 65–82.

• Voruganti, Lakshmi; Slomka, Piotr;, Zabel, Pamela; Costa, Giuseppe; So, Aaron; Mattar, Adel; and Awad, George A., 2001, “Subjective Effects of AMPT-induced Dopamine Depletion in Schizophrenia: Correlation between Dysphoric Responses and Striatal D2 Binding Ratios on SPECT Imaging”, Neuropsychopharmacology, 25(5): 642–50. Has relevant recent references. Supports the dopamine pleasure interpretation. Caution: Wise 1996 is reported in terms of pleasure, whereas he had by then abandoned such interpretation and uses there only the behavioral term “reward”. But in this study, with human patients, feeling bad when dopamine-depleted by anti-psychotic medication may be checked more directly than in Wise’s animal studies.

• Voznesensky, Andrei (1967/1966), “Oza”, in Antiworlds and the Fifth Ace: Poetry by Andrei Voznesensky: A Bilingual Edition, Patricia Blake and Max Hayward (eds.), New York: Basic Books.

• Wacker, Jan; Heldmann, Marcus; Stemmler, Gerhard, 2003, “Separating Emotion and Motivational Direction in Fear and Anger: Effects on Frontal Asymmetry”, Emotion, 3(2): 167–193.

• Walther von der Vogelweide, c. 1227, “Elegie”. There are many editions and reprintings in anthologies.

• Warner, Richard, 1987, Freedom, Enjoyment, and Happiness: An Essay in Moral Psychology, Ithaca and London: Cornell Univeristy Press. A cognitive definition of enjoyment, in terms of belief and desire, is at p. 129. Purports to develop a ‘Kantian’ approach, but this is an analysis in terms of belief and desire quite unlike Kant’s own treatment, which provides rough functional characterizations but no analysis because he took pleasure to be undefinable. See under Kant for citations.

• Watkins, Calvert rev. and ed., 2000, The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots, 2d ed. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. Much of its content is available as an appendix to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.

• Watson, David, 2000, Mood and Temperament, New York and London: The Guilford Press. A very accessible summary of some of the easier relevant science.

• Wierzbicka, Anna, 1999, Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.

• Wierzbicka, Anna and Jean Harkins, 2001, Introduction to Harkins and Wierzbicka, 2001, pp. 1–34.

• William of Ockham, 2001, (c. 1317–26), “Using and Enjoying”, trans. Stephen Arthur McGrade, in Arthur Stephen McGrade, John Kilcullen and Matthew Kempshall, eds., The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. Two, Ethics and Political Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 351–417. This translates Questions 1–4 and 6 of Distinction 1 of his Ordinatio, a commentary on the first book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Original Latin text: Guillelmi de Ockham (William of Ockham), Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, Gedeon Gál (ed. with the assistance of Stephen Brown), 4 vols., St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1967, Vol. I, Prologus et Distinctio Prima, pp. 371–447, 486–507. These are Vols. I-IV in their edition of Ockham’s Opera Theologica.

• Williams, Bernard, 1959, “Pleasure and Belief”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 73 (Supplement): 73–92; reprinted in Philosophy of Mind, Stuart Hampshire (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, New York: Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 225–42.

• Willner, Paul, 2002, “Dopamine and Depression”, in Gaetano Di Chiara (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Pharmacology, Vol. 154/II: Dopamine in the CNS II, Berlin: Springer, 2002, pp. 387–416.

• Winkielman, Piotr; Berridge, Kent C. 2004; “Unconscious Emotion”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13(3): 120–23.

• Winkielman, Piotr; Berridge, Kent C; and Wilbarger, Julia L. 2005; “Emotion, Behavior, and Conscious Experience: Once More without Feeling”, in Barrett, Niedenthal, and Winkielman 2005, pp. 335–62.

• Wise, 1982, “Neuroleptics and operant behavior: the anhedonia hypothesis”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5(1): 39–87. With peer commentaries. A case for the pleasure interpretation of activity in the midbrain dopamine projections. The bold interpretation is withdrawn in his 1994 and 1999, which give some reasons, but others still hold similar views and there seems to be at least some causal connection.

• Wise, Roy A., 1994, “A brief history of the anhedonia hypothesis”, in Appetite: Neural and Behavioral Bases, Charles R. Legg and David Booth (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243–63. A former leading advocate of the pleasure interpretation of the consequences of mesolimbic dopamine, in the 1980s, recants, with reasons, more of which may be found in his 1999.

• Wise, Roy A., 1999, “Cognitive factors in addiction and nucleus accumbens function: Some hints from rodent models”, Psychobiology, 27(2): 300–10. This journal issue has articles presenting various views on the functions of the mesolimbic dopamine system, none of which support the pleasure interpretation.

• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1968, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed., Oxford: Blackwell.

• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1980, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell. From his notebooks. Overlaps with material published as Zettel.

• Wolfsdorf, David, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

• Wundt, Wilhelm, 1896/1897, Grundriß der Psychologie, 1896, Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann; Trans. as Outlines of Psychology, Charles Hubbard Judd, trans., Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1897. Many libraries have reprint editions. Later editions and other writings of Wundt’s are compared with this first edition’s original presentation of the tridimensional view of affect (in its §7; Judd trans., pp. 74–89, especially pp. 82–85) in Titchener, 1908, ch. IV.

• Young, Paul Thomas, 1959, “The role of affective processes in learning and motivation”, Psychological Bulletin, 66: 104–25. Distinguishes hedonic from sensory intensity.

• Zajonc, Robert B., 1980, “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences”, American Psychologist, 35: 151–175.

• Zajonc, Robert B., 1984, “On the primacy of affect”, American Psychologist, 39: 117–124.

• Zajonc, Robert B., 1994, “Evidence for Nonconscious Emotions”, in The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, eds., New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 293–97. (This and the other short papers and the editors’ Afterword in the same section of this reader, Question 8: “Can Emotion Be Nonconscious?”, pp. 283–318, afford a mix of empirical and conceptual considerations. The term “nonconscious” is sometimes misleading in the work of Zajonc and his collaborators when what is clearly established in the experimental results referred to seems to be rather affect that is not firmly bound to an object when explicit awareness was earlier lacking either of the thing that fails to be the affect’s object or of its causing the affect. Cf. Zajonc 2000, pp. 47–48; Berridge and Winkielman 2003, pp. 185–86; Berridge 2002. Some phenomena Zajonc is concerned with seem to be only nonconscious causation, or conditioning, of future emotional memory or reactions. But Zajonc, whose major 1980s claim was about the independence of affect from (sophisticated) cognition, apparently wants to emphasize that point by calling this fast and automatic processing of stimuli without awareness of these or of their result “emotion”. Beyond this, it may be necessary to distinguish different uses of “nonconscious emotion”, corresponding to distinctions between phenomenal and cognitive concepts of consciousness made, for example, in Block 1995 and 2002. For an empirically-founded attempt to connect a related distinction to the neurobiology of the cingulate cortex, see Lane 2000, pp. 358–60. For perspectives on relevant observations, beyond those cited by Zajonc, see the discussion in Berridge 1999, 2004 and Shizgal 1999.

• Zajonc, Robert B., 1998, “Emotions”, in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2 vols., 4th ed., eds., Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, Boston: McGraw-Hill, Vol. 1, pp. 591–632. Good overall review of the evidence for the relative independence of affect systems from sophisticated cognition by an early advocate of this in an introduction to many aspects of the subject, including cultural influences and the differences these may make for affect.

• Zajonc, Robert B., 2000, “Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect”, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition, Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, pp. 31–58.

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Related Entries

Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | consciousness: and intentionality | consciousness: representational theories of | emotion | hedonism

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Ned Block, David Chalmers, and Daniel Stoljar for their suggestions during an earlier revision and to Arindam Chakrabarti and Arthur Stephen McGrade for the help acknowledged in notes 26 and 20, respectively.

Copyright © 2016 by Leonard D. Katz <[e-mail]>